Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[daftandbarmy]

We do love our interlocking, interwoven, and interjumbled organizational structures....so there's that.  [

But seriously, the reason we have TBGs is that the government directed that we establish them, though they never took the form of the 100 RegF and 300 PRes pers originally specified.  It would be interesting to follow the communications chain to see how that concept evolved. 

However, I will go the other way with this. One useful byproduct of the TBG system is that we created set of units that actually look like real units with crazy things like multiple sub-units, BHQs supported by Sigs Pls, and Admin Coys.  To me, that structure looks a lot more viable than our current "core" structure of 100+ embryonic units organized into 10 tiny CBGs.  Why would we reach into a PRes Svc Bn to generate an Admin Coy when we could just build an organic Admin Coy?  If that was our core structure, we could assign the TBG tasks to those units on a rotating basis (like the IRU), or maybe the DOMOPs task is just a standing task for all of the PRes battalions with a uniform level of readiness across the board.

What I would much prefer to see would be 12-15 PRes combined arms battalions organized into 3-5 Brigades. If we moved the BTLs into depots as others have suggested here, leaving only trained pers in the battalions, I see no reason why you couldn't/wouldn't consistently field a 400 pers unit for DOMOPS and CT if the "effective" strength of the unit was 8-900. 

Beyond that, I would be open to some dedicated CS and CSS units, but only after the integral capabilities in the core battalions were fully fleshed out.  For example, we would not consider re-establishing PRes Arty Regiments until the unit level organic capabilities (such as a Mortar Pl) were well established in the core battalions.  The same concept could equally be applied to Armd Recce, Engineers, Sigs, CSS, and even HSS if the Army could convince them to play along.  The guiding concept would be to build a robust capability from the ground up, and stop when we run out of troops, not a hollow one from the top down.

Well, if we want to simplify and allocate resources to our 'main effort' then I think they are eating some of our lunch right now, and making our focus fuzzy.

 

[RCPalmer]

Well, if we want to simplify and allocate resources to our 'main effort' then I think they are eating some of our lunch right now, and making our focus fuzzy.

Sorry, who's eating our lunch?  Its almost lunchtime in AB and I'm getting peckish  8)

 

[daftandbarmy]

Sorry, who's eating our lunch?  Its almost lunchtime in AB and I'm getting peckish  8)

Now you've got me thinking about steaks in downtown Calgary, curse you!

As you've noted, the DRCs don't come with a big bucket of new people and shiny toys, they leech off of our current, diminished and harried, resources. AKA 'Our Lunch'.

It seems like it's a nice little club though what with all the junkets, TD, photo ops, and big SUV rentals

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Now you've got me thinking about steaks in downtown Calgary, curse you!

You mean the ones raised humanely in the US  ???  [lol:

 

[RCPalmer]

Now you've got me thinking about steaks in downtown Calgary, curse you!

As you've noted, the DRCs don't come with a big bucket of new people and shiny toys, they leech off of our current, diminished and harried, resources. AKA 'Our Lunch'.

It seems like it's a nice little club though what with all the junkets, TD, photo ops, and big SUV rentals

The hardest part of living in Calgary is getting sick of steak...just kidding that doesn't happen  ;D

It seems like every location has implemented the TBG differently. Some establish separate structures and troops, others use it as their primary vehicle for delivering CT. 

For us, the tasks are farmed out to each unit.  For example, the Calg Highrs provide 2 x Pl and a DRC Coy HQ. 41 Sigs provides the Sigs Pl, and (because it is their turn in the rotation), the TBG Comd and staff.  In that way, 41 TBG is really just all of the operational elements in 41 CBG.  The downside of this approach is that it if taken seriously it is a lot of work for the lead unit for that year.  The upside is that it really prevents the empire building.  Fortunately, the (with the exception of the signalers) the TBG validation doesn't really reach below the sub-unit command teams. It is more of a leadership and time distraction for us than a resource distraction preventing us from training soldiers. 

 

[McG]

It seems like every location has implemented the TBG differently. Some establish separate structures and troops, others use it as their primary vehicle for delivering CT. 

I can't find any established TBG doing a quick search in DHRIM down to the unit level.  Is it that some brigades task units to fill elements of the TBG while other brigades expropriate positions from units to create the illusion of a dedicated organization, or is something else being done to make these things exist?

As you've noted, the DRCs don't come with a big bucket of new people and shiny toys, they leech off of our current, diminished and harried, resources.

But, are the TBGs a parasite on the backs of units or is the problem the extraneous unit HQs between the TBG and the necessary sub-units?

Right now, the generic PRes unit establishment is one mission sub-unit, one training sub-unit and (occasionally) a band all under a Bn/Regt HQ (you can check your own establishment on DHRIM and it will most likely fit this model).  Often times, the training sub-unit HQ is used to man a second mission sub-unit HQ in some healthier units or units with multiple parading locations.

One could put the RSS and Cl B positions into the mission sub-units then strip away everything less the mission sub-units.  Next, elevate these sub-units to unit status with majors as COs.  Create (and establish) a formation with an HQ that is structured like a Bn HQ (... let's call it a TBG HQ), and place all the Coy/Sqn/Bty units into the formation.  Use positions from the various training sub-units to create a territorial training group (or territorial depot).  Bands (where they exist) could continue to exist as a platoon of the mission Coys/Sqns, or they could be rolled together as platoons of a territorial band (or they could be shut-down and the positions harvested for riflemen).  Finally, any leftover positions are reinvested into the companies, squadrons, batteries and TBG HQ.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

Globemaster requires 3,000 feet with a 160,000 lbs load. Landing distance for a Herc (numbers vary) at a weight of 130,000 lbs is 2,300 feet, for the C-130E. I couldn't find landing specs for the C-130J.

Charlottetown Airport runways are 5- and 7,000 feet respectively, and it was announced just last month the second runway would get a 2,000 foot extension.

Ye Olde CFB Summerside has three runways (only two are - somewhat - maintained), the longest of which is 8,000ft. And Hercs have landed there a number of times, including last year's Air Show at the old base airport.

I'm not disputing some of your other points. Our lack of vehs is PRes-wide, not just affecting the Sigs in Brighton and PEIR. We can shake the tree as much as we like, and our COs can raise (polite) hell up the chain. Until someone higher realizes we are at a critical point CAF wide in terms of vehs and equipment, it's not going to be pretty when something "Day After Tomorrow" DOES happen.

Or, hell, we'll just show up in our pj's and wait for the civies to dig us out, too.

Don't get me wrong.  I know there is lots of willingness and desire; heck we used to plan for 'aid to the civil power' stuff *just in case*.  There was one time it did actually happen.  There was a murder in western Prince (Richmond area...) that they couldn't locate the person or body.  CAF assistance was requested - not 1 person from either Sqn was asked to 'assist' (it was primarily a Coy from 2RCR who came) in the ground search.  Never mind, exactly like you pointed out, local PRES types grew up, lived and resided in that area and knew the place and people like the back of their hand. 

Juan (OP Splinter, as it was called...);  I watched that one and the politics between DEUs and components play out. 

I get the loyalty, willingness, desire part.  There is a 'XVII' included in my 1/4 sleeve tattoo. 

 

[RCPalmer]

I can't find any established TBG doing a quick search in DHRIM down to the unit level.  Is it that some brigades task units to fill elements of the TBG while other brigades expropriate positions from units to create the illusion of a dedicated organization, or is something else being done to make these things exist?
But, are the TBGs a parasite on the backs of units or is the problem the extraneous unit HQs between the TBG and the necessary sub-units?

Right now, the generic PRes unit establishment is one mission sub-unit, one training sub-unit and (occasionally) a band all under a Bn/Regt HQ (you can check your own establishment on DHRIM and it will most likely fit this model).  Often times, the training sub-unit HQ is used to man a second mission sub-unit HQ in some healthier units or units with multiple parading locations.

One could put the RSS and Cl B positions into the mission sub-units then strip away everything less the mission sub-units.  Next, elevate these sub-units to unit status with majors as COs.  Create (and establish) a formation with an HQ that is structured like a Bn HQ (... let's call it a TBG HQ), and place all the Coy/Sqn/Bty units into the formation.  Use positions from the various training sub-units to create a territorial training group (or territorial depot).  Bands (where they exist) could continue to exist as a platoon of the mission Coys/Sqns, or they could be rolled together as platoons of a territorial band (or they could be shut-down and the positions harvested for riflemen).  Finally, any leftover positions are reinvested into the companies, squadrons, batteries and TBG HQ.

I can only speak from perspective of a unit level Ops O and Coy OC (so I don't know all of the backroom stuff), but in 41 CBG it was all CFTPO tasks to units, and all of the pers would remain on the unit's manning reports. For a while we only populated the positions based on our tasks down to the MCpl level on an ongoing basis, but I think there was a move afoot to force units to continuously populate every position.  Either way, once a DOMOP started, the CFTPPO build would be updated to reflect who actually showed up. 

I think we are of the same mind with regards to the nuts and bolts of restructuring.  What was your rationale in making each company a CF unit with its own CO, UIC, etc. instead of a sub-unit of a TBG/Bn with an OC?

I would also offer that we would likely still need a few (3-5) CBG HQs to address span of control matters. 

 

[McG]

I think we are of the same mind with regards to the nuts and bolts of restructuring.  What was your rationale in making each company a CF unit with its own CO, UIC, etc. instead of a sub-unit of a TBG/Bn with an OC?

There is a lot of responsibility that comes with being a CO, and the position is specifically empowered in the NDA and QR&O.  I think there is value in keeping that local.  A CO does not need to be a LCol, and there are examples across the CAF of minor units established with COs that are majors (and even a few with captain COs).

 

[RCPalmer]

There is a lot of responsibility that comes with being a CO, and the position is specifically empowered in the NDA and QR&O.  I think there is value in keeping that local.  A CO does not need to be a LCol, and there are examples across the CAF of minor units established with COs that are majors (and even a few with captain COs).

Absolutely.  I see your point.  The counterpoint to consider is authority and responsibility often also brings with it a significant time commitment. In the current construct, even with full-time staff support, a CO needs to parade around 100 days a year to be effective (and I realize that is because we try to try to apply a RegF administrative model to the PRes).  I see no reason why a Maj or Capt couldn't be a CO, but I would rather have them focus on training their soldiers instead of worrying about the budget, acting as the IA on grievances, stickhandling AR(MEL) matters, etc. 

 

[MilEME09]

There is a lot of responsibility that comes with being a CO, and the position is specifically empowered in the NDA and QR&O.  I think there is value in keeping that local.  A CO does not need to be a LCol, and there are examples across the CAF of minor units established with COs that are majors (and even a few with captain COs).

One would think the rank would scale to the size of an organization, a smaller PRes unit would maybe have a CO who is a captain, but then after a few years their membership adds a second Coy maybe so making that CO a major would then be warrented, not say have a LCol for 120 reservists

 

[daftandbarmy]

IMHO the TBG is primarily a Domops 'task' that can be assigned to units to lead on a rotational basis in an annual set of orders from the Bde Comd. Call it what it is: a Domops Response Lead Unit Tasking.

A few extra resources and Bde assets can be realigned to help out the lead unit, you know, like we practice all the time (I hope) already in other parts of our business. Sigs and Log orgs are already really good at figuring out how to realign to major units to make this work.

It doesn't need to add all the complexity of CFTPO tasking and all the other administrivia that accrues to these politically driven shadow units, does it?

Really, I'm no expert, so help me out here.

 

[RCPalmer]

IMHO the TBG is primarily a Domops 'task' that can be assigned to units to lead on a rotational basis in an annual set of orders from the Bde Comd. Call it what it is: a Domops Response Lead Unit Tasking.

A few extra resources and Bde assets can be realigned to help out the lead unit, you know, like we practice all the time (I hope) already in other parts of our business. Sigs and Log orgs are already really good at figuring out how to realign to major units to make this work.

It doesn't need to add all the complexity of CFTPO tasking and all the other administrivia that accrues to these politically driven shadow units, does it?

Really, I'm no expert, so help me out here.

We can always make it work, it just isn't very efficient.

My point is that we don't really need 2 structures at all, and that if we are going to ditch a structure, it should be the less functional one, which in my opinion is the completely unsustainable 110 unit/10 CBG model we currently have.  If we were permanently organized into real battalions with the host of capabilities that should organically reside in a battalion (which might look a lot like TBGs) we would be in a much better position for CT and DOMOP. 

 

[Colin Parkinson]

One option for some Pres armour units would to be driver/crew commanders for APC. You could build a basic or training APC off a commercial truck chassis, even using soft steel and pres armour would maintain and provide vehicle and crew to support the infantry. For the time being could start with trucks with a hatch and gun ring to start practicing the techniques. Hell I bet the US be happy to sell us cheaply a whole bunch MRAPs  [
For the button and bows brigade their is even historical use of armour to provide infantry transport that they can make a fuss about.

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

Beyond that, I would be open to some dedicated CS and CSS units, but only after the integral capabilities in the core battalions were fully fleshed out.  For example, we would not consider re-establishing PRes Arty Regiments until the unit level organic capabilities (such as a Mortar Pl) were well established in the core battalions.  The same concept could equally be applied to Armd Recce, Engineers, Sigs, CSS, and even HSS if the Army could convince them to play along.  The guiding concept would be to build a robust capability from the ground up, and stop when we run out of troops, not a hollow one from the top down.

Mortar platoons? Those don't even exist in regular force infantry battalions.... If there is no means of calling out the so called "core battalions" than what purpose does having it fully fleshed out if it can't deploy and only needs to do one for one augmentation of the reg force? Why do we need 10 CBGs worth of "core battalions" to provide one for one augmentation for 9 regular battalions?

 

[Eye In The Sky]

One option for some Pres armour units would to be driver/crew commanders for APC. You could build a basic or training APC off a commercial truck chassis, even using soft steel and pres armour would maintain and provide vehicle and crew to support the infantry. For the time being could start with trucks with a hatch and gun ring to start practicing the techniques. Hell I bet the US be happy to sell us cheaply a whole bunch MRAPs  [
For the button and bows brigade their is even historical use of armour to provide infantry transport that they can make a fuss about.

And, in my opinion, a fairly shittty mud recce veh.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I was thinking more of APC's that move the infantry around and practice some of the techniques, sort of a Saxon like vehicle.

 

[RCPalmer]

I was thinking more of APC's that move the infantry around and practice some of the techniques, sort of a Saxon like vehicle.

Yep, the Aussies have wholesale converted their Army Reserve Armored Recce units to Bushmaster APV crew units.  In many ways, the Bushmaster would have been a good TAPV alternative.  Decent mobility and protection with the ability to carry a full infantry section:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bushmaster_Protected_Mobility_Vehicle

It wouldn't have been a particularly good recce vehicle, but probably no worse than TAPV. 

From a doctrinal standpoint, this dovetails quite nicely with the ACR concept they employ in their regular army.  All of the Infantry battalions are light, but each brigade maintains an ACR which includes about a battalion's worth of LAV and M113 based lift mannned by armored crewmen.

 

[RCPalmer]

Mortar platoons? Those don't even exist in regular force infantry battalions.... If there is no means of calling out the so called "core battalions" than what purpose does having it fully fleshed out if it can't deploy and only needs to do one for one augmentation of the reg force? Why do we need 10 CBGs worth of "core battalions" to provide one for one augmentation for 9 regular battalions?

Except that the 81mm conversion has already started, and will only accelerate as the C3 fleet dies out.  Are you saying that we can't generate a dozen mortar platoons out of the strength of 20+ PRes Arty regiments and independent batteries?  The Australian Army Reserve has already converted all of their Arty units to mortar platoons for virtually the same reasons we would. The lack of a gun for the PRes to train on will also have implications for individual augmentation of RegF Arty batteries, so I think that this is a good role, and quite realistic given current realities.

You keep stating that the only role of the PRes is 1 to 1 augmentation of the RegF, but repetition doesn't make it any more true. That statement is incorrect in terms of the experience of the last 20 years which includes multiple Pl and Coy level reserve deployments in expeditionary operations, and several Bn/TF level deployments in domestic operations.  It is also incorrect with regards to the Army's Force Employment Concept, manifested most recently in Waypoint 2018, which solidifies the role of Bn sized PRes elements for DOMOPS and up to company level for expeditionary ops. 

If the PRes is going to train above IBTS, and our mandate requires that we do, we need units to train in. To train at Pl level we need a Coy HQ , and to train at Coy level we need a Bn HQ, etc. All I am advocating is that we move away from our current unsustainable model of 120+ hollow PRes battalions and 10 small CBGs to 12-15 real PRes battalions in 3-5 CBGs.  This would allow us to reinvest a considerable portion of our existing institutional overhead in real capabilities that would be of benefit to the individual augmentation mandate as much as the others. 

An element of mandatory service would have a lot of advantages, but unless the government makes the call we aren't going to get it.  Are you saying that we shouldn't bother making any reforms within the (surprisingly successful) volunteer model we do have?

 

[daftandbarmy]

An element of mandatory service would have a lot of advantages, but unless the government makes the call we aren't going to get it.  Are you saying that we shouldn't bother making any reforms within the (surprisingly successful) volunteer model we do have?

If we fix it so that it doesn't take a year for a soldier to join a part time outfit, as I have seen happen more than once, that would be the kind of transformation we should start with IMHO