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Army Expansion Versus The "Exodus of Experience" - Do We Have A Problem?

Bartok5

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Teddy Ruxpin said:
.....Making matters worse, we're beginning to hemmorage senior leadership (MCpl - CWO and Maj/LCol) - the very people who will form the foundation of the training staffs and the leadership of any "new" units. 

.......IMHO, we have the focus wrong.  I honestly believe we need to focus on retaining the people we have - both Regular and Reserve - before embarking on a massive recruiting campaign.  Things like resigning incentives, cash bonuses and preferential postings go a long way towards retaining people already trained, as do challenging and interesting jobs..... 

I split Teddy Ruxpin’s quotes above from the “MND Report Card” thread, as I believe that the subject of attrition within the senior officer and NCO ranks is worthy of some examination and discussion.  I can only speak to my personal experience within the Reg F, as I have been out of the Res F system for many years.  I will leave it to others to address Reserve “attrition versus expansion” issues. 

I fully agree with Teddy that the current government’s ambitious efforts to significantly increase Reg F Army strength will prove challenging  unless the ongoing problem of leadership attrition can first be addressed.  The fundamental question is whether or not the current situation can actually be rectified, and if so, how?  To answer the first question, it may be useful to consider how we have ended up where we are.

Anyone with more than a day in uniform understands that we will never achieve complete success in stemming voluntary releases.  Attrition is a perennial problem for every volunteer military, and the CF is no exception.  There are historical "steady states" for attrition within each CF trade, and those baseline rates of release must be accepted as an immutable reality of military personnel management.  There will always be a percentage of folks who decide at various points along the career path that military service is no longer consistent with their personal goals, their family desires, etc. 

Unfortunately, we are currently experiencing a disproportionately high rate of release amongst our experienced Reg F leadership in the ranks of Sgt-CWO and Capt-LCol.  This is a significant problem for the Army even at its present strength, and is a potential "show-stopper" in terms of achieving near-term force expansion.  At the very same moment the government wishes to increase our overall strength, we are seeing unprecedented rates of attrition amongst the core of experienced leadership that is required to make the expansion initiative a reality.  A recruitment and training system that would have already been stressed to support the government’s intent must now also contend with an ongoing haemorrhage of critical talent.  So how did we get to this unfortunate confluence of events, and what can we do to address it?

As far as the Reg F is concerned, I see two primary reasons for the sudden, seemingly disproportionate exodus of experienced leadership.  The first (and foremost) is simple military demographics associated with a cycle of force reduction and limited recruiting that spanned the 1990s.  Recruiting targets during the mid to late 1980s were designed to offset historical rates of attrition for a CF Reg F component of 90,000 personnel.  In other words, we were aggressively hiring in comparatively large numbers.  Then the Berlin Wall fell and the end of the Cold War created Canadian expectations for an immediate “peace dividend”.  The Reg F was subjected to a government-directed force reduction throughout the 1990s that saw our strength drop by 40% to the current figure of approximately 56,000 uniformed personnel.  Recruiting was dramatically reduced throughout that decade in order to achieve reduction targets through attrition.  Cash incentives and early retirement benefits were also offered to many trades in an effort to encourage early retirement (eg. the Force Reduction Program). 

The deliberate reduction in Reg F strength throughout the 1990s put a stop to the steady intake of new recruits necessary to maintain a healthy and balanced force.  We ended up with a large "bubble" of personnel who were recruited during the mid to late 1980s moving through the career progression system, with very little “new blood” following in their footsteps.  In effect, the force reduction efforts of the 1990s created a recruitment (and succession) void that is now coming back to haunt us.  The critical mass of Reg F personnel recruited in the mid to late 1980s are now reaching 20 years of service, and many are opting to release with the basic 40% pension.  At the very same time as this “bubble” of experienced personnel are choosing to retire, the curtailed recruitment of the 1990s leaves us with a disproportionate shortfall of suitably experienced “next generation” personnel to fill vacated leadership and staff positions. As a result, the Canadian Army is suddenly faced with an alarming (and increasing) shortage of experienced Reg F Sgt-CWOs and Capt-LCols.  The “band-aid” solution is to promote increasingly less experienced personnel into key leadership and staff positions.  That approach has the advantage of creating a much "younger" force, but the immediate institutional cost in terms of reduced developmental experience among key leaders and staffs may be high.  Efforts to quickly fill the void created by the ongoing departure of the 1980s “bubble” will undoubtedly present short-term challenges and growing pains.  I would hazard to guess that it will be upwards of five to 10 years before equilibrium is fully re-established based on the post-2000 resurgence in recruiting.

The second (and arguably more important) reason that we are experiencing a surge in the loss of experienced Reg F leadership is the increasing lack of incentive to continue serving.  As ironic as it may seem, although opportunities for promotion have increased as a result of the ongoing attrition "bow-wave" from late 1980s recruitment, promotion simply isn't as attractive as it used to be for many of the officers and senior NCOs who are now reaching 20 years of service.  The "pinnacle" positions that experienced leaders once aspired to (eg. RSM, unit CO, Bde Comd) have lost their lustre and are now viewed as being far more bureaucratic than operational by those who remember "the good old days".  Let's face it - under the current Army Managed Readiness Plan, the vast majority of unit COs and RSMs are relegated to nothing more than "Force Generators" responsible for training sub-units to deploy under someone else's operational command.  Unless the stars align and you are one of the two unit headquarters anointed to deploy a Task Force each year, you will "command" little more than a training establishment.  In other words, you now get all of the administrative headaches but none of the professional rewards formerly associated with unit command.  The net effect is greatly reduced incentive for for operationally-focused leaders to aspire to unit and formation command. 

Given the above, it is no coincidence that within the past 24 months, two LCol COs within 1 CMBG have voluntarily released after serving just one year of their two-year unit command tour.  Couple that with the increasing tendency of top-performing majors to decline selection for Toronto Staff College (the LCol qualifying course), and it becomes apparent that there are serious problems associated with the lack of meaningful unit command. 

Compounding the demoralizing state of higher command appointments is the realization that only a very select few will actually attain such a position.  The vast majority of officers and senior NCOs reaching the rank of LCol/CWO will end up in the staff stream, serving in an endless cycle of desk jobs at various HQs and training establishments.  While key staff positions can be very rewarding in their own right, those appointments are simply not what "warrior leaders" aspire to.  As a result, the majority of my peers now consider sub-unit (vice unit) command to be the pinnacle of their service.  Once company/squadron/battery command has been completed, typically prior to the 20-year point, what is there left to look forward to?  If the answer is "not much", then one tends to look elsewhere for personal and professional fulfillment.  Sure, there will always be those who are content to continue serving after their duty within operational units has ended.  All the power to them, provided that their motivations are not entirely self-serving or purely financial in nature.  In my experience however, those who joined to lead soldiers on operations are increasingly discouraged by their comparatively “boring” job prospects following sub-unit command.  Hence the reason that so many are suddenly opting to release at the 20 year point with the financial assurance of a basic pension to enable their pursuit of greener pastures.

The results of a recent CF job satisfaction survey provide further evidence of emerging problems vis-a-vis the future health of CF senior leadership.  The survey clearly indicated that the most dissatisfied rank within the CF, regardless of trade, is LCol.  Is it any wonder that senior officers in that rank are opting for early retirement in ever increasing numbers?  Is it surprising that more and more majors want nothing whatsoever to do with the next rank?   Houston, we have a problem…..         

I offer the above comments from the perspective of a Reg F infantry officer who has made a conscious decision to leave the Army at the conclusion of my final regimental posting in the Summer 2007.  I reckon that this makes me one small part of the ongoing “experience exodus” problem that Teddy Ruxpin refers to.  As a member of the group in question, perhaps my personal outlook can provide some useful insight as to what makes many members of my military generation “tick”.
     
When I retire next year I will have completed six years of Res F service as an NCM, followed by 21 years of commissioned Reg F service.  I have thoroughly enjoyed the privilege of various command and instructional appointments, culminating in deputy command of an infantry battalion.  I have zero regrets and would do it all again without a second’s hesitation.  The fact remains however, that I am not the least bit interested in what further Reg F service has to offer beyond this stage of my career.  This is a view that I can unequivocally state is shared by an increasing number of my peers – many of whom have already reached the 20-year point and released, or are fast approaching that milestone and have made their intentions clear.  I have outlined the underlying reasons for our disinterest in further CF service with my preceding comments.  The prevailing line of thought among many of my peers is that we’ve given as much as we’ve received in dedicating the best years of our lives to the CF and to the nation.  We therefore bear no moral obligation to continue serving in a role that has limited potential to offer us future job satisfaction.  If that sounds a tad selfish, particularly in light of the fact that our departure may be leaving force expansion in a difficult situation, then so be it.  At the end of the day, I believe that it is better for people of my era to leave on a positive note and make the transition to civilian life rather than stick around out of a misplaced sense of obligation that would inevitably lead to dissatisfaction for all concerned.             

Would re-signing incentives or cash bonuses help to curtail the ongoing exodus of experienced Reg F leadership?  I can only speak with certainty for myself, and the answer is a resounding “no”.  Money has never been a significant factor in my decision to serve, and a “bribe” would have zero influence on my decision to retire.   I was never in it for the money.  Service, personal challenge, excitement, job satisfaction, and all of the other “intangibles” associated with military service were my sole motivation.   I feel quite secure in extrapolating my personal views to encompass the vast majority of officers and Senior NCOs of my particular era.   

As far as preferential postings are concerned, I am sure that it would be nice to be able to live and work wherever one prefers.  But geography is irrelevant if there is not a suitably challenging and rewarding job to be done when you get there.  And therein lies the crux of the issue – there are precious few jobs that fit the bill for guys like me who have already held what they considered to be the best jobs available within the Army at the time.  There is no going back.  Our successors are nipping at our heels and they need the essential formative experiences that only those “good go’s” can provide.  The bottom line is that when the best jobs are already behind you and there is nothing in the foreseeable future that holds similar personal appeal?   It is simply time to move on. 

Based on all of the above, which I readily admit is nothing more than a distillation of personal observations and views, I can’t honestly see a solution to the problem of experienced senior leadership leaving the Army at this critical juncture.  The departure of key personnel in the Sgt-CWO and Capt-LCol ranks at this particular point in time is the result of myriad institutional and personal influences – some of which have been 20 years in the making and are only now coming home to roost.  Additional pay and benefits aren’t going to change the situation.  And at the end of the day, do we really want to retain the kind of people who would only stick around for the money?   I don’t think so.  Alternative or complimentary incentives such as preferred postings are simply another form of bribe (in cases other than those involving legitimate compassionate circumstances where the member wants to serve but can’t unless posted to a specific location).   Such incentives  wouldn’t convince me to stay, as they have nothing whatsoever to do with the fundamental problem of job satisfaction.  And therein lies the rub.  There are relatively few appointments that are of sufficient interest to operationally-focused leaders following their service as a sub-unit commander or Sergeant Major.  Most leaders didn’t join to fly a desk.  Staff duty is a “necessary evil” which many accept as the price to be endured between operational postings.  Once regimental duty ends and there is nothing further to look forward to, all bets are off.  How do you generate enthusiasm for further military service when the system cannot offer the individual something that he or she aspires to?         

Will Army expansion be adversely affected by the “bow-wave” of experienced leadership attrition?  Well, the ongoing loss of so much expertise certainly can’t help matters in the short term.  I expect that there will be some difficult and busy times for those who continue to serve and must “step up” to the initial training and leadership task while perhaps lacking the same degree of training and experience that their predecessors enjoyed.  Such is life –  junior NCOs and officers will simply have to suck it up and get on with the job, knowing that the institution we all cherish will eventually be stronger for their efforts. 

Having said that, I have complete faith in our current and future generations of developing leaders.  My recent experience with junior officers and NCOs in training establishments and within operational units has left no doubt in my mind that they are every bit as bright, motivated, dedicated and innovative as their predecessors – perhaps moreso.   That bodes very well for the future of our Army, regardless of the various challenges that lie ahead.  I for one, will be happy to step aside and hand over the reins to my successors when the time comes.  I’ll have done my bit, and it will be their turn to shine.  I have every expectation that they will do so in spades.             

My apologies if my personal take on this subject seems unduly negative or depressing.  That certainly wasn’t my intent!  As I stated earlier, I’ve enjoyed a tremendous military career with so few regrets that they are irrelevant in the overall picture.  There is much for young officers and NCMs to look forward to these days.  I am personally convinced that after a decade of decline, the Canadian Army and the CF as a whole is now moving in a very positive direction.  Public recognition and appreciation are at an all time high, we are fully engaged in interesting and meaningful missions on the world stage, funding for essential equipment and training appears to be forthcoming, the force is expanding, new “high-speed” units are being created, etc, etc.  It is a very exciting time to be in the Army, and I expect that those who are just starting out or are in the early stages of their careers will thoroughly enjoy themselves.  Just give it a few years, and nobody will miss the retiring “dinosaurs” from the dark ages….    ;)

Sorry for the long ramble.  As you can perhaps appreciate, Teddy Ruxpin has touched upon a subject  of considerable personal interest to me.  I look forward to hearing the views of anyone who cares to offer their thoughts on the matter.  I can't promise prompt responses (if any are warranted), but I will certainly look in on the thread to see what fellow Army.ca folks think.

Cheers,
 
Wow.  "TARGET - TARGET STOP!"  You hit the nail on the head.  I am rolling up onto 30 years Regular service, with 5 years of Militia before that.  I am amazed at the number of my peers with still bright futures who are pulling the pin.  Some of them were being groomed for bigger and better things, but are releasing none the less.  I often joke that I will not be able to CRA until 75, as I will be the only person left in the building who knows where the toilet paper is kept. 

Reasons?  Mostly peripheral.  The fact is that if today's army still provided the ability for units to train together in the field for extended periods, then combined with other units as brigades and - dare I say it? - a division now and then, we would begin to rediscover the lost part of our institutional soul. 

A return to unit rotations would help a lot as well.

Years ago, my peers and I remarked that Tank Troop Warrant and Recce Troop Warrant were the best jobs in the Army.  That is true even more so now, as those may be the last positions for a Warrant that guarantees him the job he joined to do.  After that : Chaos.

Tom
 
Exchange the terminology to the Navy and you have the same problem in Maritime Command. It is likely the same in the Air Force.
 
I agree, however it could never be worse than the 90's.
 
LIKELY said:
I agree, however it could never be worse than the 90's.

Likely,

It depends on how fast the expansion occurs, if it is attempted over a relatively small period of time 3-5 years, there will be large institutional problems for decades to come.

Cheers,
 
We went from about 76,000 - 78,000 when I joined in 1976 to about 90,000 in Jan 1991 when they announced the pull back from Germany, so we gained about a thousand a year - more during the 5,000 YTEP we took in 1983.  That worked, not even mentioning the many Radar Station closures in that period and the re-assignment of those PYs.

We could sustain a growth rate of a thousand a year - if we could recruit and RETAIN to it.

Tom
 
Just a few questions: 

Does the Army have to expand?

Does it need to happen before the next change in the mood of the country?

If so how is this to happen?
 
Does the Army have to expand?
Only if the govt wants us to do more than one tour at a time. Right now, that is not really possible, not at current strength levels and equipment levels.

Before the mood changes?
Honestly, I do not think the "mood" of the country matters a whole lot. We have been supported for years by the general Canadian population, and yet we were cut again and again. I to remember the lean times in the early 90's, with pay freezes, militia bullets, and FRP's. We were supported, just as we are supported right now. But the general population has no idea about our manning levels, retention issues or problems in the training system.

As for what Mark C is saying, I couldn't agree more.
The only reason I remustered is due to the fact that in my old trade, I had done it all. Except for driving a desk full time, I had done just about everything that my trade does. I had no interest in administration of that type (and I do not have the math skills to get an engineering degree). I needed something different in order to keep contributing and not turn bitter.
I have seen senior people getting out over the last two years at a slightly frightening pace. LCol Vida getting out was a shock to many, but he stated, to the entire Bn, he was not interested in doing a higher level admin job that had no real command component. He was an infantry soldier and wanted to command infantry soldiers. The amount of WO's that have left 1 VP in the same time frame proved to be very difficult for the Bn to overcome. These people had done their time, sacrificed much, and were done. I talked to a couple, that I have a great deal of respect for, about why they are pulling pin now. It was just time. At the crest of the curve that started 20 years ago. It will continue.

With the current backlog at many training establishments, and the wait times that goes with it, we are going to be feeling these growing pains for the for seeable future. I think we will come out the other side in better shape, just as we left the late 90's in good shape. We had adjusted to our size and were comfortable in our own skin. That is changing, again. That's not due to a change in mood, but a change in political vision on how important the CF is to Canadian National/International policy. That will change again, the next time someone else decides how important/unimportant we are as an extension of foreign policy.
 
Kirkhill:

(1) The Army has been ordered to expand by two successive governments.  That is sufficient reason to do so.  (Plus, there's the whole hollow strucuture issue, adn the inability of the current effective strength to generate forces required for ongoing operations).

(2) The expansion has to follow a rational course, ensuring junior leadership is in place to handle any influx of new personnel.  If, in the future, other governments make different olicy coices, having a well-trained pool of leaders is an important asset.  (And, of course, as the strucutres fill out and new ones are created it will be necessary to ensure a suitable pool of senior leaders as well)

(3) To grow, you require training system capacity - a training system that will have the ability to meet the steady-state requirement to account for normal attrition, plus capacity to deal with surges such as this.  Note that surge capacity does not necessarily mean more classrooms and instructors in Gagetown; it can mean using current units to run schoolhouses in their own lines, while providing national guidance and standards, or other methods.  It also means careful scheduling, to ensure proper flows - it makes no sense to overload on PLQ serials for new recruits before they are occupationally qualified.

It also means abandonning out usual "fix the problem this year" mentality.  TCBF spoke of increasing in size by 1000 per year.  That's probably a realistic number; we must also attempt to build a sustainable structure without age bubbles percolating through the system (the post-FRP freeze on recruiting will continue to haunt the CF for another decade at least).  Rapid increases may also lead to rank stagnation with large cohorts in competition; a staggered approach helps preserve a more orderly career progression and avoids career frustration and early releases.

Just my 2c.
 
Seeing as how I have started playing devil's advocate on this one I will continue.

First off I am a supporter of expansion.  I think we can and should do more. - Side Note - even with increased numbers I am still not sure that Darfur would be doable.

Now to the issue of how and when, and potentially what.

We are looking at standing up 13,000 more regs (23,000 with reserves was it?)  or about a 20% expansion in the force. 

I understand your caveats about cohorts, bubbles and career development and I accept them.

However.

Looking at the experience of Iraq and Afghanistan, or even Canada, Britain, Australia and the US in earlier years Armies have been able to expand at much faster rates than those envisaged here.

I admit that those were extraordinary circumstances, that they created forces that took years to come up to useable capabilities and that after the emergency was over resulted in a surplus of bodies and many disappointed individuals who were not allowed to continue with careers they had come to enjoy.

However again.

Is it not possible to contemplate hiring large numbers of "temporaries", such as the YTEPs mentioned earlier, just to get them into uniform, give them some rudimentary training and then start weeding through them to find the bodies you need. 

First of all find sufficient numbers of motivated individuals to secure the expansion before politics jumps in and starts using recruiting difficulties to argue that the Canadian public doesn't support a large force.

Second, test the motivation and skill of those available to you.

Third, release those unsuitable and sign up the more promising candidates for short term contracts as privates.

Fourth, offer careers to promising candidates, either in trades, "elite" forces or in rank.

Fifth, retain as many skills as possible by encouraging released soldiers to stay with the reserves, perhaps make it part of the first YTEP or Short term contract that on release they are still liable for 2-3 years reserve service.

I know/believe that much of this is already being done.  I understand that this would both put an additional load on junior leaders (Cpls commanding sections with a trained private as 2ic, Sgts as Pl 2ic) which would necessitate a reduction in the capabilities of some units with concommitent morale issues to be dealt with.  However historical precedent suggests that good leadership can overcome many of those problems in a year or two.

As I say. Playing devil's advocate here.

Cheers.
 
To address Kirkhill's point:
The rapid expansion that you are talking about was the first and second world wars methinks.
Both of those were stage four mobilizations where the reserve (militia) units flushed out from their usual sub unit size to full regiments and battalions. As far as I know there isn't a modern equivalent of that moblization plan (someone please correct me if I am wrong). So to do that would take an order in council (not likely) and that still leaves the quality issue that you mentioned. Not suggesting a solution here just making a few observations on your devil's advocation...
As far as Res F retention...it is ongoing issue that each unit, and brigade has struggled with in their own way. I could go on at length about the unique aspects of P Res retention but most of them are similar to the Reg F reasons (lack of opportunity/challenge). In my twelve years (all P Res) of service we have gotten better at retaining people. We used to have about 30% rollover per year, now I think that it is more like 17-19%. The two biggest things that keep the keener Reservists around is the opportunity for courses (Basic Para is a great retainer) and the prospect of deploying overseas. Unfortunately the new(er?) TF model that TCBF mentioned has reduced rather than increased the chances for P Res guys in my trade (Armd Recce) to 'get over'. Since that is a relatively new development it remains to be seen what impact that has on my unit. Fortunately we (my unit anyways) have not had the same "Exodus of Experience" that you guys are having. Perhaps Ironically we have had a few guys score some long term Class B jobs in places like Meaford to help train the Reg F guys coming out of St Jean.
My two bits.
 
Just a quick question. Is this issue even mentioned in the last International Policy Statement - Defence section?

If not more than 2 lines, is our political leaders aware of this issue and how serious it is?

That sheds a new light on this for me. I always thought it was the same problem as in the civil sector, namely the demographics changing it all, employers having much more difficulty to recruit qualified workers because of population aging. Looking at statistics on Statistics Canada, the curve of 25-54 population is not as steep as 55+ (Canadian population, by age), but it still means a challenge on passing on the expertise to younger generation. Still, the participation rates goes up and up (Participation rates), maybe it's good news, is it that we begin to work younger, that we work older, that birth rate is shrinking, thus leading to more participation rates? Not clear.

Being an officer candidate, this really makes me think. Thanks for bringing that up.
 
"Looking at the experience of Iraq and Afghanistan, or even Canada, Britain, Australia and the US in earlier years Armies have been able to expand at much faster rates than those envisaged here."

- We are no longer a mobilization friendly structure.  We have watered down our Summary Trial proceedings to make low level military justice basically unworkable.  We have overly complicated our entry procedures yet still take in medically and psychologically unfit pers, then fail to release them in a timely and economical manner. The army became unhappy with a "Purple" recruit BMQ plan, then invented the SQ course to make up for it, but now will settle for a longer BMQ.  Which will of course be watered down to the point where the army becomes unhappy with a "Purple"..

You see where I am going with this.

 
One of Mark's points hit home, the lack of challenging and satisfying career opportunities. I am pretty much topped out at rank (unless I go on a killing rampage), and to tell the truth, even though I took a job wildly out of trade (I am an Infantry soldier working as the Brigade G6-IT) I am getting pretty stagnent. Writing for the CAJ and Army.ca provides some relief since I can pretend I am making a contribution to the Army and CF as a whole, but I have few opportunities to put my hand on the wheel, and it is boring.

Some overall relief will take place with the growth of "new" units like CSOR and the expansion of JTF 2, and filling out the hollow sub units of existing battalions/regiments will make sub unit command much more satisfying.

I believe we "can" expand rapidly and produce a good quality force if we throw out our antiquated layers of staff administrivia, streamline the entry process and go for hard core training. The Brigades and Areas/JTF's which are set to produce a task force should be allowed to ramp up to WW II era "tiger training" from Unit led level 2 right to the BTE (and not with a 5:1 saftey staff/shooter ratio either). This will forge a cohesive force and provide lots of opportunities to field test leaders and potential leaders. These people will have been force fed the experience needed to carry out successful missions and train new troops to follow them.
 
Myabe a way to look at it would be to go back to unit/ Bn led battle schools and trade course.  We would use the main training bases..ie G'town nd Wainwright and a cadre of instructors/adm sign for some buildings to run their courese...the units would simply rotate staff when it comes their time to train "their" new soldiers.
 
Breaking News:
The upper echelon of leadership began punching out their subordinates today across the CF in the hopes of being demoted in rank and thereby reopening up those plum jobs that have since passed them by.
 
Two questions:

1. In the recruitment/basic training process what is the biggest bottle neck?

2. In the retention area, is there a rotation (for want of a better description) of duties/slots that NCO and officers go through. (the point here being that, once a person has trained up for an area, eg: infantry, done a tour, then come back and passed on his/her skills to the next batch, what then? simply repeat? Is there another step up in knowledge/skill level that they can aspire to?)
 
Quagmire said:
Breaking News:
The upper echelon of leadership began punching out their subordinates today across the CF in the hopes of being demoted in rank and thereby reopening up those plum jobs that have since passed them by.
that's not funny. Have you SEEN my CO?  :eek:

GAP said:
2. In the retention area, is there a rotation (for want of a better description) of duties/slots that NCO and officers go through. (the point here being that, once a person has trained up for an area, eg: infantry, done a tour, then come back and passed on his/her skills to the next batch, what then? simply repeat? Is there another step up in knowledge/skill level that they can aspire to?)
the Infantry is a never-ending learning experience. And there are all kinds of positions available in other areas. But, the point is, nobody really wants to take most of them, since they mean leaving the boys, and no longer leading troops. There is nothing higher to aspire to than leading well-motivated troops. It's the pinnacle.
 
  It is the same sort of thing with the tech trades. Once you hit Sgt, you never touch a tool again (there are certain exceptions. I know a Wpns Sgt WO that beds all the sniper rifles in his unit). Even at MCpl, your wrench bending time is limited. Medics, Truckers, Death Techs, etc. many are in the same boat. Some of Air Force trades stay active at the Sgt level, but I have never seen a WO or above actually do their trade anymore (cept SAR Techs). If what you want to do is no longer your job, how motivated can you remain? Even if your job is worthwhile and contributing a great deal, it can be difficult.
  All (ok, most) our staff positions, planning positions (etc.) are vital to our continuing effectiveness and we need to fill those positions with people knowledgeable in their respective trades, but it can be such a drastic change.
 
 
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