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Canadian Special Operations Force Command (CANSOFCOM)

Video - Recruiting Video presentation shown to serving members to consider at their Information Sessions:

https://www.facebook.com/video.php?v=782401888518458
 
Hello!
I'm new to the Army.ca forum. I just had a few questions to ask and I thought this was the right place. I was hoping that someone could possibly tell me how the Canadian Special Forces go about recruiting. Do they come to your unit? And do you have to be recognized by an officer in order to get accepted or can you just apply/sign up somewhere? I understand you have to be in reg force for 2 years and reserves for 3 in order to apply.
 
If you Googled it you would have found your answer in seconds.

http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/jobs-caf-unique/operations-special-forces-locate.page
 
Teager said:
If you Googled it you would have found your answer in seconds.

http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/jobs-caf-unique/operations-special-forces-locate.page
I apologize if I came off as ignorant. I did Google it, I just needed a confirmation. Thank you!


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
 
And for today's necro post, here is a CP story reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act in which the Deputy Commander claims that the members of CANSOFCOM face possible burn out.

Special forces operating on ‘borrowed time,’ need more troops: general
By The Canadian Press — Jul 4 2017
http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/special-forces-operating-on-borrowed-time-need-more-troops-general-1.3488314

OTTAWA — The deputy commander of Canada's special forces says his troops risk being run ragged after three years in Iraq, as well as several other lesser-known missions in other parts of the world.

Brig.-Gen. Peter Dawe says that's why the Liberal government's plan to add more than 600 additional soldiers to the elite force is not only welcome, but necessary.

Canada currently has about 2,000 special forces soldiers, many of whom Dawe says have done multiple tours through Iraq since first being sent to help fight the Islamic State group in August 2014.

But Canadian special forces have also been called upon to help train local forces facing extremist threats in different parts of Africa, Southeast Asia and Central America.

The demand doesn't appear to be letting up, as the government announced last week that Canadian soldiers will stay in Iraq for at least another two years.

Dawe says his troops continue to get the job done, but  have been operating "on borrowed time" and need the help to ensure they — and their families — don't suffer burnout.

- mod edit to add link -
 
Old Sweat said:
And for today's necro post, here is a CP story reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act in which the Deputy Commander claims that the members of CANSOFCOM face possible burn out.

Special forces operating on ‘borrowed time,’ need more troops: general
By The Canadian Press — Jul 4 2017

OTTAWA — The deputy commander of Canada's special forces says his troops risk being run ragged after three years in Iraq, as well as several other lesser-known missions in other parts of the world.

Brig.-Gen. Peter Dawe says that's why the Liberal government's plan to add more than 600 additional soldiers to the elite force is not only welcome, but necessary.

Canada currently has about 2,000 special forces soldiers, many of whom Dawe says have done multiple tours through Iraq since first being sent to help fight the Islamic State group in August 2014.

But Canadian special forces have also been called upon to help train local forces facing extremist threats in different parts of Africa, Southeast Asia and Central America.

The demand doesn't appear to be letting up, as the government announced last week that Canadian soldiers will stay in Iraq for at least another two years.

Dawe says his troops continue to get the job done, but  have been operating "on borrowed time" and need the help to ensure they — and their families — don't suffer burnout.

We're likely to see the CAF, the Army part anyways, be skewed towards the SOF role as a result of circumstances we have no control over, much.

It will be important, to be successful, to make sure that the rest of the force is also beefed up and aligns to support them or else we could see a 'stress fracture' of some kind appear. Sneaky peekies need pay, boots and PERs too :)
 
I guess it also begs the question - do CANSOFCOM units really need to be the lead on all of the "train, advise, assist" jobs?

I know capacity is more of an issue with 9 infantry battalions, but surely some of the regular battalions could be involved in some way?

I'm sure this has been discussed elsewhere but the British Army has started moving towards this model. The first cadre is underway now.

This from General Carter, CGS from a June 2016 conference at RUSI (https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/160628-lwc16-cgs-opening_address.pdf):

"But we have learned, I think, over the last three years that we need bespoke structures to do some of this overseas capacity building and hence the announcement in the SDSR of five Specialised Infantry Battalions. That title is a place-holder that may become something different in due course, but for the moment it is recognition that our conventional infantry achieved significantly more than might have been expect during Afghanistan and that we need to give them the opportunity to continue to deliver something well above the conventional task.

These battalions will be smaller, some 300 strong, and they will be designed to Train Advise Assist, and where appropriate to accompany indigenous forces, thus taking perhaps greater risk than conventional infantry might have to take and, of course, they will major on language and cultural expertise. They will be rolled out from next year through a series of pilots and the goal is that they should be able to deliver capacity building at a higher end than conventional infantry."

Food for thought anyways!
 
Pretty soon everyone will be special forces (SF) at this rate.  Mission creep; you do not need to be SF to advise indigenous population soldiers in conventional warfare.  You need to be SF when you advise in ops designed for SF operational environments.  Teaching Iraqi army recruits to shoot straight, throw a grenade or drive a hummer does not require an operator.  Teaching irregular forces in a complex operational environment requires SF, teaching SF requires SF.
 
CEDE NULLIS said:
I guess it also begs the question - do CANSOFCOM units really need to be the lead on all of the "train, advise, assist" jobs?

I know capacity is more of an issue with 9 infantry battalions, but surely some of the regular battalions could be involved in some way?

I'm sure this has been discussed elsewhere but the British Army has started moving towards this model. The first cadre is underway now.

This from General Carter, CGS from a June 2016 conference at RUSI (https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/160628-lwc16-cgs-opening_address.pdf):

"But we have learned, I think, over the last three years that we need bespoke structures to do some of this overseas capacity building and hence the announcement in the SDSR of five Specialised Infantry Battalions. That title is a place-holder that may become something different in due course, but for the moment it is recognition that our conventional infantry achieved significantly more than might have been expect during Afghanistan and that we need to give them the opportunity to continue to deliver something well above the conventional task.

These battalions will be smaller, some 300 strong, and they will be designed to Train Advise Assist, and where appropriate to accompany indigenous forces, thus taking perhaps greater risk than conventional infantry might have to take and, of course, they will major on language and cultural expertise. They will be rolled out from next year through a series of pilots and the goal is that they should be able to deliver capacity building at a higher end than conventional infantry."

Food for thought anyways!

I think the issue with this is more of a political one;  *sending troops to Iraq*...the general population will see that as *doing what Trump wants us to do* and Afghanistan is still resident in some people's memories.  Right now, Joe and Jane Canuck seem ok with the Air Force there doing...*air force-y stuff* and our Special Forces there doing *mentoring*. 

We're not at war* with ISIS, remember?  ^-^
 
Lightguns said:
Pretty soon everyone will be special forces (SF) at this rate.  Mission creep; you do not need to be SF to advise indigenous population soldiers in conventional warfare.  You need to be SF when you advise in ops designed for SF operational environments.  Teaching Iraqi army recruits to shoot straight, throw a grenade or drive a hummer does not require an operator.  Teaching irregular forces in a complex operational environment requires SF, teaching SF requires SF.

The CAF is way ahead of you: http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/peacekeeping-africa-sajjan-1.3712202

We only get a snippet of what missions are being completed by CANSOF, but based on that article the CDS and MND seem to be very in tune with providing conventional forces as trainers when the mission and specific AOR warrants it. What you're suggesting is that the government automatically just throws SOF at everything first, instead of the CDS doing a mission analysis and providing a force package that meets the government's intent. I strongly doubt that's the case, especially with the DComd stating his troops are being run ragged.
 
PuckChaser said:
the DComd stating his troops are being run ragged.

It's been almost 3 years sustained now.  You can only rotate in/out what you have, and if what you have isn't enough to rest people, they get burnt.  The longer you sustain the more burnt people get and the harder it is for them to recharge.  This is reality in a small military with inadequate numbers of people and funding.
 
Eye In The Sky said:
It's been almost 3 years sustained now.  You can only rotate in/out what you have, and if what you have isn't enough to rest people, they get burnt.  The longer you sustain the more burnt people get and the harder it is for them to recharge.  This is reality in a small military with inadequate numbers of people and funding.

Concur. Especially when you're talking about 10% deployed, 10% training and 10% having just returned. 30% of CANSOF if the 2,000 pers is accurate is tagged just for IMPACT.
 
Rotate more of the Reg Army through CANSOFCOM positions?

Vandoos, PPCLI and RCDs doing a two year secondment to a CSOR Direct Action Company and then return to their Regiment?
 
Chris Pook said:
Rotate more of the Reg Army through CANSOFCOM positions?

Vandoos, PPCLI and RCDs doing a two year secondment to a CSOR Direct Action Company and then return to their Regiment?

You can't just rotate NCMs/Officers in to CANSOF Assaulter/Operator roles like a regular posting. There still has to be a selection and Assaulter/Operator course to get members that have the abilities/skill sets/personality that suites SOF and the roles they are employed. Just because someone was a good Infantryman/Officer in a Battalion doesn't mean they would be succcessful as an CSOR Operator, or JTF2 Assaulter.

 
Chris Pook said:
Rotate more of the Reg Army through CANSOFCOM positions?

Vandoos, PPCLI and RCDs doing a two year secondment to a CSOR Direct Action Company and then return to their Regiment?

Hmmm sounds like the Airborne Regiment.  >:D

LightFighter said:
You can't just rotate NCMs/Officers in to CANSOF Assaulter/Operator roles like a regular posting. There still has to be a selection and Assaulter/Operator course to get members that have the abilities/skill sets/personality that suites SOF and the roles they are employed. Just because someone was a good Infantryman/Officer in a Battalion doesn't mean they would be succcessful as an CSOR Operator, or JTF2 Assaulter.

The problem with CSOR is they've gone beyond the initial training scope of the unit.  When CSOR was created, they took the bulk of 3 RCR Para Company, ran them through a crash course and said, you're now CSOR.  So what you're saying is factually incorrect, it's perfectly possible to take a normal Infantry Company, weed out a few laggards and build a Commando unit, how do you think the Paras/Royal Marines have successfully done it for years?

CSOR has become JTF2 lite because we've gone for the 90% solution when the 75% probably would have sufficed and also been cheaper.  I know a number of Operators who have been with CSOR since the beginning, they freely admit that they probably wouldn't crack the unit if they had to try out with today's selection standards.

What the CAF probably needs is a dedicated light infantry Battlegroup that's got a larger emphasis on physical fitness, field craft and individual soldier skills than your standard infantry battalion.  Think Recce Platoon but way bigger.

You could have a short selection focused on physical fitness followed by a short commando course, voila unit created. 

The elite of the French Army do it this way.  The FFL takes their most physically fit/keen legionnaires and generally send them to 2REP.  They then all do BPara followed by a "stage commando" which is dependent on which company they wind up in (2REP Companies all have different specialties - Mountain, Littoral, Desert, Urban, etc).  After a few years, if they're still keen, they can attempt to get in to the elite Groupe Commando Parachutistes (GCP) which is a Tier 2 SOF unit within the French Army (each unit within the parachute brigade has at least one GCP, 2REP has two).

Because Canada only ever really dabbles in anything we do, six pack of fighters here, sprinkling of Int guys there, some CIMIC here, few tanks over there.... we tend to choose the most expensive COA, not necessarily the best one for producing massive amounts of combat power.  Such is life in the Armed Forces of a declining middle power  8)
 
Eye In The Sky said:
It's been almost 3 years sustained now.  You can only rotate in/out what you have, and if what you have isn't enough to rest people, they get burnt.  The longer you sustain the more burnt people get and the harder it is for them to recharge.  This is reality in a small military with inadequate numbers of people and funding.

I imagine that's what happens when you have ambitious commanders trying to "Keep up with the SOF Jones'".
 
Eye In The Sky said:
.... This is reality in a small military with inadequate numbers of people and funding.

Or is it reality in a military an army that is spending resources on anything other than that element that is regularly engaged?  20,000 candidates in 3 Brigades to keep 3 companies in CSOR supplied?  And you can't find enough physically fit, switched on specimens?




 
Lightguns said:
Pretty soon everyone will be special forces (SF) at this rate.  Mission creep; you do not need to be SF to advise indigenous population soldiers in conventional warfare.  You need to be SF when you advise in ops designed for SF operational environments.  Teaching Iraqi army recruits to shoot straight, throw a grenade or drive a hummer does not require an operator.  Teaching irregular forces in a complex operational environment requires SF, teaching SF requires SF.

The Canadian Army, with their pedantic and ridiculous (Micro) Managed (Un) Readiness Plan, have priced themselves out of business.  CANSOF makes a point of excelling in, and embracing ambiguity and filling empty space.  Is there any doubt why CANSOF continues to grow at the expense of the Canadian Army?
 
Chris Pook said:
Or is it reality in a military an army that is spending resources on anything other than that element that is regularly engaged?  20,000 candidates in 3 Brigades to keep 3 companies in CSOR supplied?  And you can't find enough physically fit, switched on specimens?

We dabble Chris, it's all about dabbling in this Armed Force  ;D

devil39 said:
The Canadian Army, with their pedantic and ridiculous (Micro) Managed (Un) Readiness Program, have priced themselves out of business.  CANSOF makes a point of excelling in, and embracing ambiguity and filling empty space.  Is there any doubt why CANSOF continues to grow at the expense of the Canadian Army?

So if we were to compare the CAF to a potluck?

Is CANSOFCOM the dude that brings pulled pork but only enough for like two people to have

Is the Army the jackass that shows up with 10 rotten veggie plates from the roadside truck stop

;D
 
My concern would be repeating the mistake that the Israelis made. They decided in the 50s that all infantry should be paratroopers, those that couldn't or wouldn't were sent to the mechanized infantry which was under funded to fund the paratroopers.  The result was that their infantry corps valued paratroopers travelling light to mechanized infantry and thus the mechanized infantry became a bastard that was transferred to the Armoured Corps who underfunded it and let it's training go because of the lessons of 67 when infantry rarely dismounted.  In 73 when the Arabs got ATGMs the armoured paid the price of not having a trained mechanized infantry.  The quick fix was to give the paratroopers half tracks from reserve infantry units whose troops were turned into labour for the engineers.  Thus wasting the vertical insertion capacity of a majority of the paratroopers.
 
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