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CH-148 Cyclone Progress

I am assuming this is a positive development?
If the Sea King begins retirement in 2015 does that mean that IOC for the Cyclone is 2015? Or is IOC now 2014 for the 12 Cyclones ready?
FOC is 2018,right? Does anyone know what capabilities are to be added over that period?
I am assuming that the Cyclone has now been cleared for over water operations, ship borne operations, and night flights? 
If I remember correctly there was quite a list of deficiencies only a few months ago.
 
There are currently a number of dates being bandied about.  2015 is now the new delivery date for the first "interim MH" with "sufficient capability" to commence full initial cadre crew training and commence Sea King retirement, although the latter point seems to have been dropped into the release from the blue... presumably as optics for the 2015 election campaign.  Until delivery of "sufficient capability", the restriction to daytime, over and in-sight-of-land flight is expected to remain in place.  Delivery of the first "fully capable" aircraft has been promised for 2018 and the new target date for IOC is now 2019.  The aircraft are not cleared for operations from HMC Ships yet except for the ship-helicopter operating limitation trials.  There is still much to be done before those trials can be called complete.

The new definitions of "sufficient capability" and "fully capable" have not been released yet.

When a year (without a designated month or quarter) is given as a milestone date it is always assumed to mean "on or before the last day of that year".  When a quarter is designated (e.g. third quarter 2018) it means "on or before the last day of that calendar quarter".
 
Well, at least there's a plan, of sorts ... maybe not the best plan, maybe not even a really good plan, but we've won more important victories with less. This, at least, allows engineering and financial people to move, in concert, towards some agreed goals.

I, and others, might have wished for a different plan but I'm nowhere near the decision making process and I don't know what all the pros and cons (technical, operational, financial and political) of all the options might have been.

There is every possibility that the Cyclone will be the "good enough," affordable solution which is always the mortal enemy of the (more expensive) "best." There is even the possibility that the Cyclone will be a truly first rate ship-borne aircraft, the equal, in its generation, of the venerable Sea King.

Let's all wish the teams - Government of Canada's and Sikorsky's - well.
 
rathawk said:
There are currently a number of dates being bandied about.  2015 is now the new delivery date for the first "interim MH" with "sufficient capability" to commence full initial cadre crew training and commence Sea King retirement, although the latter point seems to have been dropped into the release from the blue... presumably as optics for the 2015 election campaign.  Until delivery of "sufficient capability", the restriction to daytime, over and in-sight-of-land flight is expected to remain in place.  Delivery of the first "fully capable" aircraft has been promised for 2018 and the new target date for IOC is now 2019.  The aircraft are not cleared for operations from HMC Ships yet except for the ship-helicopter operating limitation trials.  There is still much to be done before those trials can be called complete.

The new definitions of "sufficient capability" and "fully capable" have not been released yet.

When a year (without a designated month or quarter) is given as a milestone date it is always assumed to mean "on or before the last day of that year".  When a quarter is designated (e.g. third quarter 2018) it means "on or before the last day of that calendar quarter".

Hi rathawk,

Any word on the engine upgrade requirement to accommodate the extra weight?

My understanding is they absolutely do need more HP, but the release seems to gloss over where exactly those engines are going to come from? 

Do they already exist and will drop cleanly into the existing design....and it's just a matter of cost/engine? 

Do they already exist, but will require structural modifications?

Or are they hypothetical engines that a supplier will now need to develop and test?

It seems like this is a pretty big 'TBC' in their plan....


Thanks in advance, Matthew.
 
All good questions... no answers yet.  I suspect we shall have to wait another year or two to learn more.  A significant amount of development is still required before Sikorsky will be able to satisfy the original (2003) performance requirements.  And, we have yet to learn what, if any, of the original performance requirements have been compromised or reduced in the 31 December Cyclone Rescue operation.

The most amazing aspect of this decision is that Sikorsky has been awarded yet another four years to come up with an acceptable MHP solution following such a sterling records of so many unkept promises.
 
The question of good money after bad comes into play...

The question of what aircraft manufacturer would, in it's right mind, offer again on a CF Contract if this one fell through is also in play...

The question of how much effort has been emplaced already beyond airframes such as training, maintenance programs, equipment, dedicated hangars, support facilities, etc etc that would be lost if the airframe was changed is also in play...

The delay, the non-compliance, the continuing delays....the cost....the question of will it ever meet the requirements....well....a lot of questions there.

Is it good enough...? 

Will it be able to be made good enough...?

The answer is, we'll see.

YMMV, but I'm actually glad a decision has actually been made.  This is a legacy of poor decisions over a lot of years, by many governments, dating back to killing the EH-101.

NS

 
Another question is, with the fleet being replaced, if we wait to long it will be to late to change the specs on the ships to fit a different helicopter.
 
Perhaps it would be best to ensure that the new ships' aviation facility designs are as flexible as possible.  After all, we are not sure yet that the Cyclone will be able to operate from the current CPFs in sea and wind conditions anywhere near the same as the Sea Kings currently do, let alone be able to operate from new AORs and Destroyers.  The trials to date have revealed significant limitations with land/launch, blade fold/spread, deck handling, etc, not to mention the EME limitations that have been reported.  With Sikorsky just having been awarded almost five more years (ie until end 2018) to demonstrate that they have solved the ship compatibility problems, we will just have to wait.
 
Canada could have obtained world-class helicopters at bargain prices, but the Conservatives weren’t interested
Michael Byers
National Post
08 January 2014

Two curious developments occurred in the global helicopter industry last week.

On Wednesday, India cancelled an $800-million order for 12 AgustaWestland 101 helicopters, after allegations that the British-Italian manufacturer paid bribes to secure the contract in 2010.

The AW101 is the latest version of the EH101 — a helicopter that Canada uses for maritime search and rescue. Canada would also be using the EH101 on its destroyers and frigates, had Jean Chrétien not cancelled a $5-billion contract in 1993, incurring $478-million in penalties. The AW101 is currently in service with the British Royal Navy, the Italian Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. Last month, Norway contracted to buy 16 of the helicopters.

The loss of the Indian contract could cost thousands of jobs at the AgustaWestland plant in Somerset, U.K. This poses a problem for Britain’s Conservative government, which has heavily promoted the defence and aerospace industries.

On Friday, late in the afternoon in Ottawa, a news release announced the Harper government’s intent to proceed with the troubled procurement of CH-148 Cyclone maritime helicopters from Sikorsky. The Cyclones are supposed to replace the Sea King helicopters that have operated off Canada’s destroyers and frigates for more than 50 years.

Mechanical failures and service limitations plague the fleet. Seven personnel and 14 Sea Kings have been lost in accidents, and the risk of another fatal accident increases each time one of the aged aircraft flies.

Paul Martin initiated the Cyclone procurement in 2004. Since 2006, the project has been an albatross around Stephen Harper’s neck. Two years ago, in a rare moment of candour, then-defence minister Peter MacKay called the Cyclones the “worst procurement in the history of Canada.” Tellingly, Canada is the only country to have chosen the Cyclone.

The problems are manifold. The original contract with Sikorsky was signed when the Cyclone was a still a “paper aircraft” that existed only in design. Canadian defence officials insisted on the addition of new electronics and weapons systems, which proved too heavy for the engines. This required more powerful engines, which in turn required an expensive full re-engineering of the helicopter.

Making matters worse, the Cyclone design is based on an existing civilian variant, the Sikorsky S-92. In 2003, Sikorsky claimed the S-92 was capable of 30 minutes safe operation following an oil leak. That claim that proved false in 2009, when an oil leak was followed immediately by a crash. Yet Sikorsky claims the Cyclone — again, based on the S-92 — is also capable of 30 minutes safe operation after a leak. The use of a civilian design may also explain why Sikorsky failed to integrate copper mesh into the airframe of the Cyclone – necessary to shield the aircraft electronics from the electromagnetic waves generated by radar on naval vessels.

Last September, after a full decade of delays, the Harper government finally announced that it was looking at alternative aircraft to replace the Sea King — including the AW101 — as it considered cancelling the Cyclone contract with Sikorsky. Officials travelled to the U.K. to see the AW101 in service with the British Royal Navy, where it is called the HM-1 Merlin.

Not surprisingly, Sikorsky fought back, agreeing to pay $88.6-million in penalties for delays and offering to restructure the procurement — with the first fully capable Cyclone now promised for 2018. The Harper government accepted the offer, probably hoping the least disruptive approach will help keep the procurement out of the news.

Sikorsky says it will deliver “interim” helicopters that can be used while it develops Cyclones with the full range of capabilities. But is it fair to foist a less-than-fully capable helicopter on an aircrew that has to conduct an anti-submarine mission during a North Atlantic storm?

This takes us back to the Indian government’s recent cancellation of its contract for AW101s. AgustaWestland produces what is widely regarded as the best maritime helicopter in the world. It now faces having to layoff thousands of highly trained workers. Stephen Harper could have seized the opportunity to obtain bargain-price, world-class AW101s in very short order.

A competition would not be necessary: the EH101 was deemed fully compliant with Canada’s requirements, and the AW101 is an even more capable aircraft.

Our Conservative prime minister could have finally set aside the Liberals’ discredited and dangerous Cyclone procurement. He could have returned to the course so wisely charted by Brian Mulroney — and so foolishly abandoned by Jean Chrétien. Stephen Harper could, at long last, have actually replaced the Sea Kings.

Michael Byers holds the Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law at the University of British Columbia.
http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2014/01/08/michael-byers-canada-could-have-obtained-world-class-helicopters-at-bargain-prices-but-the-conservatives-werent-interested/
 
"Canadian defence officials insisted on the addition of new electronics and weapons systems..."

This concept keeps being brought up by media and others and has become a defacto truth among critics but it is not ture. Neither the requirements nor the mission equipment has changed in any significant manner since contract award.
 
H3 TACCO is absolutely correct.  The Rideau Institute is, intentionally or not, helping to lend true the urban myth that performance and equipment requirements were added on/increased after contract award.  There have been a few relatively minor changes to the original 2003 requirements specs since the contract was awarded but these were reductions in capability made at the contractor's behest.  The performance and equipment requirements have remained substantially unchanged since the 2003 Pre-qualification phase in 2003.

A troop seat configuration was added in 2006 as an ECP but this has had nothing to do with the delivery delays and Sikorsky's inability or reluctance to comply with the original requirements.  The troop seat configuration kit ECP merely added to the overall acquisition and ISS costs, but not by a very large amount in the grand scheme considering the large contract amendments made in late 2008 ($148.3 million) and early 2009 (another $52.2 million) plus the millions that have been spent sustaining DND project management and engineering costs through the years of delay.

There are other myths about this Project circulating as truth and while these tend to annoy those of us who know better, the real agony lies in the untold truth.
 
I wished they had just cancelled the Sikorsky purchase. Can't say I have a lot of faith in Sikorsky to deliver. Perfect way out for the government just blame the Liberals. The reality is this should have been cancelled years ago after multiple missed deadlines. A return to an all AW101 fleet seems like a preferable solution. But apparently loves buying/operating micro/orphan platforms.

Assuming a helicopter is delivered I think we have a numbers issue
1 x 15 CSC = 15
3 x 2  AOR = 6
that gives a total of 7 for training, spares, overhaul and maintenance rotation, enough?
Does anyone know what helicopter is bound for the 6-8 AOPS

I guess we all know that the chances of 15 CSC and 6-8 AOPS being delivered are slim so that might solve the #'s issues
 
rathawk said:
There are other myths about this Project circulating as truth and while these tend to annoy those of us who know better, the real agony lies in the untold truth.

It's like the opening credits to a scary movie.... :pop:
 
suffolkowner said:
Assuming a helicopter is delivered I think we have a numbers issue
1 x 15 CSC = 15
3 x 2  AOR = 6
that gives a total of 7 for training, spares, overhaul and maintenance rotation, enough?
Does anyone know what helicopter is bound for the 6-8 AOPs
I guess we all know that the chances .of 15 CSC and 6-8 AOPS being delivered are slim so that might solve the #'s issues

That's a huge over simplification of the numbers.  The numbers required are based on deployment requirements, not a one for one.

Firstly, just because the AOR can take two aircraft doesn't mean it always will.  There was a time it carried three and one crew... They were a maintenance test crew to keep aircraft servicable for other ships.

Basically you need  enough helos in the force to give the commander the coverage he needs.  So, a task group needs five, give or take.

To put it another way, those 15 CSC and 3 AORs aren't always available either.  Say, 7 CSC and 2 AOR at at time... 2 TGs plus one independant deployment.  So max 11 aircraft.

at full manning the Wing is supposed to support 15 aircraff in 11 dets, but its been a long time til we were anywhere close; and will be a longer tume til we get close again, if ever.


 
rathawk said:
There are other myths about this Project circulating as truth and while these tend to annoy those of us who know better, the real agony lies in the untold truth.

I'd like to know who you are as you seem to have an agenda, and you've indicated you're connected to the project on numerous occasions.

Before anyone asks, my nickname tells anyone connected to MH ops who I am, and for everyone else I'm an ACSO at 12 Wing Shearwater.
 
Hi Baz

I know who you are and I also know that you're an extremely well-respected MH (12 Wing) star and a very big (backseat) Cyclone and GDC champion. 

I've been both directly and indirectly involved in this failed procurement since 1975 right up until the present day but I'm now about to step away into the shadows knowing with confidence that, although I was there at the beginning of this train wreck, I was not responsible for it.

BTW, how old were you in 1975 when my SKR pursuit began?  I hope I'll be there to pay you a beer or two the day this procurement hits the omega, should I live so long.  For info, the myths that continue began in 1992 leading to the fateful political election plank to cancel the NSA "attack helicopters".  Up until November 3rd 1993, everything about this procurement was running along just fine.  That was the day the train ran off the tracks and where it remains today.

Kindest regards,
Rathawk
 
OK... you know of me, but I still can't identify you; so be it.

I am not a star, I have a niche; I make the most out of the very limited resources we have had for the last 15 years.

I'm also not a Cyclone or GDC fan... if that was the case I would not have to be censured for having a very public disagreement with them.

My concern is with the crews... to give them the best we can given the resources.

If you have been working that long then I respect your efforts... a respect that obviously isn't mutual.  I was seven in 1975, and the point is?  The reaction doesn't surprise me, given how many times I've been told a silly operator doesn't know anything, especially one that can't get promoted.
Things were fine in 1993, but we weren't finished.  we still hadn't rolled uo our sleeves as a team and made it work.  And, in my opinion, the only way to get where we need to be now is to do the same, but I'm not sure when that is going to happen.
 
BAZ, fair enough. If your confident in the numbers, I mean that's what your working with now, so...I'll take your word for it. Still I wonder where the AOPS fits in assuming 6 ships. 
 
Rat hawk, lighten up on the condescending attitude, please. It'll win you zero respect here
 
Too big to cancel? Tories spent $1.7B on troubled chopper program

http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/too-big-to-cancel-tories-spent-1-7b-on-troubled-chopper-program-1.1632160

Murray Brewster, The Canadian Press
Published Thursday, January 9, 2014 4:13PM EST
Last Updated Thursday, January 9, 2014 4:17PM EST

OTTAWA -- More than $1.7 billion has already been spent on the elusive effort to upgrade Canada's helicopter fleet, internal documents show -- a clue as to why the Harper government is sticking with the troubled program.

The eye-popping figure -- about 30 per cent of the overall $5.3-billion budget -- could have meant a far worse political firestorm for the Conservatives than the one that accompanied the ill-fated plan to buy the F-35 stealth fighter.

In the aftermath of an independent report last fall on the beleaguered plan to buy the CH-148 Cyclone choppers as replacements for Canada's aging Sea King fleet, the government acknowledged it was looking at other aircraft -- even going so far as to meet with other manufacturers.

Documents obtained by The Canadian Press under the Access to Information Act show the money went towards "acquisition progress payments" and "in-service support set-up." The nearly decade-long program has delivered just four test helicopters that National Defence has refused to formally accept.

The $1.7-billion figure is slightly higher than numbers that were buried deep in federal public accounts records released last fall.

Only about one-third of the total has been spent on aircraft. The bulk has gone towards developing mission systems, training facilities in Nova Scotia and B.C., flight-simulation equipment and support.

The briefing notes, prepared for a committee of deputy ministers, also paint a more detailed picture of the back room tug-of-war and building frustration in the military as missed delivery deadlines continued to pile up.

Cancelling the program was clearly not an option, say critics who accuse the Conservatives of perpetrating a charade with its consultations last fall.

Spending so much money and having virtually nothing to show for it would have caused untold political damage, especially among a frustrated Conservative base still reeling from the ongoing Senate expense scandal.

"It would have been a bigger blow to them, to their base, than the F-35 situation," said NDP defence critic Jack Harris.

"I am certain that politics was part of the calculations."

The Conservative reputation for prudent management of the public purse took a hit in 2012 when the auditor general slammed the F-35 stealth fighter program, even though no money had been spent.

Regardless of whether Ottawa could have recouped some of the costs, cancelling the Cyclones would have triggered an ugly, protracted court battle in the run-up to the 2015 election, said Michael Byers, a political science professor and defence researcher at the University of British Columbia.

"I think this is a big, dark cloud that hangs over the Conservative government," said Byers, who has argued publicly for the deal to be scrapped.

"We saw some of this exposed during the scandal over the F-35, and the Sea King replacement is another story that speaks very loudly to the problems this government has managing multibillion-dollar military procurements."

Byers said the government is rolling the dice on an unproven, developmental aircraft when it could have had an established maritime helicopter by 2018 -- the latest deadline set by Sikorsky, the Cyclone's manufacturer.

The Cyclones are meant to replace Canada's 50-year-old CH-124 Sea Kings. Conservatives often criticized Jean Chretien's Liberal government for cancelling the original program in 1993, to the tune of $478 million in penalties.

The Department of Public Works waited until after the close of business Friday -- "take-out-the-garbage day" in political communications circles -- to announce it would renegotiate the Cyclone contract, a clear sign to many the government was anxious to mitigate the political damage.

The government was sensitive to the bad optics even before last Friday's announcement. A briefing dated Dec. 13, 2012, noted that officials had leaned on Sikorsky to paint their ongoing meetings as "discussions," not "negotiations."

Ottawa's relationship with the aircraft maker has been increasingly strained, especially after former defence minister Peter MacKay characterized the Cyclone program as the "worst procurement in the history of Canada."

The flight decks of a number of Canadian warships -- notably HMCS Regina -- were reconfigured to accommodate the Cyclones, only to be switched back because of the delays. Internal documents show National Defence wanted the contractor to foot the $700,000 bill for the modifications, a demand overruled by Public Works.

There was also table-thumping about who would pay for the fuel in the already-delivered test helicopters.

Eventually, National Defence decided to bill Sikorsky and tack on an extra $250 per fill-up "to recover the direct personnel and equipment costs associated with the refuelling process and administrative overhead costs for accounting and invoicing." The Aug. 28, 2012, briefing insisted that the government wasn't making any money off the deal.

The government has set a deadline of the end of March to negotiate the new contract with the U.S.-based manufacturer and promises no further cheques will be cut until fully completed helicopters are delivered.

Flight training began in October on four Cyclones already at the military air base in Shearwater, N.S., said Public Works spokesman Pierre-Alain Bujold.

The air force is prepared to take ownership of up to eight test helicopters before the Cyclones are declared capable, Bujold said in an email.

That appears to be a concession; the government has said it would not formally accept the aircraft until Sikorsky had delivered a helicopter that's up to snuff.

The government's statement last Friday said it expected the Cyclones to be fully operational by 2018 and that the Sea Kings would begin retiring next year.

National Defence has not explained whether Canada would be short of helicopters during the time between the retirement of the Sea Kings and the arrival of the Cyclones.
 
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