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CRINK - The Rise of Eurasia

Kirkhill

Puggled and Wabbit Scot.
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Oceania awakes and Eurasia takes notice.


An increasing number of highly respected analysts note the tighter coordination among Russia (America’s acute challenge), China (America’s pacing challenge), North Korea, and Iran. These countries share an aversion to the international system organized and maintained by the United States and her allies. They also share a determination to achieve national goals that do not comply with expected international norms about the use of force in international politics to change boundaries and respect for sovereignty.

The authors' sense is that from the Chinese perspective the match has already started and that delay only really serves Oceania.

The Threat Perspective

Appreciating the risks of a protracted conflict first requires an understanding of the perspective of threat actors. Insofar as China is considered our pacing challenge, its outlook is particularly instructive. It is commonly held that China’s leaders today respect American military and technological capabilities. They do not appear to be confident of victory in any scenario, but these anxieties should not reassure us. They appear to take US alliance and defense buildup plans quite seriously. From their point of view, the American-led enemy mobilization has already begun.

From Beijing’s perspective, there might be several reasons to seriously consider taking what seem to be necessary actions sooner rather than later. China may not fear that such actions will cause a geopolitical break with the United States and the West, for example, because Beijing perceives this break to have already occurred. Chinese leaders see America already energetically organizing, with some effect, a global coalition to impose containment and strategic decoupling through technology and trade controls. They believe that for now, in this wartime environment, European governments are deferring to the Americans, though many Chinese leaders disagree.

Chinese leaders and strategists might also see that Americans and Europeans feel economically and financially fragile, fearful of initiating a conflict that will immediately trigger a potentially apocalyptic global economic and financial crisis. And if there is such a storm, Chinese leaders may believe they are better able to weather it. They have already been helping to establish a parallel global trading system to accommodate Russia, Iran, North Korea, and other targets of American sanctions.

And, of course, they cannot help but note that the Ukraine crisis has shocked America into trying much harder to ramp up its defense industrial base. This is a worrying development for China. Beijing is concerned that America might significantly enhance its capacity to produce weapons and other materiel, including long- or mid-range standoff precision munitions. But it will take some time for the Americans to do this, and even an extra year or two may make a difference. US rapid development and fielding initiatives are another source of concern to China as an important component of strategic competition—or even the initial stages of a conflict. Major investments in AI-related endeavors, programs like the Replicator initiative, and other innovations may well be seen as threats from a Chinese perspective.

Further, Japan is rearming and developing capabilities to operate beyond its own territory, which could have huge consequences in the Indo-Pacific, but this too will take time. To Chinese leaders, the Japanese turn may seem particularly ominous. Japan has also overcome historical grievances that have blocked close military and intelligence cooperation with South Korea. The recent activation of a new US three-star headquarters in Japan is likely to be regarded as a significant step toward increased capability for America and its regional allies and partners.

China has also watched as its American rivals now have a huge backlog of approved arms sales to Taiwan, but much of this has not been delivered. Chinese leaders will prefer that none of it ever is. The Americans have successfully negotiated for base access in the Philippines, but they are not yet ready to use these bases. And the Americans are orchestrating new military construction as well as multinational efforts and exercises with individual allies like Japan and South Korea and through multilateral mechanisms like the AUKUS partnership and the Quad. The concerted efforts of the United States to work more closely with nations across the region is also regarded as inimical to Chinese interests.

In other words, deterrence has failed.


Which, in turn, leads to this:


....

The US, like most of Oceania, is carrying a lot of debt. Financing a protracted war would put an economic burden on the US that it may or may not be able to carry. But, even if it could carry it on its own it would be economically disadvantaged compared to the rest of Oceania sheltering under its umbrella.

The US, with or without Trump, needs the rest of Oceania to pony up and carry its share of the load, to take on the same debt levels if necessary.
 
Another provocative article -


It resonates with me. Putin lives like a Tsar and he fights like a Tsar. He has chewed through his own Buryats and his own shells and is now forced to buy both from North Korea, along with UAVs from Iran and tires from China. The lack of Quality Control, especially in shells doesn't really matter when his guns shot the lands from their barrels months, if not decades, ago.

But accuracy and dud rates don't really matter if you are launching against grid squares for psychological effect.
 
Another provocative article -


It resonates with me. Putin lives like a Tsar and he fights like a Tsar. He has chewed through his own Buryats and his own shells and is now forced to buy both from North Korea, along with UAVs from Iran and tires from China. The lack of Quality Control, especially in shells doesn't really matter when his guns shot the lands from their barrels months, if not decades, ago.

But accuracy and dud rates don't really matter if you are launching against grid squares for psychological effect.
The article misses that NK mobilized 1/2M soldiers for possible deployment to Ukraine for Russian. The 10-12k there now is just the start. NK is quite willing to send more than 1/2m as it’s a win win for them regardless of the losses, because that article also misses what Russia is giving NK, Nuclear Weapon engineering assistance.

Russia may be getting weaker, but it is pushing on Ukraine still, and unlike Russias allies who are heartily supporting Russia, we in the West aren’t going the distance for Ukraine...
 
The article misses that NK mobilized 1/2M soldiers for possible deployment to Ukraine for Russian. The 10-12k there now is just the start. NK is quite willing to send more than 1/2m as it’s a win win for them regardless of the losses, because that article also misses what Russia is giving NK, Nuclear Weapon engineering assistance.

Russia may be getting weaker, but it is pushing on Ukraine still, and unlike Russias allies who are heartily supporting Russia, we in the West aren’t going the distance for Ukraine...

You're not wrong on the West.

But part of the West's problem is a failure to appreciate the role of Potemkin in Russian strategic thought. We laugh at Potemkin. They revere him.

Russia is a lot weaker than the West perceives.
 
The Economist weighs in on NK's aid to Russia:

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Europe | Blood brothers

North Korea is sending thousands of soldiers to help Vladimir Putin​

It shows how far Russia has fallen as a strategic power​

Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, declared last week that North Korea is sending troops to Russia, in effect joining the invasion as a co-combatant. The appearance of one of the world’s most erratic and heavily-armed nations in the fight might test even the best-resourced and well-rested of defences. After 32 months of grinding war against a much larger enemy, Ukraine’s are neither.

The Ukrainian claims, later backed up by South Korea, are that North Korea’s dictator, Kim Jong Un, has decided to commit at least 11,000 troops to the war. General Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, says the forces are undergoing training at four ranges in and around the Khabarovsk region in the Russian far east. He says deployment includes at least 500 officers and three full generals. According to Mr Budanov, a contingent of 2,600 is due to be transferred to battle in the Russian region of Kursk by the end of October. A senior nato official told The Economist that he could not confirm the reports, adding the alliance was yet to see signs of “large-scale” movements towards the front.

If the Ukrainian claims turn out to be true, it would not represent the first time North Korea has come to Russia’s assistance in the war. The dictatorship is already a big supplier of arms to Russia. According to Mr Budanov, shipments that began as long ago as in late 2022 have reached 2.8m shells a year, just 100,000 short of Russia’s own annual production at 2.9m shells. Since late 2023 North Korea has also transferred a number of ballistic missiles, with launch systems serviced by North Korean crews. Pulled mostly from old stock, the battlefield performance of these missiles has been erratic. They regularly overshoot military targets to wreak havoc on Ukrainian towns and cities.

North Korea is not donating its men or weapons out of charity. The enhanced co-operation stems from a mutual assistance treaty, signed by Vladimir Putin and Mr Kim during a fawning dictators’ ceremony in Pyongyang in June 2024. Mr Budanov describes the secret provisions of the agreement as a quid pro quo: Russian hard cash and know-how in return for Korean men and missiles. Russia is helping North Korea circumvent sanctions and “strengthen” its nuclear capabilities. In particular, he says, it is transferring some technologies for low-yield tactical nuclear weapons and submarine missile-launch systems. However, there is no independent corroboration of this alarming claim.

John Foreman, who paid close attention to North Korea in his role as British defence attaché to Russia in 2019-2022, says Russian attempts to strengthen the military relationship predates invasion. But he interprets the latest developments as a sign of Russian desperation, a reflection of just how far the self-appointed “world’s second army” has fallen as a strategic power. “Russia used to look down on North Korea as a pygmy state,” he says. It was the great power “with Tchaikovsky and Chekhov and ballet…not some bloke with ill-fitting suits in love with artillery and killing people.”

But if the partnership is indeed a sign of Russian weakness, it is not yet pronounced or immediate enough for Ukraine. On the battlefield, things are still looking grim. Russia is making significant progress pressing simultaneously at several points along the 1,000km frontline, despite staggeringly high casualty numbers that have now surpassed 600,000 dead and wounded, on American estimates. Russia is in the process of encircling Pokrovsk, an important logistical hub in eastern Ukraine, and advancing farther south, after taking control of the heights around Vuhledar.

A senior Ukrainian official says Russia’s next objective might be an advance on the city of Zaporizhia, a major industrial centre in Ukraine’s south close to a Russian-occupied nuclear-power plant. The same source suggests that Russia may have already taken back as much as half of the territory that Ukraine seized in the Kursk region in August 2024, Ukraine’s only significant advance since its failed counter-offensive in 2023.

Ukraine’s worries go beyond the shaky front lines. Western support, already stretched thin, is looking more precarious than before. This week the g7 further fleshed out the details of a loan of $50bn, to be paid for by interest on seized Russian assets; final agreement should be reached in the next few days. But if Donald Trump wins America’s election, now two weeks away, much of its direct military assistance could be choked off. A victory by Kamala Harris offers no promises either. Germany, Ukraine’s second-biggest backer, has already signalled that aid will fall. France has done likewise.

Meanwhile Russia is busy internationalising the war. Last week Andrei Belousov, the Russian defence minister, met officials in China for talks on strengthening military co-operation. Iran continues to supply Russia with drones, though its long-promised ballistic missiles have not appeared so far. The North Korean relationship is growing in strength. “We have partners, they have allies,” grumbles Mr Budanov. Ukraine is already neck-deep in a world war, he warns. “Just like the early days of the second world war, not everyone sees it yet.”

Ukraine is keen to use North Korean involvement to boost its own diplomatic efforts. “In such circumstances, our relations with partners need further development,” Mr Zelensky said on October 13th. Three days later, the Ukrainian president published his five-point “Victory Plan,” previously presented in private to American officials. The key points are proposals that Ukraine should receive an invitation to nato; a bigger arsenal of weapons; and something described as “non-nuclear deterrence”—essentially a large number of long-range missiles that could take out key logistical and military targets in Russia.

A senior Ukrainian official, who asked to remain anonymous, says the package should be interpreted as “coercive diplomacy”, or a way to get Russia to negotiate peace on more favourable terms. But the same official was also frank: its escalatory potential had not been well received in Washington. “They say it’s a non-starter, though part of the problem is they don’t tell the [Ukrainian] president that to his face.”

Russia, in contrast, is not overly concerned about its own escalation plans. How untested North Korean troops will fare on the European battlefield is still an open question. They have not yet been exposed to the realities of a modern war, now dominated by cheap, deadly tactical strike drones. It will take them a few weeks to adjust—if they last that long. But for Mr Budanov, the development is an “unwelcome experiment”. Russian soldiers are one thing, the spy chief says, with the vast bulk of them unmotivated and resigned to their fate. The North Koreans, on the other hand, come with a pre-programmed ideology. They have families back home that could be executed if things do not go well. “They fix some problems for the Russians. There is reason to be concerned.” ■

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The key element is "if the reports are true." The source is Ukraine and it could be propaganda to stir up support in the West.
 
NK troop movements and intent has been disclosed by other Western Intelligence and Government personnel.

The cynic in me figures that this is a cheap solution for Kim Jong Un to get Russian missile and nuclear assistance.
He has food problems, and a 900k regular army, and 7.6M reserve force --potentially losing a few hundred K or even a 1-2 million isn't a bug for him, it is a feature.
 
Kirby’s briefing suggested that as long as Nk troops stay out of combat, the US will not release long range missiles to attack them.
 
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