Australian Army Transformation

[Infanteer]

I'm always keen to keep up on what our cousins down under are doing - I see our militaries as sharing many of the same characteristics.  The Aussies are also going through a "Transformation" initiative entitled the Hardened and Networked Army.  Here is the site for anyone who is interested in checking it out.

http://www.defence.gov.au/Army/HNA/default2.htm

 

[cobbler]

I like it, EXCEPT switching 3RAR from Para to Mech roles. In Australia's region with Australia's missions I think the ability to quickly reinforce areas with another Battalion from the air is a vital capability.
The only para capable outfits in the Aus Army now will be the SASR and 4RAR (cdo's).

Another thing to mention will be the RAAF's purchase of 4 C-17's, which together with the RAN's coming LHd's will be really vital in using a 'hardened networkd army'.

 

[cobbler]

Umm...reinforce which areas?  You mean if, like, Mars invades Australia or somefink?

Umm, No.

I mean reinforce our numbers on islands that we may be operating in, in peace or war (most likely peace though, unless its low-intensity conflict against tribal warlords).

Australia is constantly involved in leading peacekeeping operations around the Sth Pacific.

Timor, the Solomons, Bouganville, PNG, and probably Timor again, Fiji, and a slight chance of West Papua.

Sea transport takes time and is limited in the numbers we can transport (and of course with emabarked army helos, mechanics, etc the number of infantry is reduced even further), so after an area is secured if we need more infantry we could drop in 3RAR for more peacekeepers (or as the case is very often, peacemakers).

Autralia and Canada have many similarities in our needs. But where Australia has the burden of regional responsibility and high involvement, Canada has none.

 

[Infanteer]

The RAAF is picking up C-17's?  Wow.  Let's see - strategic lift (C-17), attack helicopters (Tiger), medium lift choppers (Chinook), utility choppers (Blackhawks), MBT (M1A1s); most impressed with the ability of the Australian military to keep itself in good shape.

 

[cobbler]

The RAAF is picking up C-17's?  Wow.  Let's see - strategic lift (C-17), attack helicopters (Tiger), medium lift choppers (Chinook), utility choppers (Blackhawks), MBT (M1A1s); most impressed with the ability of the Australian military to keep itself in good shape.

The Army is also getting MRH-90's to supplement the blackhawks. The 90's will be used from the amphibs in conjunction with the Navy's Seakings (ths blackhawks aren't marinesed so its hell operating them from onboard ship). 12 blackhawks will be transferred over to directly support special operations.

So far only 12 MRH-90s have been ordered, but that is sure to increase. And the Navy is looking at the NH-90 as it's next air purchase.

http://www.buzztracker.org/2004/08/31/cache/322909.html

 

[Michael Dorosh]

I guess I'm having trouble seeing the utility of a single para battalion, given "Australia's current missions" and agree with the decision of the Australian government.

If you are talking about the defence of Australia, you have to ask yourself: who would be invading Australia, and in the event of an invasion, what good would a single battalion be in defending the continent. Any invasion would have to be huge, and I don't think there is any reasonable risk of such.  Any small invasion would be suicidal given Australia's current political alignment and alliances.

Given the prospect of a "huge" invasion, the question would be - who short of the Martians would want to and be in a position to do so? Hence my original reply - apologies if it seemed abrupt, I just thought it was a foregone conclusion Australia was in no danger of a direct, imminent, large scale invasion.

If you are talking about peace operations ala East Timor, again, I have to ask in what situation would an airborne drop be necessary - can someone name a similar situation in the history of similar missions dating back 50 years when an airborne battalion was used to strengthen a mission?

If you are talking counter-insurgency, the US and Australians got through the Vietnam War without needing to use paratroopers, is there reason to think that would change now? A more recent example would be Iraq and Afghanistan I suppose.

And isn't it rather difficult given the terrain in "Australia's region" to operate paratroopers? I realize not all islands are heavy jungle, but wouldn't airmobile troops deploying from helicopters be far more practical than using parachutes?

There is no "need" for a parachute battalion IMO, unless someone can provide a realistic "f'rinstance" in which an Australian battalion might need to be redeployed beyond the range of a tactical helicopter squadron.

I'll give a parallel example; teams of mules have provided useful for resupply in the last 60 years - in Italy in the Second World War, for example, and I believe some forces have used them in the mountains of the former Yugoslavia, going where trucks can't. Given that it is a specialized capability, and that the trend in modern first world militaries is to minimize expenditures and focus on those capabilities most necessary, would it be worthwhile to keep a mule squadron trained and part of a standing army in the unlikely event it might be necessary despite no current forecast for its use and no historical usage of same in the last 60 years? The answer is no.  Which isn't to say that paratroops or mule squadrons are useless; defence planning with a small budget in a peacetime army is based on priorities. Canada has done the same thing with heavy armour; a tough pill for traditionalists to swallow also.

I rather thought that's why we have these discussions - to examine what those priorities should be rather than vigorously defending tradition?

Finally, there is the not inconsiderable factor of casualties and willingness to accept them. One can debate the 'brittleness" of public resolve. Again, given Australia's "current missions" which I have to belive involve a level of public approval somewhat less than was displayed in a full scale war, is it not true that the likelihood of airborne employment brings with it the spectre of increased casualty counts? Direct parachute assaults have always been costly; in a homeland defence scenario this would not be a factor but again, one has trouble envisioning the need - or desire - to parachute a battalion of men into hostile territory outside of such a scenario given not just current missions but also the public's willingness to accept the higher level of loss normally associated with such operations.

Isn't that why we haven't seen many airborne operations since 1945 in the first place?

 

[onecat]

Michael Dorosh  "If you are talking about the defence of Australia, you have to ask yourself: who would be invading Australia, and in the event of an invasion, what good would a single battalion be in defending the continent. Any invasion would have to be huge, and I don't think there is any reasonable risk of such.  Any small invasion would be suicidal given Australia's current political alignment and alliances. "

You just listed the whole the Liberal party defence policy, their whole reason for unfunding and cut backs is totally based on your ideas of it won't happen here so we don't need it, and if it does we have  our allies ( ie the US) to defence us.  Its a failed policy and as Canada has con't to discover theer are more reason to need a fully trained and eqiupted military...  Hopefully the Aussies they'll stop here before its too late.

 

[Kirkhill]

Michael:

I think we tend to look at invasions as led by armed forces and thus figure that we need to prepare for fleets of landing craft and helicopters as the first indicators of problems.  Strangely enough I think that such a threat can only be mounted by a "law abiding" state - one that is in control of its population and adheres to the notion of actually declaring war against another state.

An alternate scenario can be built around the Mexican-American war of the 1840s and the earlier insurrection at the Alamo.  In that instance neither belligerent had control over its people or its borders and settlers moved from one jurisdiction to the other.  Once inside the other jurisdiction they started agitating to live life according to their rules, not the "host's" rules.  Eventually the agitation broke over into isolated instances of armed insurrection.  Finally the parent nation of the settlers came to the "rescue" of the settlers and ultimately claimed the "host's" territory for its own.

This not an American phenomenon.  It is a well established historical pattern.

The ability to defend ones borders from "settlers" in the first place and from "armed insurrection" sponsored by external governments in the second place makes the loss of territory and/or invasion less likely.  No country can realistically expect a positive outcome from an invasion unless it believes at least a sizeable portion of the population will support the invasion.

I look at airborne forces as being equivalent to the quick strike teams used by the forest services to quickly put out brush fires before they get out of hand.  The old saw used to be "Better a Battalion in time than a Division too late".  Perhaps these days, given technology improvements, that could be down-sized to better a Company now than a Brigade too late.   The same principle applies.

Cheers.

PS - I will get that info I promised off to you.  Its sitting beside me.

 

[Michael Dorosh]

Kirkill - good points; I think a parachute-trained commando unit would be very necessary, for example, a hostage rescue at an airfield offshore ala Entebbe. But you wouldn't have a light infantry battalion doing that, you'd have an SAS for such missions, with much less need for conventional supporting subunits.

If you are saying retention of a conventional parachute unit would be a useful deterrent to large scale invasion (EDIT - just reread your post, looks like my signal crossed, but I'll leave this in anyway), I don't see a situation in which a determined enemy would look at Australia's defences and say 'my God, we can't invade them, they have a parachute battalion!" and saying on the contrary, all other things being equal, "thank God they don't have that parachute battalion, we strike at dawn!"  Wouldn't a defence of Australia be aimed at defending major cities, ports, and airfields?  The fighting for Iraq has involved much urban terrain; who knows how a potential conquest of Australia might take shape, but one has to suspect that urban fighting would play a large role.

Of course, no one thought armour could fight in cities either, before Iraq, didn't they.  I still suspect parachutes and buildings wouldn't mix well. 

radiohead - why so convinced the Liberals were wrong in some of their assumptions?  I agree with you, but for different reasons. Canada needed a military capable of performing on the world stage - that might have included a brigade of armour in the two gulf wars (not paratroops), more conventional forces in Yugoslavia, or other missions as they became necesary  Our paratroopers did good work in Somalia that was overshadowed by some unfortunate incidents, but they didn't jump there. Canada's defence policy and standing in the world was indeed hurt by Liberal policies, but there is no direct connection between that and the specific capabilities we are discussing here.

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

The other thing they mention was that they want a force capable of dominating a battlefield in Australia and in its immediate vicinity.

I interpret this to mean they want to have the capability to deploy airborne troops into a place like Bali should they determine the situation warrants such action.



Matthew. 

 

[Old Sweat]

Michael,

The Australian situation is rather more tense than ours. They are just off the outer edge of the huge Islamic crescent that runs from the pillers of Hercules to the Phillipines, and this has coloured their thinking, quite rightly in my opinion. Also, their north-west quarter is a long way from population centres, empty and arid, but still part of their homeland. like us, any assessment of Australian attitudes is effected by population, distance and climate.

Add in their unfortunate experience in the Second World War, when the vast majority of their forces were in the Middle East and the UK at the time of Pearl Harbor. (Of their four infantry divisions, three were in the eastern Mediterranean and one was in Singapore, and thus, soon there were three) Despite pre-war promises from the Brits, the other formations were slow returning. One division was sent to Ceylon (Sri Lanka), not Australia while the others were retained in the Middle East for a long period. One fought at El Alemain in October 1942, ten months after the start of the Pacific War, and with large Japanese forces in New Guinea threatening Queensland and the Northern Territory. The situation was at least as bad for the RAN and RAAF. In the latter case there was not a single modern fighter aircraft in Australia.

Having an airborne capability gives them another option, and one that can be rapidly deployed.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

I suppose, IMHO, that quick and immediate response to a natural or man made disaster, outside the range of helborne ops may be a good reason to have the capability. They don't just have to be utilized for red vs blue situations do they?

 

[Michael Dorosh]

Michael,
The Australian situation is rather more tense than ours.  (good historical stuff snipped)
Having an airborne capability gives them another option, and one that can be rapidly deployed.

Bitter memories of relying on US support probably linger as well, and a reluctance to do the same. I think we're all in that same boat though.

Okay, so do we know how did the Australian government reached their conclusions? Not trying to imply they are sacrosanct, most governments make poor decisions wrt the military in the name of fiscal expediency; does their official explanation hold water?

 

[Michael Dorosh]

I suppose, IMHO, that quick and immediate response to a natural or man made disaster, outside the range of helborne ops may be a good reason to have the capability. They don't just have to be utilized for red vs blue situations do they?

It's an excellent point, but the question then is -

a) what disasters do you train them to operate in? Would they need additional special training other than military training?
b) why haven't they been used that way in the past in other nations?  Or have they?

On the face of it, you would seem to have highlighted another reason to include them. The opposite view would be that it would be an expensive misuse of resources. 

 

[cobbler]

Bitter memories of relying on US support probably linger as well, and a reluctance to do the same. I think we're all in that same boat though.

Okay, so do we know how did the Australian government reached their conclusions? Not trying to imply they are sacrosanct, most governments make poor decisions wrt the military in the name of fiscal expediency; does their official explanation hold water?

It's not fiscal expediency, its just how they view the needs of our services. I welcome another mech battalion, but perhaps a different one than 3RAR.

In fact converting from para to mech and moving the entire battalion half a continent west will cost quite a bit of dough, it is certainly not the work of government tightening the purse strings.

And how did this end up discussing an Australian invasion scenario? I never mentioned such a thing.

 

[ArmyRick]

Its interesting to see how their transformation is going compared to ours.

 

[Trooper Hale]

Well its not like anyone is really telling US how our transformation is going! Theres a lot of bitterness amonst the Reserves especially where i am because of the Armour situation. We'r supposed to be armoured corp soldiers but under the guise of a "Harder, Net worked Army" within the next few years there is going to be very little Hardness in the Reserves, in fact there will be very little armoured vehicle qualifications amongst reserves. Its all good and well to say that training reserves as Recon scouts (dismounts) will mean that they can be sent to Full-time units to releave their manpower shortages but how about the need for armoured crew? Rotations to Iraq at the moment are being supplemented by Choco's who are already driver qual'd, what happens in a few years when to get a reserve qualified they need to do the full ASLAV course? Reserves are used to be stuffed around, personally i'm excited that we'll get to play with the big guns and not have to walk anywhere but there is still a lot of bitterness that we seem to be getting pushed around by a Army that see the reserves as a bit of a joke. I'm hoping that if nothing else, we'll still have the option of doing AFV drivers courses and, even more hopefully, be encouraged to do so.
But what do i know? I'm only a reserve Trooper and have no idea what goes on around me.

And on the subject, the think the Airborne question is a bit of a dead-end, theres not a lot of need now-days for a para-drop, I mean i dont see the jungles of East Papua being a fun place to have to float down into, i cant speak for any of them but I'm guessing most Para's quite like having unbroken necks.
Jumping out of a AFV or a chopper seem a lot more relevent to todays military situation in and around Australia then dropping and capturing the enemies bridges below the front line. The world has changed although i am intrigued by the mule idea! I've already wanted to be a qualified Mule-ist

 

[1feral1]

Michael,

The Australian situation is rather more tense than ours. They are just off the outer edge of the huge Islamic crescent that runs from the pillers of Hercules to the Phillipines, and this has coloured their thinking, quite rightly in my opinion. Also, their north-west quarter is a long way from population centres, empty and arid, but still part of their homeland. like us, any assessment of Australian attitudes is effected by population, distance and climate.

Add in their unfortunate experience in the Second World War, when the vast majority of their forces were in the Middle East and the UK at the time of Pearl Harbor. (Of their four infantry divisions, three were in the eastern Mediterranean and one was in Singapore, and thus, soon there were three) Despite pre-war promises from the Brits, the other formations were slow returning. One division was sent to Ceylon (Sri Lanka), not Australia while the others were retained in the Middle East for a long period. One fought at El Alemain in October 1942, ten months after the start of the Pacific War, and with large Japanese forces in New Guinea threatening Queensland and the Northern Territory. The situation was at least as bad for the RAN and RAAF. In the latter case there was not a single modern fighter aircraft in Australia.

Having an airborne capability gives them another option, and one that can be rapidly deployed.

Old Sweat, you've been doing your homework, good on ya, as for this new 'hardening' effort, it only benifits my Regiment, and it is already beginning to pay off, slowly but surely.

As for ARA AGR anamosity, there has always been and always will be, the same in any army which has Res vs Reg.I have come to the conclusion there is an equal amount of idiots that falls through the cracks in each component.

Cheers,

Wes