- Reaction score
- 1,300
- Points
- 1,040
Found this on USENET. Very interesting assessment:
-- A Preliminary Military Assessment of the Lebanon Conflict
http://tinyurl.com/h4hsp
(Source: defense-aerospace.com; posted Aug. 18, 2006) (Edited for style)
(© Ben Moores)
This article explains how the war was fought, looks at key military
applications and technological successes and failures, examines the main
battles and offensives, Hezbollah's campaign achievements and how the
Israeli military lost the opening battles yet recovered. Finally the article
looks at the hard questions that both militaries will have to answer and the
military equipment programs that are now required.
Israel Air Force Performance
The Israeli Air Force (IAF) has come in for considerable criticism during
the conflict. The majority of this has been more in relation to the
strategic use of the Air Force as opposed to its actual tactical utility.
However, the IAF tactical utility, for so long unquestioned in Israel, needs
to be examined.
Despite having excellent ISTAR and a formidably short kill chain the IAF,
primarily through the use of F-15s, F-16s (using JDAM and Paveway bombs) and
armed UAVs, was unable to interdict the small pockets of rocket firings from
the border area into Northern Israel. After 16 days of aerial bombardment
Hezbollah was still quite capable of sustaining a barrage of 100 or more
rocket firings against Israel, despite thousands of combat sorties by the
IAF. Hezbollah is estimated to have some 1,250 launchers of all types of
which about 300 were destroyed (or 25%). This IAF operational failure caused
the IDF to mount a full blown invasion of the region to reduce Hizbollahs
capability.
The IAF did have some successes in destroying some protected C2 nodes,
re-supply convoys and larger long range missile launchers; indeed it appears
the majority of 220mm and Fajr-3 & 5's were subsequently destroyed after
being deployed.
However, the IAF claims of destroying two-thirds of all Hezbollah long range
launchers should be closely examined. This is because numerous dummy missile
firing sites with fake heat signatures were targeted during the course of
the campaign. Furthermore is has been claimed by various Israeli sources
that Hezbollah has retained a battery or more of either Zelzal-2 range or
Nazeat 10-H (210 and 140 km range respectively).
The IAF didn't seem capable of degrading the capability of Hezbollah's
Command and control or communications network. Whilst some 23 tons of bombs
were dropped on an underground command bunker in Dahiya in south Beirut on
July 19, it is clear from the sudden self imposed silencing of the launchers
by Hezbollah for the July 31 ceasefire that its command and control, and
communications network was still in place. Indeed immediately after the
ceasefire front line units resumed pre-planned and co-ordinated firings.
UAV Applications
This conflict was the first to have both sides make use of offensive UAVs.
Both sides actually made extensive use of Offensive UAVs during the
conflict. UCAVs, (specifically IAI's Heron), were seen to be repeatedly
engaging targets with Spike and Hellfire missiles. It is understood that a
strike was carried out against Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon on the 31st of
July. It could well be that the platform used was Elbit's Hermes 450 or IAI
Searcher II UAVs. This seems unlikely as based on information available it
is known that both the Hermes 450 and Searcher II platforms were heavily
engaged on ISTAR missions. Iranian UAVs were repeatedly used by Hezbollah
and the IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps) but were unable to repeat
the success that they achieved earlier in the year; this is further
discussed in detail below.
Perhaps what is most interesting about this conflict is the lack of
excitement about the use of UAVs. The wide spread use of ISTAR platforms by
Israel hasn't been a focus of attention, no Sunday newspaper features on the
use of "Robot weapons from the future" tells us they have become mainstream.
Air Defence Performance
Hezbollah and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) forces only managed
to shoot down one air platform during the conflict. They shot down a CH-53
with an anti-tank missile. Reports of an Israeli F-16 being shot down on the
17th of July were established to be a partial rocket ignition caused by
strikes on a Zelzal rocket launcher. Hezbollah may have had some MANPADS in
their inventory but there were no confirmed reports of substantial use. With
the IAF able to strike from 15,000 feet and without a high altitude air
defence system there was nothing that Hezbollah could do.
Syrian Air Defences did much better. On the 29th of July they managed to
shoot down an Israeli Heron UAV that was attempting to "paint" Syrian
re-supply convoys. After a couple of decades of air defence ineptitude the
Syrians can congratulate themselves; although this did not stop IAF
performing low pass flights over Syrian Presidential Palaces as a reminder
of their military capabilities. Three other Israeli air platforms were lost,
two AH-64a's to a collision and a AH-64D to what seems to be Israeli
artillery fire.
These small losses confirm that Hezbollah and the IRGC (Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps) were unable to interdict the massed Israeli
heliborne advances in the past week or even deter strike or reconnaissance
operations. Considering that Iran deployed a number of high-prestige weapon
systems into southern Lebanon it can be assumed that they also deployed its
most effective air defence systems. This poor performance would put pressure
on Iran to procure S-300s and M1-Tors because it seems to confirm their
indigenous and Chinese-supplied air defence systems are ineffective against
[Israeli] airborne electronic warfare [equipment]. When these systems might
be delivered is unknown as Rosoboronexport recently confirmed that any
future orders for S-300s could only be delivered from 2011 onwards, due to a
huge backlog and a lack of qualified technicians.
Israeli air defences would appear to be relatively competent against
airborne platforms. Earlier this year Hezbollah was twice able to make
return flights with an Iranian Mirsad UAV (or maybe an Iran Aircraft
Manufacturing Industries (HESA) Ababil-3) into Israeli airspace. However,
during this conflict Iran was unable to repeat this earlier success. Three
Hezbollah UAVs were shot down by IAF Python V air-to-air missiles whilst
attempting to enter Israeli airspace. Two of these UAVs, according to some
sources, were carrying bomb loads. It would appear that all attempts to
cross the border were at night-time, suggesting that Iran has added an
infrared application modification to the standard television camera.
Israeli air defences seemed to be less capable against rocket and missile
fire. Despite large-scale investments none of the three key air defence
systems (MTHEL, Arrow & PAC-2) engaged targets, although that is arguably
because Hezbollah decided not to strike at Tel Aviv. It seems that MTHEL was
not deployed, which is worth noting, as it was specifically designed to
counter exactly the low altitude strategic rocket threat. It is understood
that the number of batteries needed to meet the threat and operational cost
made deployment cost-prohibitive.
The Rocket Campaign
Before the conflict started Hezbollah was armed with some 12,000 rockets
supplied by Iran and Syria. Some 10,000 of these were the Iranian 107 mm and
122mm rockets which have a range of less than 20km. Syria supplied a limited
number of 220mm rockets with the longer 30km range. Iranian Fajar-3 and
Fajar-5 rockets used from the second week of the war onwards (43 and 75 km
range respectively) had not been used against Israel before and caused
proportionately more damage and casualties than the 107mm and 122mm rockets.
The effectiveness of the Hezbollah rocket campaign against Israeli civilian
targets is fairly difficult to quantify, except in terms of absolute
casualties. Whilst some 4,000 rockets were fired they managed to cause only
a limited number of casualties. In comparison, Iraq's blitz of Teheran in
the final year of the Iran-Iraq war, using fewer Scuds, caused much higher
casualties and disruption. Indeed, more casualties were caused by Iraq's
pre-emptive Scud bombardment prior to Operation Desert Shield.
It was widely reported that Israel seemed incapable of stopping rocket
attacks. But upon closer examination it is clear that certain strategy
dynamics employed by Hezbollah changed over the campaign. At the beginning
of the campaign Hezbollah was merely countering IAF strikes with short range
rockets, as part of a "tit-for-tat" strategy. By the second week of the war
Hezbollah was using the long range Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rockets in order to
place political pressure on Israel. By the final week of the campaign, with
its forces being surrounded and with Israel not responding to cease fire
initiatives, Hezbollah was forced into committing whatever rockets it had
remaining in forward areas. So, it appeared that Hezbollah was escalating
their campaign, with the Israelis unable to prevent them, but it was
actually the opposite. Hezbollah's escalation was simply an attempt to gain
some utility from stocks that were out flanked.
Ground Operations
The performance of the opposing ground forces is difficult to rate because
of the different strategies that were used in the different stages of the
war. A review of events is followed by analysis of the operations.
The first significant battle was at Bent Jbail which began on July 24 and
finished on the August 1. Skirmishes continued through to the 8th of August
presumably as pockets of infantry were flushed out or attempted to
manoeuvre. The initial fighting was characterized by Israeli forces
struggling to fight their way into fortified positions with small teams of
infantry and penny packets of tanks. Bent Jbail was manned with some 200
skilled ATGM (Anti-tank guided missile) operators and fighters. They had
large stocks of forward placed rockets and knew exactly where to hit even
Merkava MK4's. These early engagements allowed Hezbollah to focus their
forces against the IDF. This concentration of forces gave them an unexpected
firepower and combat capability; with them able to kill over 15 IDF
soldiers. Parallel with operations at Bent Jbail was the Battle of Maroun
al-Ras where three Merkava's were penetrated between July 19 and July 22.
The inability of the IDF to win decisively at Bint Jbeil, combined with the
failure of airpower to rein in Hezbollah rocket strikes, forced the Israeli
government to commit significant forces to a full scale invasion of Lebanon,
abandoning its cross-border raids and air power demonstration strategy in
the process.
The IDF quickly reacted to these events with some 15,000 reservists being
called up on July 28 and by July 31. Five brigades struck North East into
Lebanon blocking off the Syrian border to the region and placing the army in
a position to move to the Litani river. This drive also cut off Hezbollah
forces operating south of this point. By August 1 there was heavy fighting
at Aita el-Shaab, Al Adisa, Kfar Kila and Taibe with further fighting in the
north at Marjayoun. For the next five days the battles of Aita el-Shaab and
Taibe continued with Israeli forces suffering significant armoured losses at
Taibe on August 5 and August 6.
By August 9 the IDF was at least nine miles into Lebanon. A slow advance
across the length of the southern border began with fighting being renewed
at Bent Jbail Aita-el-Shaab and Dibel as the IDF attempted to clear out
enemy fighters. On August 10 Marajaoun fell, allowing Israeli forces to move
north up to the Litani river. It would appear that this obligated Hezbollah
forces to maneuver and fierce fighting erupted the length of the frontline.
Later than night airborne forces moved on to the Litani river line with the
largest Israeli military airlift in 30 years.
By August 13 Israel had all but surrounded remaining Hezbollah forces in
southern Lebanon. Knowing that ceasefire lines always follow the final
frontline both sides spent the final day of the war heavily engaged in what
was the bloodiest day of the conflict. The IDF lost 24 dead in a number of
different engagements with around 100 or more casualties. Hezbollah
casualties are unknown but can be presumed to be equal or higher as their
earlier advantages of local knowledge, surprise, prepared positions and
superior local firepower were now lost.
Thus there are three distinct phases of the campaign. The first stage it is
arguable that the strategy and tactics let down the IDF. With limited
resources and operational scope against a well prepared and motivated
opposition the IDF struggled, particularly at Maroun al-Ras and Bent Jbail.
The second phase is the move to bypass Hezbollah positions and maneuver to
the north East through Marajaoun. This second phase confirmed that the
Israeli reserve call up system is as sharp as ever with large numbers of
reservists being called up and quickly deployed into operations. There is a
clear failure to effectively finish off Hezbollah force concentrations in
the border region, leading to further conflict and rocket attacks. The third
phase is an operational and strategic success for Israel as they managed to
maneuver around Hezbollah and give them no further advantage in continuing
the fight.
Observations on the ground campaign
Hezbollah proved that they had mastered positional warfare, absorbed modern
weapon systems and had the organization and morale to withstand being
surrounded and overrun. Hezbollah will have lost many of their best units
and weapon systems during this conflict but enough have survived to rebuild
again. Furthermore Iran will quickly move to re-supply Hezbollah with more
of "what worked" and less of "what didn't". Given a breathing space
Hezbollah ought to come out of this conflict technically more capable and
with veteran cadres.
The high casualty rates suffered by Hezbollah can be traced to the second
week of operations when Hezbollah failed to appreciate that the operational
tempo had increased. Nor does it appear that they were prepared for this or
able to change as Hezbollah were seen adding finishing touches to bunkers
and sowing mines rather than falling back. Although it could be argued they
had no plans to fallback And the troops had no interest in falling back to
fight another day.
Israeli heavy armoured forces seem to have suffered a series of setbacks
with some 30 tanks damaged, although only 10 appear to have been either
badly damaged or destroyed. Most of these casualties were caused by long
range man-portable anti tank missiles such as the Kornet-E 9P133, Metis-M
9M131, the 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 'Spandrel') and the 9K111 Fagot (AT-4
'Spigot'). It is understood that over 500 missiles were fired with around 50
hits on Israeli armoured vehicles. This was clearly been a surprise to
Israeli commanders, who committed penny packet armoured forces in unsuitable
roles. With tank crewmen taking half of IDF casualties it will act as an
early warning to the Israeli military that even their powerfully armoured
Merkavas are vulnerable.
Israeli special forces launched two known large scale raids. August 2 saw a
large airborne raid on the Hezbollah stronghold of Baalbek some 62 miles
behind enemy lines. Whilst the original mission to capture a high ranking
Hezbollah figure failed due to complications and quick defensive reactions,
Israel did manage to withdraw successfully with 5 captured soldiers. August
the 5th saw a second raid with Naval Commandoes raiding an apartment in
Tyre. It seems likely that this was another airborne raid but the outcome is
unknown.
Israeli ground force casualties were primarily caused by small arms fire and
long range anti-tank missiles. The scale of Israeli ground force casualties
can be attributed to the some 40 Hezbollah and IRGC command bunkers and
their numerous associated firing position entrenchments, their tactical
decision to stand and fight, as well as their relative professionalism. This
was compounded by Israeli strategic policy early in the war. Around 50% of
Israeli casualties can be attributed to anti-tank missiles, 25% to small
arms and mines, around 10% to friendly fire, 10% to rocket fire and 5% to
accidents. Historically the majority of casualties are caused by artillery
so it makes for interesting statistics.
Neither side released exact Hezbollah and IRGC casualties, and the precise
number will probably never be known due to the fog of war and political
reservations. It is expected that Hezbollah and IRGC casualties were high.
The reasons for this are that the Israeli persistent surveillance assets
deployed over the combat zone allowed Israeli commanders to immediately
identify significant enemy manoeuvres. This forced Hezbollah and the IRGC to
remain in static positions. This combined with a Hezbollah determination to
stand and fight rather than melt away into the remaining population would
have made for a high casualty environment. The Israeli heliborne capture of
the South side of the Litani river would have further increased casualties
through interdiction amongst those enemy forces attempting to retreat north.
Thus out of a 6000 strong force it is believed that around some 600-900
Hezbollah and IRGC troops were killed during the fighting.
Naval Operations
Perhaps the most discussed topic on defence related blogs and forum boards
has been the C-802 strike against the Israeli Navy Corvette Hanit. Indeed
news that the missile was not a UAV was broken on blogs and forum groups
days before it made the mainstream press; an interesting phenomenon that we
will surely see more of in the future.
The turbojet-powered C-802 has a range of up to 120 km. and a 155-kg
blast-fragmentation warhead. The missile was fired by either Hezbollah or
the IRGC using a Lebanese coastal radar. This would appear to be confirmed
as following the C-802 strike there was a subsequent destruction of the
Lebanese coastal radar network by Israeli forces.
How a C-802, a relatively mediocre anti shipping missile, managed to hit the
most modern ship in the Israeli fleet is of obvious interest. The Israeli
position is that the Hanit had its automatic defences off because of an IFF
conflict with IAF forces operating in the area. Two missiles were fired; one
hit the Hanit and the other hit an Egyptian "trawler" that was fishing
nearby. This would go someway to confirm claims that the missile has "98%
effectiveness". However, this is not matched by the missile's ability to
distinguish targets or actually arm its self properly, as the missile that
hit the Hanit failed to go off. This non-detonating strike caused only a
minor fire in the flight deck and with the ship out of repairs after 14 days
according to an Israeli Defence Spokesperson.
Conclusions
Hezbollah have proven themselves to be a professional, dedicated and
organised force, whose prime position, equipment and personnel seems to have
been squandered for two captives.
The Israeli military also seems to have been misused for two of the three
weeks of the conflict. The air force attracted much negative publicity for
expending large amounts of ordinance for little apparent gain. The regular
army forces were initially committed to attacks against superior forces that
were dug in- for no apparent strategic gain.
There are a number of technical military questions that have come out of
this conflict. The failure of Hezbollah in the air war asks questions about
the quality of Iranian air defence capability.
The Israeli army needs to examine exactly how it lost so many tanks and will
presumably speed up and increase the size of the current program for armour
self-protection suites that is being fought between Rafael with Trophy and
IMI with Iron Fist.
IFF has shown itself to be of vital importance with an Israeli warship, 10
Israeli soldiers and an AH-64D all apparently lost due to poor IFF (the bill
for this alone would pay for an IFF program)
Another interesting question is why, with Hezbollah using Iranian Electronic
Industries 1950s era analogue VHF radios, Tadiran jammers were not able to
break down Hezbollah command and control.
Finally, a review of the MTHEL and ballistic missile defence programs needs
to be made as none of them were able to influence the outcome of this
conflict [nor even to shoot down any incoming rocket-Ed] -- a significant
expense for no apparent gain.
Ben Moores is a defence analyst with a specialisation in European defence
electronics and Iranian military capability.
-- A Preliminary Military Assessment of the Lebanon Conflict
http://tinyurl.com/h4hsp
(Source: defense-aerospace.com; posted Aug. 18, 2006) (Edited for style)
(© Ben Moores)
This article explains how the war was fought, looks at key military
applications and technological successes and failures, examines the main
battles and offensives, Hezbollah's campaign achievements and how the
Israeli military lost the opening battles yet recovered. Finally the article
looks at the hard questions that both militaries will have to answer and the
military equipment programs that are now required.
Israel Air Force Performance
The Israeli Air Force (IAF) has come in for considerable criticism during
the conflict. The majority of this has been more in relation to the
strategic use of the Air Force as opposed to its actual tactical utility.
However, the IAF tactical utility, for so long unquestioned in Israel, needs
to be examined.
Despite having excellent ISTAR and a formidably short kill chain the IAF,
primarily through the use of F-15s, F-16s (using JDAM and Paveway bombs) and
armed UAVs, was unable to interdict the small pockets of rocket firings from
the border area into Northern Israel. After 16 days of aerial bombardment
Hezbollah was still quite capable of sustaining a barrage of 100 or more
rocket firings against Israel, despite thousands of combat sorties by the
IAF. Hezbollah is estimated to have some 1,250 launchers of all types of
which about 300 were destroyed (or 25%). This IAF operational failure caused
the IDF to mount a full blown invasion of the region to reduce Hizbollahs
capability.
The IAF did have some successes in destroying some protected C2 nodes,
re-supply convoys and larger long range missile launchers; indeed it appears
the majority of 220mm and Fajr-3 & 5's were subsequently destroyed after
being deployed.
However, the IAF claims of destroying two-thirds of all Hezbollah long range
launchers should be closely examined. This is because numerous dummy missile
firing sites with fake heat signatures were targeted during the course of
the campaign. Furthermore is has been claimed by various Israeli sources
that Hezbollah has retained a battery or more of either Zelzal-2 range or
Nazeat 10-H (210 and 140 km range respectively).
The IAF didn't seem capable of degrading the capability of Hezbollah's
Command and control or communications network. Whilst some 23 tons of bombs
were dropped on an underground command bunker in Dahiya in south Beirut on
July 19, it is clear from the sudden self imposed silencing of the launchers
by Hezbollah for the July 31 ceasefire that its command and control, and
communications network was still in place. Indeed immediately after the
ceasefire front line units resumed pre-planned and co-ordinated firings.
UAV Applications
This conflict was the first to have both sides make use of offensive UAVs.
Both sides actually made extensive use of Offensive UAVs during the
conflict. UCAVs, (specifically IAI's Heron), were seen to be repeatedly
engaging targets with Spike and Hellfire missiles. It is understood that a
strike was carried out against Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon on the 31st of
July. It could well be that the platform used was Elbit's Hermes 450 or IAI
Searcher II UAVs. This seems unlikely as based on information available it
is known that both the Hermes 450 and Searcher II platforms were heavily
engaged on ISTAR missions. Iranian UAVs were repeatedly used by Hezbollah
and the IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps) but were unable to repeat
the success that they achieved earlier in the year; this is further
discussed in detail below.
Perhaps what is most interesting about this conflict is the lack of
excitement about the use of UAVs. The wide spread use of ISTAR platforms by
Israel hasn't been a focus of attention, no Sunday newspaper features on the
use of "Robot weapons from the future" tells us they have become mainstream.
Air Defence Performance
Hezbollah and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) forces only managed
to shoot down one air platform during the conflict. They shot down a CH-53
with an anti-tank missile. Reports of an Israeli F-16 being shot down on the
17th of July were established to be a partial rocket ignition caused by
strikes on a Zelzal rocket launcher. Hezbollah may have had some MANPADS in
their inventory but there were no confirmed reports of substantial use. With
the IAF able to strike from 15,000 feet and without a high altitude air
defence system there was nothing that Hezbollah could do.
Syrian Air Defences did much better. On the 29th of July they managed to
shoot down an Israeli Heron UAV that was attempting to "paint" Syrian
re-supply convoys. After a couple of decades of air defence ineptitude the
Syrians can congratulate themselves; although this did not stop IAF
performing low pass flights over Syrian Presidential Palaces as a reminder
of their military capabilities. Three other Israeli air platforms were lost,
two AH-64a's to a collision and a AH-64D to what seems to be Israeli
artillery fire.
These small losses confirm that Hezbollah and the IRGC (Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps) were unable to interdict the massed Israeli
heliborne advances in the past week or even deter strike or reconnaissance
operations. Considering that Iran deployed a number of high-prestige weapon
systems into southern Lebanon it can be assumed that they also deployed its
most effective air defence systems. This poor performance would put pressure
on Iran to procure S-300s and M1-Tors because it seems to confirm their
indigenous and Chinese-supplied air defence systems are ineffective against
[Israeli] airborne electronic warfare [equipment]. When these systems might
be delivered is unknown as Rosoboronexport recently confirmed that any
future orders for S-300s could only be delivered from 2011 onwards, due to a
huge backlog and a lack of qualified technicians.
Israeli air defences would appear to be relatively competent against
airborne platforms. Earlier this year Hezbollah was twice able to make
return flights with an Iranian Mirsad UAV (or maybe an Iran Aircraft
Manufacturing Industries (HESA) Ababil-3) into Israeli airspace. However,
during this conflict Iran was unable to repeat this earlier success. Three
Hezbollah UAVs were shot down by IAF Python V air-to-air missiles whilst
attempting to enter Israeli airspace. Two of these UAVs, according to some
sources, were carrying bomb loads. It would appear that all attempts to
cross the border were at night-time, suggesting that Iran has added an
infrared application modification to the standard television camera.
Israeli air defences seemed to be less capable against rocket and missile
fire. Despite large-scale investments none of the three key air defence
systems (MTHEL, Arrow & PAC-2) engaged targets, although that is arguably
because Hezbollah decided not to strike at Tel Aviv. It seems that MTHEL was
not deployed, which is worth noting, as it was specifically designed to
counter exactly the low altitude strategic rocket threat. It is understood
that the number of batteries needed to meet the threat and operational cost
made deployment cost-prohibitive.
The Rocket Campaign
Before the conflict started Hezbollah was armed with some 12,000 rockets
supplied by Iran and Syria. Some 10,000 of these were the Iranian 107 mm and
122mm rockets which have a range of less than 20km. Syria supplied a limited
number of 220mm rockets with the longer 30km range. Iranian Fajar-3 and
Fajar-5 rockets used from the second week of the war onwards (43 and 75 km
range respectively) had not been used against Israel before and caused
proportionately more damage and casualties than the 107mm and 122mm rockets.
The effectiveness of the Hezbollah rocket campaign against Israeli civilian
targets is fairly difficult to quantify, except in terms of absolute
casualties. Whilst some 4,000 rockets were fired they managed to cause only
a limited number of casualties. In comparison, Iraq's blitz of Teheran in
the final year of the Iran-Iraq war, using fewer Scuds, caused much higher
casualties and disruption. Indeed, more casualties were caused by Iraq's
pre-emptive Scud bombardment prior to Operation Desert Shield.
It was widely reported that Israel seemed incapable of stopping rocket
attacks. But upon closer examination it is clear that certain strategy
dynamics employed by Hezbollah changed over the campaign. At the beginning
of the campaign Hezbollah was merely countering IAF strikes with short range
rockets, as part of a "tit-for-tat" strategy. By the second week of the war
Hezbollah was using the long range Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rockets in order to
place political pressure on Israel. By the final week of the campaign, with
its forces being surrounded and with Israel not responding to cease fire
initiatives, Hezbollah was forced into committing whatever rockets it had
remaining in forward areas. So, it appeared that Hezbollah was escalating
their campaign, with the Israelis unable to prevent them, but it was
actually the opposite. Hezbollah's escalation was simply an attempt to gain
some utility from stocks that were out flanked.
Ground Operations
The performance of the opposing ground forces is difficult to rate because
of the different strategies that were used in the different stages of the
war. A review of events is followed by analysis of the operations.
The first significant battle was at Bent Jbail which began on July 24 and
finished on the August 1. Skirmishes continued through to the 8th of August
presumably as pockets of infantry were flushed out or attempted to
manoeuvre. The initial fighting was characterized by Israeli forces
struggling to fight their way into fortified positions with small teams of
infantry and penny packets of tanks. Bent Jbail was manned with some 200
skilled ATGM (Anti-tank guided missile) operators and fighters. They had
large stocks of forward placed rockets and knew exactly where to hit even
Merkava MK4's. These early engagements allowed Hezbollah to focus their
forces against the IDF. This concentration of forces gave them an unexpected
firepower and combat capability; with them able to kill over 15 IDF
soldiers. Parallel with operations at Bent Jbail was the Battle of Maroun
al-Ras where three Merkava's were penetrated between July 19 and July 22.
The inability of the IDF to win decisively at Bint Jbeil, combined with the
failure of airpower to rein in Hezbollah rocket strikes, forced the Israeli
government to commit significant forces to a full scale invasion of Lebanon,
abandoning its cross-border raids and air power demonstration strategy in
the process.
The IDF quickly reacted to these events with some 15,000 reservists being
called up on July 28 and by July 31. Five brigades struck North East into
Lebanon blocking off the Syrian border to the region and placing the army in
a position to move to the Litani river. This drive also cut off Hezbollah
forces operating south of this point. By August 1 there was heavy fighting
at Aita el-Shaab, Al Adisa, Kfar Kila and Taibe with further fighting in the
north at Marjayoun. For the next five days the battles of Aita el-Shaab and
Taibe continued with Israeli forces suffering significant armoured losses at
Taibe on August 5 and August 6.
By August 9 the IDF was at least nine miles into Lebanon. A slow advance
across the length of the southern border began with fighting being renewed
at Bent Jbail Aita-el-Shaab and Dibel as the IDF attempted to clear out
enemy fighters. On August 10 Marajaoun fell, allowing Israeli forces to move
north up to the Litani river. It would appear that this obligated Hezbollah
forces to maneuver and fierce fighting erupted the length of the frontline.
Later than night airborne forces moved on to the Litani river line with the
largest Israeli military airlift in 30 years.
By August 13 Israel had all but surrounded remaining Hezbollah forces in
southern Lebanon. Knowing that ceasefire lines always follow the final
frontline both sides spent the final day of the war heavily engaged in what
was the bloodiest day of the conflict. The IDF lost 24 dead in a number of
different engagements with around 100 or more casualties. Hezbollah
casualties are unknown but can be presumed to be equal or higher as their
earlier advantages of local knowledge, surprise, prepared positions and
superior local firepower were now lost.
Thus there are three distinct phases of the campaign. The first stage it is
arguable that the strategy and tactics let down the IDF. With limited
resources and operational scope against a well prepared and motivated
opposition the IDF struggled, particularly at Maroun al-Ras and Bent Jbail.
The second phase is the move to bypass Hezbollah positions and maneuver to
the north East through Marajaoun. This second phase confirmed that the
Israeli reserve call up system is as sharp as ever with large numbers of
reservists being called up and quickly deployed into operations. There is a
clear failure to effectively finish off Hezbollah force concentrations in
the border region, leading to further conflict and rocket attacks. The third
phase is an operational and strategic success for Israel as they managed to
maneuver around Hezbollah and give them no further advantage in continuing
the fight.
Observations on the ground campaign
Hezbollah proved that they had mastered positional warfare, absorbed modern
weapon systems and had the organization and morale to withstand being
surrounded and overrun. Hezbollah will have lost many of their best units
and weapon systems during this conflict but enough have survived to rebuild
again. Furthermore Iran will quickly move to re-supply Hezbollah with more
of "what worked" and less of "what didn't". Given a breathing space
Hezbollah ought to come out of this conflict technically more capable and
with veteran cadres.
The high casualty rates suffered by Hezbollah can be traced to the second
week of operations when Hezbollah failed to appreciate that the operational
tempo had increased. Nor does it appear that they were prepared for this or
able to change as Hezbollah were seen adding finishing touches to bunkers
and sowing mines rather than falling back. Although it could be argued they
had no plans to fallback And the troops had no interest in falling back to
fight another day.
Israeli heavy armoured forces seem to have suffered a series of setbacks
with some 30 tanks damaged, although only 10 appear to have been either
badly damaged or destroyed. Most of these casualties were caused by long
range man-portable anti tank missiles such as the Kornet-E 9P133, Metis-M
9M131, the 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 'Spandrel') and the 9K111 Fagot (AT-4
'Spigot'). It is understood that over 500 missiles were fired with around 50
hits on Israeli armoured vehicles. This was clearly been a surprise to
Israeli commanders, who committed penny packet armoured forces in unsuitable
roles. With tank crewmen taking half of IDF casualties it will act as an
early warning to the Israeli military that even their powerfully armoured
Merkavas are vulnerable.
Israeli special forces launched two known large scale raids. August 2 saw a
large airborne raid on the Hezbollah stronghold of Baalbek some 62 miles
behind enemy lines. Whilst the original mission to capture a high ranking
Hezbollah figure failed due to complications and quick defensive reactions,
Israel did manage to withdraw successfully with 5 captured soldiers. August
the 5th saw a second raid with Naval Commandoes raiding an apartment in
Tyre. It seems likely that this was another airborne raid but the outcome is
unknown.
Israeli ground force casualties were primarily caused by small arms fire and
long range anti-tank missiles. The scale of Israeli ground force casualties
can be attributed to the some 40 Hezbollah and IRGC command bunkers and
their numerous associated firing position entrenchments, their tactical
decision to stand and fight, as well as their relative professionalism. This
was compounded by Israeli strategic policy early in the war. Around 50% of
Israeli casualties can be attributed to anti-tank missiles, 25% to small
arms and mines, around 10% to friendly fire, 10% to rocket fire and 5% to
accidents. Historically the majority of casualties are caused by artillery
so it makes for interesting statistics.
Neither side released exact Hezbollah and IRGC casualties, and the precise
number will probably never be known due to the fog of war and political
reservations. It is expected that Hezbollah and IRGC casualties were high.
The reasons for this are that the Israeli persistent surveillance assets
deployed over the combat zone allowed Israeli commanders to immediately
identify significant enemy manoeuvres. This forced Hezbollah and the IRGC to
remain in static positions. This combined with a Hezbollah determination to
stand and fight rather than melt away into the remaining population would
have made for a high casualty environment. The Israeli heliborne capture of
the South side of the Litani river would have further increased casualties
through interdiction amongst those enemy forces attempting to retreat north.
Thus out of a 6000 strong force it is believed that around some 600-900
Hezbollah and IRGC troops were killed during the fighting.
Naval Operations
Perhaps the most discussed topic on defence related blogs and forum boards
has been the C-802 strike against the Israeli Navy Corvette Hanit. Indeed
news that the missile was not a UAV was broken on blogs and forum groups
days before it made the mainstream press; an interesting phenomenon that we
will surely see more of in the future.
The turbojet-powered C-802 has a range of up to 120 km. and a 155-kg
blast-fragmentation warhead. The missile was fired by either Hezbollah or
the IRGC using a Lebanese coastal radar. This would appear to be confirmed
as following the C-802 strike there was a subsequent destruction of the
Lebanese coastal radar network by Israeli forces.
How a C-802, a relatively mediocre anti shipping missile, managed to hit the
most modern ship in the Israeli fleet is of obvious interest. The Israeli
position is that the Hanit had its automatic defences off because of an IFF
conflict with IAF forces operating in the area. Two missiles were fired; one
hit the Hanit and the other hit an Egyptian "trawler" that was fishing
nearby. This would go someway to confirm claims that the missile has "98%
effectiveness". However, this is not matched by the missile's ability to
distinguish targets or actually arm its self properly, as the missile that
hit the Hanit failed to go off. This non-detonating strike caused only a
minor fire in the flight deck and with the ship out of repairs after 14 days
according to an Israeli Defence Spokesperson.
Conclusions
Hezbollah have proven themselves to be a professional, dedicated and
organised force, whose prime position, equipment and personnel seems to have
been squandered for two captives.
The Israeli military also seems to have been misused for two of the three
weeks of the conflict. The air force attracted much negative publicity for
expending large amounts of ordinance for little apparent gain. The regular
army forces were initially committed to attacks against superior forces that
were dug in- for no apparent strategic gain.
There are a number of technical military questions that have come out of
this conflict. The failure of Hezbollah in the air war asks questions about
the quality of Iranian air defence capability.
The Israeli army needs to examine exactly how it lost so many tanks and will
presumably speed up and increase the size of the current program for armour
self-protection suites that is being fought between Rafael with Trophy and
IMI with Iron Fist.
IFF has shown itself to be of vital importance with an Israeli warship, 10
Israeli soldiers and an AH-64D all apparently lost due to poor IFF (the bill
for this alone would pay for an IFF program)
Another interesting question is why, with Hezbollah using Iranian Electronic
Industries 1950s era analogue VHF radios, Tadiran jammers were not able to
break down Hezbollah command and control.
Finally, a review of the MTHEL and ballistic missile defence programs needs
to be made as none of them were able to influence the outcome of this
conflict [nor even to shoot down any incoming rocket-Ed] -- a significant
expense for no apparent gain.
Ben Moores is a defence analyst with a specialisation in European defence
electronics and Iranian military capability.
