Battle of Trafalgar... Time to move on?

[dapaterson]

To recap your argument: Who cares about other Commonwealth nations. Except Britain.

 

[Journeyman]

.... the Battle of the Atlantic ...a Canadian led the allied forces involved, many of the key strategic decisions were still being made at the Admiralty.

Two points (in trying to keep a rein on revisionist history):

1.  Britain and Canada shared responsibility for North Atlantic convoys, hunting the enemy, and rescue... with the USN assuming control over the central and southern Atlantic. Northwest Atlantic Command "spanned from north of New York City to 47 degrees west," and was placed under the command of RAdm Leonard W. Murray on 30 April 1943.  So Canada "led" in the NW half of the Atlantic.

2. This division was proposed by USN CNO Adm Ernest J. King at the Atlantic Convoy Conference (Washington DC: 1–12 March 1943).  Not part of "the Admiralty."


Trivia: Northwest Atlantic Command was the only Allied theatre of operations commanded by a Canadian during the war.


Again, carry on with Mess discussions...

 

[FSTO]

Two points (in trying to keep a rein on revisionist history):

1.  Britain and Canada shared responsibility for North Atlantic convoys, hunting the enemy, and rescue... with the USN assuming control over the central and southern Atlantic. Northwest Atlantic Command "spanned from north of New York City to 47 degrees west," and was placed under the command of RAdm Leonard W. Murray on 30 April 1943.  So Canada "led" in the NW half of the Atlantic.

2. This division was proposed by USN CNO Adm Ernest J. King at the Atlantic Convoy Conference (Washington DC: 1–12 March 1943).  Not part of "the Admiralty."


Trivia: Northwest Atlantic Command was the only Allied theatre of operations commanded by a Canadian during the war.


Again, carry on with Mess discussions...

I'm sure King was not happy to make that recommendation. He was not a fan of the British (and by extension the Canadians as well)

 

[Journeyman]

    :nod:

But I suspect he felt the lesser evil was to keep the British and Canadians busy south of Greenland, without cluttering-up and pestering the Americans throughout the rest of the Atlantic.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Speaking of which I was reading elsewhere that the Defense of the West Coast of Canada against German Surface raiders in WWI was given to the Japanese Fleet. While I know we were somewhat still Allies at that point, I don't recall any Japanese ships stationed on this side and only occasional Port visits by Japanese warships.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

But I suspect he felt the lesser evil was to keep the British and Canadians busy south of Greenland, without cluttering-up and pestering the Americans throughout the rest of the Atlantic.

Actually, King probably knew very well what he was doing for two reasons:

First, while you could not tell the RCN from the RN during WWII, King knew there was a difference because (and this must have influenced him in his decision) the Canadians had "saved his bacon" during the early going in the war. When he refused to listen to the Admiralty's suggestion that he institute convoys along the eastern seaboard, tankers -amongst others - started being sunk in such number that they almost needed to institute rationing in the US North-East. Canada said, screw this - he doesn't want to listen so we will create our own tanker convoys from the Caribbean to Canada and escort them ourselves. These Canadian convoys did not lose a single tanker. What do you think happened? The US bound tankers joined the Canadian convoys and were saved.

Second, since the US barely contributed to naval forces in the Atlantic, and even less to convoy protection but King was aware, like all senior US officers, of the understandings concerning defence of North America reached with the Bretton-Woods accord, he knew that pushing for Canadian command on this side of the Atlantic would give him a much greater access to information on what was going on and a greater say in the conduct of the Atlantic war than leaving such command in the hands of the British - who would have refused American command over the Atlantic failing a much much larger contribution to it than the one the Americans made.

Keep also in mind that the RN provided naval protection of British North America from the beginning and the establishment of the Naval Service of Canada was not so much a new creation, but rather (if you really delve into the Naval Service Act of 1910) the formation of a Canadian squadron of the RN.

Pusser: We see eye to eye on many things (I would say most) naval, but this above is, IMHO, a complete misreading of both facts and history.

After the war of 1812, the British were leery of another American invasion and started massive investments in defence of its remaining North American colonies: The current Citadel in Quebec and Fort Henry in Kingston, multiple forts along the Richelieu River (hence its being known here in Quebec as the "Valley of the Forts"), the Rideau canal, etc.

Then came the little scrap known as the US civil war. The British knew there and then that their efforts were futile: They could no longer possibly protect their colonies if the US decided to dispose of them. This led to England pushing its colonies into a union to provide for their own protection (it became the Canada we know) and to England being very careful from now on to avoid any action that could provoke the Americans.

This second aspect is what ultimately led to the creation of the Canadian Navy - not to be a squadron of the RN but to be independent of the RN so we could deal with the Americans. You see, at the turn of the 20th century, the biggest maritime problem for young Canada was the American fishermen flaunting our fishing rights and fishing in Canadian waters as if they were theirs - with England unwilling to start a scrap with the US standing by and ignoring the problem. Canada was not amused.

At the same time, England was involved in an arms race with Germany. This, as you know, involved Battleships and Battle-cruisers. These were very expensive and it was a serious drain on the British treasury. So they called on all of their colony at the 1902, 1907 and in particular the 1909 Imperial conference on defence, to agree to contribute funding directly to the "imperial" fleet - meaning the RN - so that more Battleship could be built. All agreed but Canada. Even from 1902 on, Canada being unhappy with England's way of protecting our coast started a "naval service in disguise", the Department of Marine and Fisheries, to protect Canadian fishermen. It came to a head when Canada flatly said no to an Imperial fleet and indicated it would pay for the defence of its own coasts. This led to the creation of the RCN. You can almost say that this was one of the first act of independence of the young Dominion - well before WWI and the ensuing Westminster Statute.

And the RCN was not, or ever meant to be a "squadron" or  "squadrons" of the RN. The RCN was to be independent and assume all responsibility for Canadian waters, with an understanding that if war came, it would coordinate its action with the Imperial fleet.

Thus, when WWI came, the existing large vessels (two cruisers) were incorporated into the Pacific Squadron and the Bermuda squadron respectively, while the new acquisition small vessels for port and coast defence built during the war remained under full Canadian control and command throughout.

A good place to read on this is in : RCN in Retrospect 1910-1968, Coll. edited by James A. Bouthillier, (UBC Press, 1982), Chapter 2: L.P. Brodeur and the Origins of the Royal Canadian Navy

But I suspect he felt the lesser evil was to keep the British and Canadians busy south of Greenland, without cluttering-up and pestering the Americans throughout the rest of the Atlantic.

Journeyman: Nobody, and especially the Americans, operated North of Greenland, except the British who escorted the Murmansk convoys. US operations in the Atlantic in WWII were limited to their own coast, the Caribbean's, one escort group for mid-ocean (E.G. 8 ) and the escorting of their own military convoys.

And Colin, I addressed the Japanese contribution in one of my posts above. 
   

 

 

[Journeyman]

But I suspect he felt the lesser evil was to keep the British and Canadians busy south of Greenland, without cluttering-up and pestering the Americans throughout the rest of the Atlantic.

Journeyman: Nobody, and especially the Americans, operated North of Greenland, except the British who escorted the Murmansk convoys.

Nowhere did I say that anyone was north of Greenland.

  But I'll try again with pictures....

[Convoys generally followed the red route; real estate to the north = Greenland/Iceland {therefore sailors to the south } ]

[Note that the bit above Iceland/Greenland is not  Atlantic.]

 

[Pusser]

Oldgateboatdriver, we've read the same books, but come to different interpretations.  I don't think we disagree, but we certainly place different emphases on things.

In the late 19th Century, Britain came to the conclusion that it could no longer afford to provide worldwide military protection to the entire
Empire.  Thus it began to ask its members, particularly the self-governing Dominions, to start contributing.  The preference stated at the Imperial Conferences was for the Dominions to provide funding in order to build more ships for the RN.  Canada indeed refused, stating that if we were going to fund a navy, we would like to establish our own.  The Admiralty was deadset against this and the British government wasn't thrilled, but didn't have much choice.  It is also worth noting that only the governing Liberal Party was in favour of a Canadian navy, the Conservative Party was all for giving money to Britain to build ships.  The resultant Naval Service Act was a compromise.  It established a naval service (not yet the RCN), but one that was effectively absorbed into the RN in times of crisis (hence my conclusion that it was really just a de facto (if not de jure) Canadian squadron of the RN).  It is worth noting that the Governor General (Lord Grey) actually suggested a unique ensign for the fledgling service (a White Ensign with green maple leaf in the centre), but this was flatly refused by the Admiralty because they viewed all Imperial ships as being part of a greater RN and thus, wanted them all dressed the same.

The Liberals then lost the Drummond-Arthabaska by-election, largely due to the unpopularity of the Naval Service Act.  The good citizens of Drummond-Arthabaska were opposed to the creation of a Canadian Naval Service because they saw it as an imperialist tool for Britain.  The Liberals lost the seat to Henri Bourassa's Nationalists.

The Naval Service Act was also a contributor to the Liberals losing the 1911 General Election, after which the Conservatives tried to strangle the (now) RCN by cancelling its building program and passing legislation to provide funding to the RN to build dreadnoughts.  The dreadnought funding bill was then defeated in the Liberal dominated Senate, the net result being that the RCN remained small, yet the RN got no money.

The RCN remained dependant upon the RN for decades for trainers and in senior leadership positions.  This really did not change until after WWII.

 

[Underway]

Journeyman: Nobody, and especially the Americans, operated North of Greenland, except the British who escorted the Murmansk convoys. US operations in the Atlantic in WWII were limited to their own coast, the Caribbean's, one escort group for mid-ocean (E.G. 8 ) and the escorting of their own military convoys.

HMCS HAIDA did the Murmansk run as well.  The Arctic is right there on her battle honours, 1943-1945.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Yes she did. She was part of the HMS INDOMITABLE escort: a British task force. Individual Canadian ships may have served, but only as assigned to a British group. No Canadian task force, escort group or flotilla was ever assigned to the Murmansk run.

None of the Tribal class destroyers of Canada served under Canadian command in WWII: They all served in Royal Navy groups or fleets. The British were too chintzy to affect high end destroyers like the Tribals to mere mid-ocean escort tasks, regardless of the fact they would have been damn useful, and the Canadian Regular force "British" bent meant that they also looked down at the escort fleet as lower  class to be left to the RCNVR. They wanted action with the real fleet, meaning with the Brits, and in fleet destroyers, cruisers and aircraft carriers.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Yes she did. She was part of the HMS INDOMITABLE escort: a British task force. Individual Canadian ships may have served, but only as assigned to a British group. No Canadian task force, escort group or flotilla was ever assigned to the Murmansk run.

None of the Tribal class destroyers of Canada served under Canadian command in WWII: They all served in Royal Navy groups or fleets. The British were too chintzy to affect high end destroyers like the Tribals to mere mid-ocean escort tasks, regardless of the fact they would have been damn useful, and the Canadian Regular force "British" bent meant that they also looked down at the escort fleet as lower  class to be left to the RCNVR. They wanted action with the real fleet, meaning with the Brits, and in fleet destroyers, cruisers and aircraft carriers.

This is my sense of it, too ... as it was told to me, when I was a young boy, by a couple of people who had very "close up and personal" insights.

There was a deep, personal and professional animus between VAdm Percy Nelles, an able administrator but, generally, regarded as an indifferent sailor and a downright poor strategist, and RAdm Leonard Murray who was highly regarded as both a seaman and as a leader who understood the strategic imperatives. Murray, and his boss, Adm Sir Max Horton in the UK, were fighting a HUGE and, arguably, decisive battle ~ a strategically decisive campaign, really ~ and they believed that the only really important tools were the frigates (improved corvettes) and light aircraft carriers and, later, Lancaster bombers. Nelles wanted to build a Big Navy of real destroyers and cruisers while Murray (and Horton) wanted more and More and MORE frigates (and merchant ships). Both Nelles and Murray got what they wanted, the latter because Churchill, above all others, shared the Horton/Murray view of the strategic situation.

The convoys to Russia were important, Russia had to be kept in the war; that too was a key strategic imperative. But most of what went to Russia had, first, to make it to Britain from North America and Horton and Murray were responsible, as commanders, for making that happen.

Neither Horton nor Murray were liked, at all, by their respective political leadership groups ... which, partly, explains why RAdm Murray was "thrown under the bus" for the Halifax riots, but, I was assured, both were happy with their status ... as long as no-one in London or Ottawa was able to interfere with their command decisions and as long as new ships and crews continued to arrive.

The RCN, as a service, expanded far too much and too quickly in 1940 and 41. the RCNR and, especially the RCNVR simply could not cope and many (most) Canadians warships had to be pulled from convoy duty in 1942/43 for retraining: the captains and crews were not up to the job of mid-ocean escorts; it required levels of seamanship, ship handling and tactics that could not be learned "on the job." This is not, in any way, to denigrate the courage or abilities of those men ... they were, just, inadequately trained because the need for "throughput" overwhelmed the system. In 42/43 Murray was given more and more British ships and his Canadian ships were sent to special British squadrons, organized by Horton, specifically for training. It worked; it was, in a way, akin to the "battle schools" the Canadian Army used in the same time frame to turn uniformed civilians into soldiers.

 

[FSTO]

The RCN, as a service, expanded far too much and too quickly in 1940 and 41. the RCNR and, especially the RCNVR simply could not cope and many (most) Canadians warships had to be pulled from convoy duty in 1942/43 for retraining: the captains and crews were not up to the job of mid-ocean escorts; it required levels of seamanship, ship handling and tactics that could not be learned "on the job." This is not, in any way, to denigrate the courage or abilities of those men ... they were, just, inadequately trained because the need for "throughput" overwhelmed the system. In 42/43 Murray was given more and more British ships and his Canadian ships were sent to special British squadrons, organized by Horton, specifically for training. It worked; it was, in a way, akin to the "battle schools" the Canadian Army used in the same time frame to turn uniformed civilians into soldiers.

Just finished this book:
https://www.amazon.ca/Mobilize-Canada-Unprepared-Second-World/dp/1459710649

Great read on how woefully prepared Canada was for the upcoming war. You are almost yelling at the pages "Can't you idiots see what is coming?"
That Canada was able to get to some level of competency by 1942 was a incredable achievement.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

To be fair FSTO, the British, from whom our Prime Ministers still took their cue in those days, also either didn't see it coming - or did not want to see it coming - "exiled" Winston Churchill's preaching in the desert to the contrary notwithstanding.

 

[FSTO]

To be fair FSTO, the British, from whom our Prime Ministers still took their cue in those days, also either didn't see it coming - or did not want to see it coming - "exiled" Winston Churchill's preaching in the desert to the contrary notwithstanding.

True, the appeasement sentiment was strong in Whitehall, I would argue it was doubly prevalent in Langevan Block.

 

[Edward Campbell]

At the risk of dragging this even father off track ... two factors prevailed, especially in Britain:

    1. Horrible memories of World War I ~ think of "SuperMac" (Harold Macmillan) returning to Oxford to find that he was the only survivor from his class in his college ... a certain segment of British, especially English society paid a
        disproportionate price for some outdated ideas about gentlemen and "service;" and

    2. As in Canada, the impact of the Great Depression was especially severe in Britain ~ worse than in France or Germany because of the structure of the British economy. It was especially vulnerable to market failures.

That doesn't excuse appeasement but I think it helps to explain why it was so politically popular, as it was in America, too, by the way.

 

[jollyjacktar]

One cannot fault them for not wanting to get into another major war with Germany, however, once they could plainly see the writing on the wall they should have charged ahead faster and further than they did.

 

[Kirkhill]

...

    2. As in Canada, the impact of the Great Depression was especially severe in Britain ~ worse than in France or Germany because of the structure of the British economy. It was especially vulnerable to market failures.
...

I am not sure I can agree with you on your second point E.R.  My families survived the Great Depression in Britain in reasonable condition.  The Scots side worked in the Co-Op in coal mining parts of Ayrshire and the English side sold dairy equipment across Scotland.  There are no family legends of people starving.  There are tales of having to put a car up on blocks and reducing the maid staff to one that came in to work rather than living-in.  There are tales of flying to Skye on business in a deHavilland Dragon Rapide. 

The Jarrow March of 1936 happened but I never got any sense that the Depression in Britain was as generalized a disaster as it was in Canada and the US.

Indeed someplaces, like the Birmingham and the Midlands were booming building electrical products, cars and houses.

The Tyneside and the Rhondda were very badly hit.

 

[Pusser]

I am not sure I can agree with you on your second point E.R.  My families survived the Great Depression in Britain in reasonable condition.  The Scots side worked in the Co-Op in coal mining parts of Ayrshire and the English side sold dairy equipment across Scotland.  There are no family legends of people starving.  There are tales of having to put a car up on blocks and reducing the maid staff to one that came in to work rather than living-in.  There are tales of flying to Skye on business in a deHavilland Dragon Rapide. 

The Jarrow March of 1936 happened but I never got any sense that the Depression in Britain was as generalized a disaster as it was in Canada and the US.

Indeed someplaces, like the Birmingham and the Midlands were booming building electrical products, cars and houses.

The Tyneside and the Rhondda were very badly hit.

In retrospect (largely because of The Waltons I could argue), we have a tendency to look upon the Great Depression as a period of universal poverty, but that wasn't really the case.  Although unemployment got as high as 25-35% (depending on the country), that also means that 65-75% of the population remained employed. Both of my grandfathers remained employed throughout the Great Depression (although one did lose every last dime he had had in the bank), so starvation was never a possibility.  Nevertheless, that's not to say things were rosy.

 

[Edward Campbell]

It's true that Britain entered the Great Depression later and (officially) existed it sooner than America and the overall "loss" to the economy was less than in America, but ...

The British economy had, already, taken a big hit from the First World War and the American economy, which has blossomed in that war, had farther to fall.

Britain lost, worst, in those so called "invisible exports:" banking and shipping and insurance. That had a "rolling" impact as the British recovery was always weak ... the Second World War damn near did them in. By 1946, when Dean Acheson, for example, expected Britain to intervene in the Greek civl war he was shocked to be told, by Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, that the UK could not afford to send an infantry division, not even a brigade, to Greece; the cupboard was bare ~ Britain was broke. (That, the understanding that both allies and former enemies were broke, was part of the impetus for the Marshall Plan.)

 

[Kirkhill]

I think that most Brits of a certain age would define the economic crisis as continuing through the war to the end of rationing in 1954, two years after Her Majesty took the throne.

But the crisis/crises probably depended a lot on who you were and where you lived.  Britain is a small island and the locals moved to find work, or emigrated.