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Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

That’s more a discussion for the other thread, but your observation is incorrect. We already have a fourth brigade (numbered 6) and it already has engineer and artillery regiments. The infantry an armoured units also already exist.
That's mixing apples and oranges. We have three manoeuvre brigades and one combat support brigade. 6 CCSB is not a deployable entity in its own right. On top of that you've moved most of its units out to other formations and repurposed some in a way that you will still be short PYs. 4 Fd(GS) is now an AD regiment in another brigade so there is no arty regt to convert to 3 RCHA. You've moved out 21 EW as well and the IA. Your missing an engineer support regiment for the Army because you've converted it to combat engineers. There is no service battalion to assign to the 6th and there is no HQ and signals squadron to assign to the 6th. While you've moved the RCD from the 2nd to the 6th, there is no longer a brigade recce/cavalry capability in the 2nd which limits its employability.

Long story short, you are compromising a very important combat support function in favour of creating four manoeuvre brigades which have no more actual combat power than the three that already exist.

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Some interesting thoughts.

You've seen my ideas upthread so I won't go into details but just make some general comments.

I firmly believe in restructuring most, but not all, ResF battalions into company size sub-units but letting them keep their geographic facilities and unit character. I don't believe in giving these aggregated battalions some neutral new name. Our units have history and heritage which should be retained even if it bends some noses out of joint. If the CScotR don't like being a company in the Seaforths then tough sh!t.

You've created a fourth RegF brigade group by creating a new RegF armoured regiment, artillery regiment, engineer regiment, service battalion and signals squadron. That's over 2,000 PYs that aren't there for that even at a 90/10 manning level; so one is forced to leave it at three brigade groups unless you are prepared to go to a 70/30 structure for most of those units. That requires a whole different equation.

I'm more and more of the view that all artillery, RegF and ResF, should be taken out of the brigades and brigade groups and concentrated in two artillery brigades for numerous reasons but principally for training and deployment augmentation reasons.

I'd also remove the service support groups from the divisions and restructure them into one or, more probably, two sustainment brigades and a signals brigade. The later would also get 21 EW Regt, the Int Regt, the Influence Activity and all the ResF sigs regts/sqdns

Similarly I'd take 4ESR into an engineer brigade with all the ResF engr regiments.

I'd leave the three RegF brigades with their infantry, armour/recce, an engineer squadron, a service battalion and a signals squadron.

I'd leave the four ResF Inf regiments with all their regional infantry and recce squadrons amalgamated into one recce regiment.

Finally, I'd reduce the divisions to two and allocate 3 Div 1 CMBG and what you call 30 and 40 CRG an artillery brigade and a sustainment brigade and the signals brigade while 2 Div gets 2 and 5 CMBG, 10 and 20 CRG an artillery brigade and a sustainment brigade.


Probably true but it depends very much as to what you call "ties". There's the tie that currently exists between 2 RCHA and 7 Tor, 11 Fd, 30 Fd 42 Fd, 49 fd, and 56 Fd and then there is the 30/70 battalion/regiment concept.

I don't think the paradigm will ever shift until you have a RegF CO with the responsibility, authority and resources to train his reservists. Everything else is blowing various densities of smoke up our collective butt holes.

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Sounds like you're proposing a 'bold' approach to an organization that is anything but ;)

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New paper, with yet another opinion on what to do with the reserves
.https://www.cgai.ca/rebuilding_the_reserve_force?twclid=2-1epqx1dccf07rt4vofgc9cbu6
 
New paper, with yet another opinion on what to do with the reserves
.https://www.cgai.ca/rebuilding_the_reserve_force?twclid=2-1epqx1dccf07rt4vofgc9cbu6

'Rebuilding' is an amusing concept given there wasn't much 'built' in the first place.

How about 'blowing it up and starting from scratch' ;)
 
New paper, with yet another opinion on what to do with the reserves
.https://www.cgai.ca/rebuilding_the_reserve_force?twclid=2-1epqx1dccf07rt4vofgc9cbu6
Champion got a good oversight of the issue when he wrote Relentless Struggle which was commissioned by Reserves 2000. While Reserves 2000 make many good points about what is wrong with the reserves, I tend to disagree with them as to the solutions. You do not solve the reserves' problem by removing them from the management of the Army, you solve it with a direct and precise defence policy paper and budget that tells the Army leadership exactly what they are to do so that there can be no misunderstanding (or flexibility for that matter).

The problem for most MNDs is that their lack of knowledge about the military in general and the influence of the senior RegF leadership results in reserves being a micro problem in a portfolio with numerous macro problems.

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Champion got a good oversight of the issue when he wrote Relentless Struggle which was commissioned by Reserves 2000. While Reserves 2000 make many good points about what is wrong with the reserves, I tend to disagree with them as to the solutions. You do not solve the reserves' problem by removing them from the management of the Army, you solve it with a direct and precise defence policy paper and budget that tells the Army leadership exactly what they are to do so that there can be no misunderstanding (or flexibility for that matter).

The problem for most MNDs is that their lack of knowledge about the military in general and the influence of the senior RegF leadership results in reserves being a micro problem in a portfolio with numerous macro problems.

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But qualified Majors/Coy/Sqn Commanders promoted to General, and qualified Warrant Officers/Pl/ Tp 2ICs promoted to CCWO equivalents, is a good thing though, isn't it? ;)
 
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But qualified Majors/Coy/Sqn Commanders promoted to General, and qualified Warrant Officers/Pl/ Sqn 2ICs promoted to CCWO equivalents, as is a good thing though, isn't it? ;)
I've yet to see how Reserves 2000 addresses the obvious issues with underqualified leadership amongst officers and NCMs.

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I've yet to see how Reserves 2000 addresses the obvious issues with underqualified leadership amongst officers and NCMs.

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It's the Elephant in the room familiar to many third world countries...

... the rulers can't cut off access to power to the 'inferior tribes' when you need their support at the political level to guarantee your (shaky) position.
 
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How many parade nights do you think you get for one RSM + CO trip to London ? Obviously meeting the threshold of “essential activity.”
 
Does the RCD receiving a Guidon from the GG also qualify as "essential activity"?

 
New paper, with yet another opinion on what to do with the reserves
.https://www.cgai.ca/rebuilding_the_reserve_force?twclid=2-1epqx1dccf07rt4vofgc9cbu6

What bothers me most about this article is those quote.
“So all they [the CAF] want from the PRes [the primary reserve, that is to say, the main reserve forces that train throughout the year] is to get people on full-time service without sustaining the Force”

They as if to imply the Reserves is a seperate entity. We hear it here too where the Army’s decisions are “the reg force wants” as opposed to the Army. The attitude that this is not a single team, but two entirely different organizations is flawed and creates a fundamental distrust.
 
Does the RCD receiving a Guidon from the GG also qualify as "essential activity"?

For my money no, but that just meant everyone dressed up fancy and the Govenor General drove a couple hours with some fabric. They all drew the same pay that month as normal.
 
What bothers me most about this article is those quote.
“So all they [the CAF] want from the PRes [the primary reserve, that is to say, the main reserve forces that train throughout the year] is to get people on full-time service without sustaining the Force”

They as if to imply the Reserves is a seperate entity. We hear it here too where the Army’s decisions are “the reg force wants” as opposed to the Army. The attitude that this is not a single team, but two entirely different organizations is flawed and creates a fundamental distrust.

Meanwhile, at the QOR's Officers' Mess ;)

end yes GIF
 
I’m sure the regiment as a whole will no doubt benefit from this incredibly important trip and the the training budget in no way shape or form could have used the money from flights, hotels, and TD in any more productive ways.

Unlike, for example, Vimy Ridge 2017 where the Reg F members were looked after but reservists in attendance had to pay their own way I believe?

I know one HCol, for example, who paid out of own pocket so that about 20 all ranks from his PRes unit could fly over and attend.
 
Unlike, for example, Vimy Ridge 2017 where the Reg F members were looked after but reservists in attendance had to pay their own way I believe?

I know one HCol, for example, who paid out of own pocket so that about 20 all ranks from his PRes unit could fly over and attend.
I know our association paid for ours to attend.
 
Unlike, for example, Vimy Ridge 2017 where the Reg F members were looked after but reservists in attendance had to pay their own way I believe?

I know one HCol, for example, who paid out of own pocket so that about 20 all ranks from his PRes unit could fly over and attend.

Okay, who controls that pay though? Is that the best use of tax dollars? The only people I know who were at Vimy for that were already in Europe on deployment. I believe the regimental funds paid for their stay. But the actual wage is a non issue obviously.

The gist of my sarcastic commentary here is that all up and down this thread you will find the chief complaint being a lack of training time / money for the reserve units. Which is obviously problematic. And obviously this is a single specific example, but when you have Lt Cols and CWOs attending conferences / ceremonies etc it eats the budget for no damned reason. Vimy is an important cultural touch stone, a new guidon is important to the whole unit ( especially when it’s done in their lines), a trip to get a picture with royalty is less so.
 
Okay, who controls that pay though? Is that the best use of tax dollars? The only people I know who were at Vimy for that were already in Europe on deployment. I believe the regimental funds paid for their stay. But the actual wage is a non issue obviously.

The gist of my sarcastic commentary here is that all up and down this thread you will find the chief complaint being a lack of training time / money for the reserve units. Which is obviously problematic. And obviously this is a single specific example, but when you have Lt Cols and CWOs attending conferences / ceremonies etc it eats the budget for no damned reason. Vimy is an important cultural touch stone, a new guidon is important to the whole unit ( especially when it’s done in their lines), a trip to get a picture with royalty is less so.
You could list a pile of things that could be better used on training. I’m pretty sure the QOR’s trip to London had zero effect on training or the money earmarked for it. Trips and conferences for a minuscule few are not the issue.

It’s not like they meet royalty every three years. I’d be curious how many times that unit has sent anyone to London in say, the last 50 years or so to meet their Col in Chief. I bet it’s pretty minimal.
 
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