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Canadian Military/Defence procurement process (Mega Thread)

I wanted to post this in the Fighter discussion, but the line below would work equally well with the P-8 that the US, UK, Australia, NZ, South Korea, Norway and India currently have or are ordering.

But there’s an additional irony here. The F-35 was not just the choice of the Harper government. It was initially selected by the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien. The primary reason: interoperability with our primary allies. The U.S., U.K. and Australia would all be buying the F-35 so it just made sense.

https://nationalpost.com/opinion/canadas-fighter-jet-debacle-this-is-no-way-to-run-a-military?utm_term=Autofeed&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Facebook#Echobox=1538563618
 
MarkOttawa said:
Important procurement qualification from Mercedes Stephenson (now Global) at twitter:
Ok SO very important information to correct and clarify what is in the PMO release about changes to cabinet. The responsibilities for defence procurement and Phoenix are changing [or gripping] cabinet committees NOT Ministers
I agree that changing Ministers is mere theatre, allowing the gov't to proclaim "look, we've done....something  :dunno: " -- most real work is overseen at DM and A/DM level. 

A recurring, but often overlooked procurement problem is that "procurement" doesn't start until after  'options analysis' is complete, producing a statement of requirements.  In some instances these analyses have dragged on for 10 years;  as they dither, yes, technology advances, so naturally, it must be included, adding further delays as 'the plan' gets re-jigged..... again.

So one acquisitions step could be reduced by telling the good idea faeries (Mil & Civ) to STFU much earlier, and adapt the construction process to the realities of time/tech advancement.  For example, UK shipbuilding factors in the higher-tech only after construction of hulls, propulsion, etc has already commenced... thus moving inevitable tech obsolescence to the right.


And don't get me going on how 'sole-sourcing' is supposedly some ultimate evil.  ::)
 
Journeyman said:
And don't get me going on how 'sole-sourcing' is supposedly some ultimate evil.  ::)

Well of course it is when Bombardier/Irving doesn't get the contract.  :nod:
 
Journeyman said:
...

And don't get me going on how 'sole-sourcing' is supposedly some ultimate evil.  ::)

Sole source procurement make good sense, and is, in fact, the ONLY sane thing to so when:

1. You know what it is that you need, i.e. a C-17 not just any big transport aircraft. You may know that because, for example, you know that you want an aircraft that is built and supported by an ally, not by e.g. the Russians;

2. You need it sooner rather than whenever any competitive process might be finished;

3. The item you need is in production; and

4, There is only one source ... thus, there's no point in any competition.

Sole source procurements should, almost always, be political decisions, rarely bureaucratic and almost never (maybe some specialized, super-secret stuff like crypto is the exception) a military one. The C-17s, the Chinooks and the Leopard 2A6M CAN tanks are good examples of good, smart, sole-source procurements. In each case it needed a minister to overrule the bureaucrats, including the ones in CADPAT, because, sometimes, the standard, much loved and defended to the bureaucratic death ~ paper cuts and eye strain ~ process isn't useful or even desirable.
 
Moving away from a two year posting cycle, and the assumption that receipt of a posting message magically transforms someone into the CAF expert on a subject would also assist.
 
dapaterson said:
Moving away from a two year posting cycle, and the assumption that receipt of a posting message magically transforms someone into the CAF expert on a subject would also assist.


:rofl:  Too true!  [:D  As those of us who spent year after painful frustrating year in both requirements and engineering can attest.  ::)
 
Why the Pentagon Could Never Build A Death Star

https://taskandpurpose.com/pentagon-death-star/

Say what you will about Darth Vader, but he knew how to run a modernization program. When he was put in charge of the Death Star Joint Program Office, that battle station reached initial operating capability on time – a feat the Pentagon seems unable to replicate many years later.

The Defense Department could learn a lot from Vader. For example, is there any mention in the “Star Wars” trilogy of the second Death Star being over budget? Of course not. You best believe that the Sith bad-ass would have locked the prime contractor into a fixed-price contract that included a clause such as, “JPO reserves the right to force choke your CEO every time the software doesn’t work as advertised.”
 
Piece by Dave Perry of CGAI--I'll believe big amounts of future money are there when I seen them--and will major projects get closer to timelines and announced budgets? Also gov't has recently promised complete replacement of all large CCG vessels. That will need a big budget, how will that affect monies for Canadian Forces? Remember Liberals like CCG these days as it's not in the killing business; and think of all those shipbuilding Jobs! Jobs! Jobs! in Canada.

Plus new procurement minister Anita Anand does not necessarily inspire confidence https://anitaanand.liberal.ca/.

The Defence Procurement Outlook for Canada’s 43rd Parliament

While defence received little attention during the 2019 federal election, an interesting point of consensus between the two most popular political parties was the need for further reform to the way Canada conducts military procurement.1

The re-elected Liberals proposed to create Defence Procurement Canada. The Conservatives, now the Official Opposition, pledged to use the House of Commons Standing Committee on Defence to de-politicize procurement projects, while reforming a cabinet committee on defence procurement and creating a Privy Council Office secretariat to support it.  The two approaches shared the idea of creating one organization to act as a single point of accountability, although the modalities of achieving this differed considerably.

The clear message, though, from Canada’s two major parties is that they want a different, presumably better, outcome from Canada’s defence procurement system.  For a party in opposition, a call for action is predictable, although that does not mean it lacks merit.  For a Liberal Party coming off four years of majority government to call for such a significant change in the form of a new entity for defence procurement is unexpected, including, it appears, to many Liberals themselves and the public service.  The Liberal pledge is especially surprising given that Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s government spent the past two years extolling its record on defence procurement to stakeholders, and procurement officials have been unanimous in promoting their record of achievement when given the opportunity.

These campaign pledges highlight two problems with Canada’s procurement system. First is a growing disconnect between procurement practitioners in government and everyone else paying attention about how well our procurement system functions.  People working on procurement, while acknowledging some challenges, generally believe that the system works far better than those outside it perceive, and there is a widespread sentiment that the years since the launch of Strong, Secure, Engaged have been particularly productive.  The views of those not working in the area, and for most in industry, are far more negative, ranging from the rejoinder that procurement is broken, to simply too bureaucratic, too cumbersome and too slow.  A second and related problem seems to be that those working on procurement from the inside continually establish expectations that are not met.  The procurement performance is judged more often than not based on whether delivery lived up to publicized plans.  If the reality of delivery is slower than promised, those outside the system see problems...[read on]
https://www.cgai.ca/the_defence_procurement_outlook_for_canadas_43rd_parliament

Mark
Ottawa

 
Oldgateboatdriver said:
Second: 2023 for the first JSS!!! Can we revisit getting Obelix 16 months from ... now, per chance?

Too expensive.  They already burned through the 5 year budget for the Asterix.  It's year two...
 
Cloud Cover said:
Hmmm. Need a bigger budget.

Given that the medical system isn't paying hospitals, Valcartier is shutting down their gym for lack of money, and the money for an Individual Learning Plan has basically dried up I'm thinking money is a little tight.  Maybe it all went to the Asterix already... ;D
 
No way man, we want our money for nothing and our ships for free.
 
Conclusion of another piece at CGAI:

Defence Procurement Canada: Opportunities and Constraints
...
No structural reform, however overarching, will represent a silver-bullet fix to what one former Defence minister characterized as a “sclerotic” process.54 The presence of central agencies in the procurement process, their policies and the realities of defence politics in Canada generally highlight the limitations on any restructuring. Minimizing interdepartmental duplication and leveraging procurement expertise still must contend with Treasury Board’s contracting policy. Decision-makers must therefore consider whether the DPC proposal will go beyond alterations of the DND-PSPC-ISED structure and consider changes to the roles and responsibilities of central agency involvement, including contracting reform (e.g., more use of advance contract award notices, or ACANs).55

None of this is to say that a DPC should not be pursued. On the contrary, those very same arguments made on human resource consolidation and reducing the silo co-ordination challenges between departments and ministers’ offices remain strong incentives for considering structural reforms. As detailed above, the last 15 years have seen numerous examples of projects being sidelined by personalities and trifurcated process. The challenge for decision-makers, particularly in a minority government, is how to ensure that any proposed changes avoid disrupting ongoing or planned acquisitions lest it become an exercise in self-defeat. Canada’s own history of experimenting with the DDP should serve as a caution to the notion that establishing a DPC will be a panacea for avoiding all procurement ills.
...
About the Author

Jeffrey F. Collins earned a PhD in political science from Carleton University in 2018. He also holds a MA in strategic studies (Birmingham), a law degree (Aberdeen), and a BA and certificate in public administration (Memorial). He is an experienced policy advisor at both the federal and provincial level and is currently a research fellow with both the University of Manitoba's Centre for Defence and Security Studies and Dalhousie University's Centre for the Study of Security and Development, respectively.

Jeff's research interests are in defence procurement, missile defence, Canadian and Australian defence policy and the Arctic. He has spoken and published widely in these areas and is the co-editor of the book, "Reassessing the Revolution in Military Affairs" (Palgrave Macmillan 2015). A new book, "Canada's Defence Procurement Woes" (Palgrave Macmillan), is due out in 2020.

A proud east coaster, Jeff hails from Newfoundland but now resides in Prince Edward Island.

https://www.cgai.ca/defence_procurement_canada_opportunities_and_constraints

Mark
Ottawa

 
Report on delays

https://www.nationalnewswatch.com/2020/02/05/more-than-100-military-procurements-facing-delays-defence-department/#.XjryQUBFyUl
 
related to the topic: anyone in uniform can tell you bases are falling apart

Feds short hundreds of million in repair, maintenance of defence infrastructure

The federal government has been chronically underspending on the repair and maintenance of Canada's defence infrastructure for years, leaving officials to play catch-up on maintaining aging roads, runways, jetties and thousands of buildings across the country.

https://www.nationalnewswatch.com/2020/03/03/feds-short-hundreds-of-million-in-repair-maintenance-of-defence-infrastructure-2/?fbclid=IwAR27OMySvPcEEM_5Pt1_S3jfat6_K4ctR3sXMK_eryI2OHJj3QG0nJVRGsw#.Xl575KhKiUk
 
https://www.mondaq.com/Article/899742?email_access=on

Canada: Defence Procurement Canada: An Ambitious Government Initiative - 3 Mar 20
by Phuong T.V. Ngo and Quin Gilbert-Walters


As part of its 2019 election platform, the federal Liberals announced a plan for the creation of a new Crown agency that would be responsible for conducting procurements on behalf of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, dubbed "Defence Procurement Canada."

Since the election, few details have been released about Defence Procurement Canada although it may have a structure to a similar Crown corporation: Defence Construction Canada.

What We Know
Earlier this year, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau sent mandate letters to the four ministers responsible for the creation of Defence Procurement Canada:

Minister of Public Services and Procurement, Anita Anand;
Minister of National Defence, Harjit Sajjan;
Minister of Fisheries, Oceans and the Canadian Coast Guard, Bernadette Jordan; and
Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry, Navdeep Bains.
The Minister of Public Service and Procurement was instructed to lead the project. Her mandate letter instructed her to ensure that Canada's biggest procurements were delivered on time and with greater transparency. Specifically, Minister Anand was told "This priority is to be developed concurrently with ongoing procurement projects and existing timelines."

Specific timelines have yet to be released with respect to the creation of Defence Procurement Canada. It is not entirely clear whether the new agency would assume responsibility for procurements that have already begun, namely the Future Fighter Capability Project and the National Shipbuilding Strategy.

What to Expect
The proposed Defence Procurement Canada is being created along side the implementation of another important policy, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). At the time of publishing, the Government of Canada has introduced Bill C-4, An Act to implement the Agreement between Canada, the United States of America and the United Mexican States. Both the United States and Mexico have already ratified the agreement.

Once the USMCA comes into force, the trade agreements applicable to Canadian procurements will change. Unlike NAFTA, the USMCA chapter for government procurement does not apply to Canada. Instead, Canada's government procurement with the United States and Mexico will fall under two trade agreements that are already in force. Procurement between Canada and the United States will be governed by the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP). Procurement between Canada and Mexico will be governed by the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which came into force at the end of 2018.

With a view to conducting more streamlined procurement processes for defence purposes, the Government of Canada may seek to conduct Defence Procurement Canada's procurements under the national security exceptions of the AGP and CPTPP. In 2019, the Government changed the regulations of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal to require it to dismiss complaints where a national security exception has been invoked by the procuring entity. This change requires complaints to be reviewed in the Federal Court where the timelines are considerably longer and the remedy does not necessarily include the correction of an unfair procurement practice. Rather, the Federal Court has the remedies available to it under judicial review including the ability to quash a contract award.

Conclusion
A new procurement agency with specialization in defence procurements could go a long way in improving the efficiency of important purchases by the government. However, there are currently few details. Gowling WLG will continue to provide updates on the creation of this new Crown corporation.
 
https://globalnews.ca/news/6762098/coronavirus-canada-military-spending/?utm_source=GlobalNews&utm_medium=Facebook&fbclid=IwAR0N51mDlDTIgEBHTwwDXsMzce9OT87YFJ82bsZS8-OgcwV6iSIQ6zJ1r-A

COMMENTARY: How the coronavirus crisis is bad news for Canada’s military budget

I agree with this article the CAF will get the short end of the stick now, equipment will get worse, the budget will shrink, and all our problems will start compounding further
 
From the article:
With a $113-billion deficit suddenly a prospect, the last thing any government will want to pay for are military purchases that will cost tens of billions of dollars, however badly the new kit has been needed for many years.

We were paying more in interest than on defence; now undoubtedly more. The wild spending and millions of giveaways in recent years put Canada in this jam.

We continue to give cash to China.


https://www.thepostmillennial.com/liberals-refuse-to-say-how-much-foreign-aid-were-giving-to-china/

Liberals refuse to say how much foreign aid we’re giving to China -3 Oct 19


https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-ottawa-to-increase-foreign-aid-as-part-of-the-fight-against-covid-1/

Ottawa to roll out (More) foreign aid as part of the fight against COVID-19 spread - 19 Mar 20
 
The military should be preparing a pitch to show how economic revival funding can be used to stimulate local economies by repairing military related infrastructure. 
 
Colin P said:
The military should be preparing a pitch to show how economic revival funding can be used to stimulate local economies by repairing military related infrastructure.

Agreed, especially to a degree the PRes, new or upgrading armories and other facilities would create jobs in a lot of towns and cities. Be a chance to prepare for future growth, maybe return old capabilities, for example what if we rebuilt the CFB Edmonton airfield? New hangers in cold lake, etc..
 
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