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Afghanistan: Why we should be there (or not), how to conduct the mission (or not) & when to leave

Karzai: "The Afghans want to have a government of their own. The Afghans don't want a government from abroad."
That is, of course, the view from the Presidential Palace in Kabul -- and on one level, he's correct, the Afghans must eventually run their own lives.

But a recurring theme from Kandahar and Helmand was "we don't like the Taliban; we don't like the central government; we don't like you -- but currently, you are the least of the evils." The overwhelming majority of Afghans I met have no overarching desire for 'a government of their own.' They want to be left alone to farm and raise their families. To that end, they appreciate the PRTs; it meets their needs.

While Karzai controlling the PRTs would strengthen his control, and hence government, I suspect the added bureaucracy and corruption/nepotism would not benefit the average Afghan, thus weakening the campaign.

Like the protests in Egypt, lofty ideals make for great placards and headlines, but the average person's aspirations tend to be less grandiose and lie closer to home.
 
Speaks for itself:

U.K. fretted over Canadian pullout
WikiLeaks: British PM complained about departure from Afghanistan

http://thechronicleherald.ca/Canada/1226854.html

OTTAWA — A leaked diplomatic cable says former British prime minister Gordon Brown complained to the Americans about the withdrawal of Canadian and Dutch troops from Afghanistan.

The document indicates Brown feared the departures would undermine public support for the war among NATO countries, particularly the United Kingdom.

Online whistleblower WikiLeaks released the U.S. diplomatic message, which also shows Brown fretting over which nation could replace the departing allies in Afghanistan’s volatile south.

The leaked cable, from September 2009, provides a rare, behind-the-curtain peek at how Canada’s closest allies viewed the decision to quit the fighting by July this year.

Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Defence Minister Peter MacKay have said they felt no pressure from either Washington or London to stay in Kandahar, and that allies respected Parliament’s decision to leave.

They both maintained that position, even as Harper announced Canada would switch to a training mission in Kabul last November.

But the cable reveals an anxiety rarely voiced in public and suggests the U.S. tried to persuade Canada to station some troops at the provincial reconstruction base in Kandahar after combat operations ended...

"The PM said that if the Netherlands and CANADA (sic) left, public opinion in other countries, including his own, would suffer," said the diplomatic cable from the U.S. Embassy in Kabul.

Mark
Ottawa
 
We do seem to be taking time working out our details--presumably because the CF were blind-sided by the govt's new commitment:

NATO: 740 trainers still needed in Afghanistan
At stake is the ability of the nation's police and army to take the lead in protecting and defending the nation by 2014

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41560860/ns/world_news-south_and_central_asia/

KABUL, Afghanistan — More nations are pledging support, yet NATO still faces a shortage of 740 trainers needed to get Afghan soldiers and policemen ready to take the lead in securing their nation, the coalition's top training official says.

Needed most are 290 police trainers, including those to work in new training centers opening in Afghanistan this year, U.S. Lt. Gen. William Caldwell, the commander of NATO's training mission, told The Associated Press in an interview Saturday [Feb. 12]...

The Afghan army and police still need thousands more officers trained. And there still is a critical shortage of trainers who can teach specific skills, such as how to manage military hospitals and clinics or fly and maintain Mi-17 aircraft.

At a ceremony Saturday at Camp Eggers in Kabul, Latvia and Lithuania together pledged up to 23 trainers to mentor the Afghan Air Force in southern Afghanistan. Their commitment raised to 32, the number of nations involved in the training mission...

The 740 shortfall exists even though 764 extra trainers, pledged by countries such as Romania and Bulgaria, are already making their way to Afghanistan.

Caldwell said the Netherlands and a nation in Latin America were considering sending trainers and that he was eagerly awaiting the details of Canada's pending commitment.

In November, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper decided with some reluctance to keep troops in Afghanistan in a noncombat training role after his nation's combat mission ends this year. Harper said he wanted to see a complete pullout of Canada's 3,000 troops. But he said Afghan forces needed further training and he didn't want to risk the gains that exiting Canadian troops had fought to achieve.

William Crosbie, Canada's ambassador to Afghanistan, said Sunday in Kabul that his country was finalizing plans to commit nearly 1,000 personnel, including 200 support staff and possibly 50 military police trainers and 45 civilian police trainers.

"Canada has said we're committed to doing it," Crosbie said, adding that details about where the trainers will be deployed and what they will be doing will be finalized in coming weeks
[emphasis added].

Caldwell said Canada's contribution would be an "enormous uplift" for the training mission that would fill the need for army trainers, but would not completely satisfy the demand for police trainers.

"We have had sufficient numbers of trainers to get where we are today, but we know that we need to accelerate this in 2011," Caldwell said. "We're going to open up five more major police training centers in 2011 and that's why we need those 290 more police trainers."..

Mark
Ottawa
 
Quelle surprise, some well worth reading polemic from Terry Glavin:

In Tahrir Square: Nir Rosen, Lara Logan, Mao, McChrystal, The Weak and The Strong
http://transmontanus.blogspot.com/2011/02/in-tahrir-square-nir-rosen-lara-logan.html

...
You get the picture. Try to imagine the 30 million most generous, hardcore and well-heeled contributors among Obama's fan base suddenly being obliged to abandon their familiar argots and turn their worlds upside down from an American counterinsurgency (FMLN, got it; Sandinistas, check; Tupamaros, yes, I dimly recall) to an American-backed insurgency. Next thing you know poltergeists are flinging dog-eared Chomsky volumes all over everybody's living rooms and Cousin Henry's writhing on the floor in the paroxyms of acid flashbacks. So McChrystal had to go. And that's not even half of the way the thing I'm calling "Rolling Stone" comes into it...

Wish I could write thus.

Mark
Ottawa
 
One way to undermine President Karzai (and the ISI?):

U.S.-Taliban Talks
by Steve Coll February 28, 2011
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2011/02/28/110228taco_talk_coll?currentPage=all

...
Last year...as the U.S.-led Afghan ground war passed its ninth anniversary, and Mullah Omar remained in hiding, presumably in Pakistan, a small number of officials in the Obama Administration—among them the late Richard Holbrooke, the special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan—argued that it was time to try talking to the Taliban again.

Holbrooke’s final diplomatic achievement, it turns out, was to see this advice accepted. The Obama Administration has entered into direct, secret talks with senior Afghan Taliban leaders, several people briefed about the talks told me last week. The discussions are continuing; they are of an exploratory nature and do not yet amount to a peace negotiation. That may take some time: the first secret talks between the United States and representatives of North Vietnam took place in 1968; the Paris Peace Accords, intended to end direct U.S. military involvement in the war, were not agreed on until 1973.

When asked for comment on the talks, a White House spokesman said that the remarks that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made last Friday at the Asia Society offered a “thorough representation of the U.S. position.” Clinton had tough words for the Taliban, saying that they were confronted with a choice between political compromise and ostracism as “an enemy of the international community.” She added, “I know that reconciling with an adversary that can be as brutal as the Taliban sounds distasteful, even unimaginable. And diplomacy would be easy if we only had to talk to our friends. But that is not how one makes peace. President Reagan understood that when he sat down with the Soviets. And Richard Holbrooke made this his life’s work. He negotiated face to face with Milosevic and ended a war.”

Mullah Omar is not a participant in the preliminary talks...

the Obama Administration has understandably concluded that the status quo is untenable. The war has devolved into a strategic stalemate: urban Afghan populations enjoy reasonable security, millions of schoolgirls are back in class, Al Qaeda cannot operate, and the Taliban cannot return to power, yet in the provinces ethnic militias and criminal gangs still husband weapons, cadge international funds, and exploit the weak. Neither the United States nor the Taliban can achieve its stated aims by arms alone, and the Administration lacks a sure way to preserve the gains made while reducing its military presence, as it must, for fiscal, political, and many other reasons.

If giving peace talks a chance can decrease the violence and shrink the Afghan battlefield by twenty or even ten per cent, President Obama will have calculated correctly: even a partly successful negotiation might help create political conditions that favor the reduction of American forces to a more sustainable level. A Taliban-endorsed ceasefire, to build confidence around long-term talks supported by many international governments, might also be conceivable.

Last spring, in Kabul, several former Taliban leaders told me that some exiled senior Taliban in Pakistan wanted the United States to leave Afghanistan but, at the same time, they preferred to talk with the Americans directly about the country’s future, both to escape I.S.I. manipulation and because they regarded Karzai as a weak puppet...

...Defense Secretary Robert Gates and military commanders, such as Admiral Michael Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued that Obama’s “surge” of troops needed more time to inflict morale-sapping damage on the Taliban; their theory was that Taliban leaders would take peace talks seriously only when they felt sufficiently battered. Last year, American-led forces killed or captured scores of mid-level Taliban commanders. General David Petraeus said recently that counterinsurgency efforts in the Taliban strongholds of Helmand and Kandahar provinces had pushed the guerrillas back. It was these perceived military gains that influenced the Administration’s decision to enter into direct talks [emphasis added]...

Mr Coll's excellent book:
http://www.amazon.com/Ghost-Wars-Afghanistan-Invasion-September/dp/1594200076

Mark
Ottawa
 
The green shoots view:

The ‘Long War’ May Be Getting Shorter
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/21/opinion/21nagl.html

IT is hard to tell when momentum shifts in a counterinsurgency campaign, but there is increasing evidence that Afghanistan is moving in a more positive direction than many analysts think. It now seems more likely than not that the country can achieve the modest level of stability and self-reliance necessary to allow the United States to responsibly draw down its forces from 100,000 to 25,000 troops over the next four years.

The shift is most obvious on the ground. The additional 30,000 troops promised by President Obama in his speech at West Point 14 months ago are finally in place and changing the trajectory of the fight.

One of us, Nathaniel, recently flew into Camp Leatherneck in a C-130 transport plane, which had to steer clear of fighter bombers stacked for tens of thousands of feet above the Sangin District of Helmand Province, in southwestern Afghanistan. Singly and in pairs, the jets swooped low to drop their bombs in support of Marine units advancing north through the Helmand River Valley.

Half of the violence in Afghanistan takes place in only 9 of its nearly 400 districts, with Sangin ranking among the very worst. Slowly but surely, even in Sangin, the Taliban are being driven from their sanctuaries as the coalition focuses on protecting the Afghan people in key population centers and hubs of economic activity, and along the roads that connect them. Once these areas are cleared, it will be possible to hold them with Afghan troops and a few American advisers — allowing the United States to thin its deployments over time.

A significant shift of high-tech intelligence resources from Iraq to Afghanistan, initiated by Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the former top commander, is also having benefits. The coalition led by the United States and NATO has been able to capture or kill far more Taliban leaders in nighttime raids than was possible in the past.

The United States certainly can’t kill its way to victory, as it learned in Vietnam and Iraq, but it can put enough pressure on many Taliban fighters to encourage them to switch their allegiance, depriving the enemy of support and giving the coalition more sources of useful intelligence.

Afghan Army troop strength has increased remarkably. The sheer scale of the effort at the Kabul Military Training Center [where the gov't wants most our new training mission to work] has to be seen to be appreciated...

Not since the deterioration in conditions in Iraq that drew our attention away from Afghanistan have coalition forces been in such a strong position to force the enemy to the negotiating table. We should hold fast and work for the day when Afghanistan, and our vital interests there, can be safeguarded primarily by Afghans.

That day is coming, faster than many Americans think.

Nathaniel Fick, a former Marine captain, is the chief executive of the Center for a New American Security. John Nagl, a former Army lieutenant colonel, is the president of the center.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/599-manea.pdf

Mark
Ottawa
 
How the Globe and Mail wants Canada to lead in Afstan, front page editorial:

Make women’s rights Canada’s postwar priority ("postwar"? do they think the war is over, or know when it will end?)
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/editorials/make-womens-rights-canadas-postwar-priority/article1914819/

Afghanistan is still one of the worst places in the world to be a woman. Now that Canada’s costly and controversial overseas mission there is winding down, this country has a unique opportunity to develop a new role in Afghanistan as a champion of women’s rights.

Canada should accept our responsibility for the women of Afghanistan, and make the advancement of their condition a primary foreign-policy objective.

Canada engaged the Taliban with a moral imperative, in many minds. Some progress has been made since the war began in 2001. However, a resurgence of the Taliban, and the withdrawal of foreign troops, will leave women vulnerable in that deeply conservative country. This is one aspect of Canada’s mission that must not abruptly end.

The Harper government needs a more systematic approach for its post-conflict role, one that ties aid to documented improvements in women’s access to legal reform, education, and health-care services. The challenges are abundant...

Ottawa should heed the advice of CARE Canada, which has called on the government to measure its post-conflict engagement in Afghanistan through the lens of improved human rights. Specifically, Canada could help tackle the barriers girls face in attending primary and secondary school; help train Afghan police in human rights; protect female leaders; ensure women are included in public-policy debate and peace-building; and focus on maternal and child health.

Afghan women need support so they can claim what is rightly theirs. Canada has an enduring obligation, and must not abandon what it has started...

If the Taliban return to power in significant parts of the country how does the Globe expect Canada to do all these warm and fuzzy things in those (and indeed other) areas?  Warm editorial thinking but fuzzy to the max.


Here's something more immediate--from Lauryn Oates at The Propagandist, further links in original:

Working Against Women - The Afghan Government's Attack on Women's Shelters
http://propagandistmag.com/2011/02/15/working-against-women-afghan-governments-attack-womens-shelters

The first women's shelters in Afghanistan only opened in the last decade, but have proven to be critical refuges to women fleeing violence. Afghanistan has one of the highest rates of violence against women in the world. The start of a network of shelters was the first crack of light into an otherwise dark void. The availability of shelters (14 in total now) is the very early beginnings of tackling a problem so pervasive as to often seem insurmountable.

In 2008, I worked on the first ever quantitative research into the levels of domestic abuse in Afghanistan. Our findings were nothing short of horrifying: in many places, a majority of women were facing regular abuse at home, whether sexual violence, physical violence, or psychological violence. Most marriages were "forced marriages" (distinct from arranged marriages), and abuse was often perpetrated by more than one family member, including female family members (30% of instances of abuse), such as a mother-in-law or sister-in-law. You can access the report, published by Global Rights, "Living With Violence: A National Report on Domestic Violence in Afghanistan" here.

Today, these shelters, which can sometimes mean the difference between life and death for women fleeing abuse, face their biggest battle yet. And it's not from violent and deranged wife beaters, insane clerics like Ayatollah Mohseni, or even the Taliban. No, it comes from the Afghan Government, the same government that is supposed to operate under a constitution that provides for the equality of men and women.

As described by an analyst in Kabul, Una Moore, the Afghan Government plans to take over control of the shelters from independent women's organizations, who founded and operate the shelters, and impose a set of rules and regulations that in some cases, could cost women their lives...

In light of the abuse regularly meted out by the Taliban, including the mutilation of women's faces as punishments and the August 2010 stoning to death of a couple in Kunduz, as well as the appallingly high levels of domstic abuse occurring across Afghanistan, one would think the Afghan Government would be seeking out ways to better protect women, rather than to remove one of the few recourses they have to safety. Seizing the women's shelters will, with certainty, make the situation of abused women worse...

More on Ms Oates:
http://readysetglobal.com/lauryn.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
Still troop density problems, with a Canadian angle:

US shift leaves Diggers exposed
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/us-shift-leaves-diggers-exposed/story-fn59niix-1226008394051

AUSTRALIAN forces are losing a third of their American allies in Oruzgan province as NATO moves troops into the more strategically important Kandahar region.

Australian military officials acknowledge that the decrease in US troops in the province will be significant but reject suggestions it will affect operations.

The Weekend Australian has learned that a 900-member squadron of the US Stryker Cavalry Regiment, tasked with mentoring Afghan police in Oruzgan, was moving over the next four weeks to Kandahar's Dand district.

The brigade will be replaced by the 4/70th Armoured Regiment, which has about 600 personnel.

It is understood that levels of US air support and the number of American special forces will remain unchanged.

US and Australian forces operate independently but often combine on large-scale operations in which Afghan police and army take part.

Colonel Dennis Malone, the most senior Australian military officer in Oruzgan, said the change was part of "a bigger picture" in which assets were being redeployed to Kandahar to backfill the withdrawal of Canadian forces later this year [emphasis added].

"There are going to be less troops on the ground (in Oruzgan) but there are techniques and methods to mitigate that," Colonel Malone said.

Asked how many fewer US troops would be in the province after the handover, Colonel Malone said: "It's going to be significant. It's going to be less but it's going to be manageable."

When soldiers complained last year that they were spread too thin in Oruzgan after the Dutch withdrawal, ADF chief Angus Houston assured them that the Dutch battlegroup had been replaced by a much more powerful US battalion.

"To a large extent we have more combat power in the area now," Air Chief Marshal Houston said.

"We are much better off than we've ever been."..

Via Spotlight on Military News and International Affairs:
http://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/257-eng.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
Good old Matthew Fisher was onto this Feb. 3:
http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/Alaskan+army+brigade+replace+Canadian+Forces+Afghanistan/4218512/story.html

A U.S. army brigade from Alaska is to replace Canadian troops when their combat mission in southern Afghanistan ends this July.

About 4,000 troops of the 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team of the 25th Infantry Division from Fort Wainwright, near Fairbanks, Alaska, are to "backfill" for Canada's 2,800-member battle group, according to the Stars and Stripes, which cited a U.S. army colonel as its source...

The arrival of the Stryker brigade from Alaska was being timed to get them to Afghanistan ahead of the fighting season, which usually begins in the late spring, Col. James Blackburn, whose own Stryker brigade is getting ready to leave southern Afghanistan, told a town-hall meeting recently at his unit's home base in Germany...

The arrival of the Stryker brigade from Alaska was being timed to get them to Afghanistan ahead of the fighting season, which usually begins in the late spring, Col. James Blackburn, whose own Stryker brigade is getting ready to leave southern Afghanistan, told a town-hall meeting recently at his unit's home base in Germany...

Fellow knows his stuff and ORBAT unlike...

Mark
Ottawa
 
Stunted shoots, from the Afghan & Military Blog:

Whack-a-Mole or Taliban
http://www.bouhammer.com/2011/02/whack-a-mole-or-taliban/

If you watched any of the news this weekend, through today then you know that it has been a bad few days in Afghanistan. There have been multiple bombings, attacks, and a lot of death over the last few days. What is really scary is that is is areas which have been historically “safe” like Konduz that have had a recent uptick in reported attacks.

The “Mez” and Konduz used to take a back seat to the south and east when it came to violence against coalition forces. That is why many countries sent their forces to Afghanistan with the caveat that they only serve in the north. Countries like Spain, Germany and many others only liked to have their forces serve up north.

Now what will they do? What will our coalition “partners” do this year? There are no “safe” areas anywhere in the country. The reason is because the Taliban/Al-Queda/HIG, or whatever you want to call them are like the mole in the game whack-a-mole. When we attack them and put the pressure on them in one area they just pop up somewhere else...

This is a 360 degree asymmetrical battle-field as it always has been in Afghanistan. That means you can never pull from one area to strengthen another area, otherwise you risk losing gains in the “safe” areas. The enemy is nomadic, the fighters we face every day, that make the IEDs, and that kill and torture local nationals are for the most part not from the area where they fight. Their higher level leadership may be, but many of the local level JDAM fodder aren’t. So they will move to wherever they see an opening to exploit our lack of attention on a certain area.

So how we will address this issue and keep them from moving into areas we have made “safe”? My answer on that will come in a couple of days. This posting is long enough already.

On the other hand the Afghan political (and other) effect of the "insurgents" likely depends on how many Pathans live the area.

Mark
Ottawa
 
Rather more measured than our government's approach:

Poland to start troops pullout from Afghanistan this year
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/90853/7295304.html

Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski wants to start the withdrawal of Polish troops from Afghanistan this year, head of the National Security Office (BBN) Stanislaw Koziej said on Monday.

"This complies with president's earlier declarations and content of his address during a meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon last November. Such position stems from a comparison of Polish national interests with conclusions of analysis and assessment of condition and outlook for the operation in Afghanistan. It is also fully situated within the Alliance's long-range strategy towards Afghanistan passed during NATO last summit," Koziej stressed, quoted by the PAP news agency.

He added that the reduction of Poland contingent's involvement and the conclusion, in tune with the general allied plan, of the participation in the Afghan operation should last until 2014.

The pullout operation is to be divided into three stages. Gradual reduction of tasks and the size of the contingent are to lead to the termination of combat operations and the handing over of Polish responsibility in the Afghan province of Ghanzi. This stage is to end in 2012.

In 2013-2014, Poles are to take part in a training mission with maintaining combat readiness for limited alarm support of Afghan or coalition forces and the completion of the involvement in the military operation.

Following 2014, Poland is to maintain its readiness for cooperation, including military training and technical cooperation, with Afghanistan on grounds of earlier negotiated bilateral agreement within allied partnership.

The Polish military contingent, which counts some 2,600 soldiers, is taking part in the operation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Within the operation, Poles assure security in the province of Ghanzi, including protection of the Kabul-Kandahar road and the Ghanzi-Sharan route.

Since the start of the Afghanistan operation, Poland lost 23 soldiers and a paramedic.

Mark
Ottawa
 
From a WSJ book review:

In Afghanistan With Our Warrior Elite, By ANDREW EXUM
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703584804576144234171319632.html?mod=WSJ_Opinion_MIDDLESecondBucket

Bing West's "The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan"
http://www.amazon.ca/Wrong-War-Grit-Strategy-Afghanistan/dp/1400068738/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1298386637&sr=8-1
is one of the best books yet written on the war in Afghanistan. I disagree with the way Mr. West characterizes the war at times, but "The Wrong War" is filled with both vivid descriptions of the Afghan fighting and sound advice concerning how counterinsurgencies should be waged.

First, the grit. "The Wrong War" contains some of the most compelling descriptions of small-unit combat that I have ever read. Mr. West has argued in the past that the U.S. armed forces have lost their "warrior ethos" and calls them here "a gigantic Peace Corps." But these claims in no way square with what he depicts...

It is with "strategy" that Mr. West grows frustrated by the war in Afghan istan—with good reason, I might add— and by the "hearts and minds" approach he sees being applied in U.S. counterinsurgency efforts. "Hearts and minds," for Mr. West, is based on "gratitude theory," the idea that if we build enough hospitals and pave enough roads, the Afghan people will stop supporting the Taliban and throw their weight behind the government.

I agree that gratitude theory rarely works—not in Afghanistan and not anywhere else. But it is also not a characteristic of the present U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. In fact, the only time the phrase "hearts and minds" appears in the U.S. Army's counterinsurgency field manual is in an appendix—written by Australian expert David Kilcullen— that explains that the hearts-and-minds approach is not about making people like you but about affecting the decisions they make. It is about control, about convincing the population that you are going to win. "Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts," the field manual appendix reads. "Over time, successful trusted networks grow like roots into the populace. They displace enemy networks, which forces enemies into the open, letting military forces seize the initiative and destroy the insurgents." Hearts and minds, correctly understood, very much includes killing the enemy.

If that idea was misunderstood by U.S. units in Afghanistan, I would share Mr. West's frustration. But based on my own combat experiences there as well as recent trips to Afghanistan, I do not think this is the case. Mr. West claims, for instance, that we are not trying to kill insurgents. I have a hard time believing that, having observed U.S. and NATO combat operations in Afghanistan over the past 18 months. Just to give one example: U.S. conventional and special-operations units have decimated the ranks of the insurgent networks in the past year, killing mid-level leaders and enablers by the score...

...Mr. West is not the first person to argue, as he does, that the U.S. and its allies should transition from a resource-intensive counterinsurgency campaign to a lighter footprint that combines advisory teams with special-operations units. It has escaped very few students of counterinsurgency that, at a time when the Soviet Union had 115,000 soldiers engaged in a losing effort in Afghanistan in the 1980s, the U.S. was quietly winning a counterinsurgency campaign in El Salvador with just 55 U.S. Special Forces advisers. Might we not also wage the war in Afghanistan with fewer resources?

In late 2002, however, the U.S. made the fateful decision to divert the vast majority of its available military and intelligence resources to Iraq. As a result, efforts to train and equip competent Afghan security forces have lagged, while Pakistan increased support for the Taliban as a hedge against Indian influence in a post-NATO Afghanistan. (In El Salvador, of course, U.S. policy makers never had to contend with the risks posed by transnational terror groups.) The U.S. and NATO units in Afghanistan today are waging counterinsurgency operations to create the time and space for Afghan security forces to be trained...

—Mr. Exum is a fellow at the Center for a New American Security. A former Army officer, he led light infantry and Ranger platoons in Afghanistan in 2002 and 2004 before returning as a civilian adviser in 2009.
 

Mark
Ottawa
 
Major piece in Foreign Policy by Gen. (ret'd) Stanley McChrystal:

It Takes a Network
The new frontline of modern warfare.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/it_takes_a_network?page=0,0

From the outset of my command in Afghanistan, two or three times each week, accompanied by a few aides and often my Afghan counterparts, I would leave the International Security Assistance Force headquarters in Kabul and travel across Afghanistan -- from critical cities like Kandahar to the most remote outposts in violent border regions. Ideally, we left early, traveling light and small, normally using a combination of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, to meet with Afghans and their leaders and to connect with our troops on the ground: Brits and Marines rolling back the enemy in Helmand, Afghan National Army troops training in Mazar-e-Sharif, French Foreign Legionnaires patrolling in Kapisa.

But I was not alone: There were other combatants circling the battlefield. Mirroring our movements, competing with us, were insurgent leaders. Connected to, and often directly dispatched by, the Taliban's leadership in Pakistan, they moved through the same areas of Afghanistan. They made shows of public support for Taliban shadow governors, motivated tattered ranks, recruited new troops, distributed funds, reviewed tactics, and updated strategy. And when the sky above became too thick with our drones, their leaders used cell phones and the Internet to issue orders and rally their fighters. They aimed to keep dispersed insurgent cells motivated, strategically wired, and continually informed, all without a rigid -- or targetable -- chain of command.

While a deeply flawed insurgent force in many ways, the Taliban is a uniquely 21st-century threat. Enjoying the traditional insurgent advantage of living amid a population closely tied to them by history and culture, they also leverage sophisticated technology that connects remote valleys and severe mountains instantaneously -- and allows them to project their message worldwide, unhindered by time or filters. They are both deeply embedded in Afghanistan's complex society and impressively agile. And just like their allies in al Qaeda, this new Taliban is more network than army, more a community of interest than a corporate structure.

For the U.S. military that I spent my life in, this was not an easy insight to come by. It was only over the course of years, and with considerable frustrations, that we came to understand how the emerging networks of Islamist insurgents and terrorists are fundamentally different from any enemy the United States has previously known or faced.

In bitter, bloody fights in both Afghanistan and Iraq, it became clear to me and to many others that to defeat a networked enemy we had to become a network ourselves. We had to figure out a way to retain our traditional capabilities of professionalism, technology, and, when needed, overwhelming force, while achieving levels of knowledge, speed, precision, and unity of effort that only a network could provide. We needed to orchestrate a nuanced, population-centric campaign that comprised the ability to almost instantaneously swing a devastating hammer blow against an infiltrating insurgent force or wield a deft scalpel to capture or kill an enemy leader...

Mark
Ottawa
 
An ineffable war?  From Joshua Foust:

The Battle for Marjah, Reviewed
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/22/the_battle_for_marjah_reviewed

...The unnarrated film unfolds in a chronology of the battle, showing how the Marines first assaulted the area, how difficult and fragile their progress was, and how they coped with the stresses of combat. It is not an easy story to tell, even if it is a common one: the frustrations of operating under the spotlight of live media coverage; of restrictive rules for combat; of wondering if your next step will set off an IED that will maim you or kill you; of dealing with the Afghans after killing one of their family members who was fighting for the Taliban. It is perhaps its own story to realize that these themes are universal in the war, and crop up routinely. But that still doesn't make a story composed of them any easier to tell or to hear.

Like the other documentaries about the war in Afghanistan, The Battle for Marjah is a study in contrasts. The officers leading their men speak eloquently and forcefully about their commitment to avoiding civilian casualties, while in the next shot a group of enlisted men cackle at the explosions they're setting off along town streets as their Afghan counterparts look on, forlorn. There is constant talk of winning the population, while the locals complain they are intimidated and unable to resist the Taliban...

It is easy to misinterpret these sorts of films. The Battle for Marjah captures the agonizing the Marines go through upon learning that some of their brother Marines accidentally killed a woman and several children. It follows them, through the uncomfortable meeting with the grieving family, as the patriarch complains that he followed ISAF's demands to hide inside his own house, only to have bombs rain down on his head. There is no easy answer for that situation, and the apology and condolence payment -- $10,000 a head -- feels cheap. There is palpable discomfort at the exchange, an unease at how to handle such a situation with empathy and humanity. These Marines are not bad people, in other words, even if they get excited during the adrenaline rush of combat. They don't enjoy killing innocents, and it's obvious they're very concerned with helping a man in the throes of grief anyway they can.

The ultimate message from The Battle for Marjah is that there are no easy answers to these fundamental questions of the conduct of the war. Just as importantly: we are not well served by those who insist there are.

The Battle for Marjah covers events that are about a year old. The Afghans of Marjah were up front with the Marines that they don't like Marines or the Taliban -- they just want to be left alone. The Marines struggled with that conflict: that they're freeing the people from the domination of the Taliban, but they're unsure that they can replace it with something better.

In the year since this documentary was filmed, it's become increasingly difficult to really figure out how things are going in the area. As recently as three months ago there were news stories of combat, IEDs, and misery, even as General David Petraeus insisted Marjah was a shining example of how the surge of 30,000 troops ordered by President Obama was winning the war. Journalists who embed with the Marines have glowing things to say about the area's prospects, even as journalists who avoid the military say the opposite. It remains to be seen how the area will wind up: the security gains are, indeed, remarkable, but as the closing moments of The Battle for Marjah note, the fabled "government-in-a-box" has not yet materialized. There is no government, in other words, only an unstable local defense force, and the Afghan security forces are non-Pashtun Tajiks and Hazaras. It makes one wonder: are expectations too high? Or are we getting something fundamentally wrong? We may not be able to answer those questions for a long time.

Joshua Foust is a fellow at the American Security Project and the author of Afghanistan Journal: Selections from Registan.net. He blogs about Central Asia at www.registan.net.
http://www.registan.net/

Mark
Ottawa
 
Further to this post,
http://forums.milnet.ca/forums/threads/49908/post-1020500/topicseen.html#msg1020500

more on Bing West's new book:

The Next Impasse, By DEXTER FILKINS
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/27/books/review/Filkins-t.html

THE WRONG WAR
Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan
http://www.amazon.ca/Wrong-War-Grit-Strategy-Afghanistan/dp/1400068738/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1298386637&sr=8-1

In the nine years since the first American troops landed in Afghanistan, a new kind of religion has sprung up, one that promises success for the Americans even as the war they have been fighting has veered dangerously close to defeat. Follow the religion’s tenets, give yourself over to it and the new faith will reward you with riches and fruits.

The new religion, of course, is counterinsurgency, or in the military’s jargon, COIN. The doctrine of counterinsurgency upends the military’s most basic notion of itself, as a group of warriors whose main task is to destroy its enemies. Under COIN, victory will be achieved first and foremost by protecting the local population and thereby rendering the insurgents irrelevant. Killing is a secondary pursuit. The main business of American soldiers is now building economies and political systems. Kill if you must, but only if you must...

So what’s wrong? Why hasn’t the new faith in Afghanistan delivered the success it promises? In his remarkable book, “The Wrong War,” Bing West goes a long way to answering that question. “The Wrong War” amounts to a crushing and seemingly irrefutable critique of the American plan in Afghanistan. It should be read by anyone who wants to understand why the war there is so hard.

The strength of West’s book is the legwork he’s done. Most accounts of America’s wars, particularly those by former military officers, are written in the comfort of an office in the United States. Not so here. At age 70, West, the author of several books on America’s wars, went to Afghanistan and into the bases and out on patrols with the grunts, waded through the canals, ran through firefights and humped up the mountains. (At one point he contracted cholera and was evacuated by helicopter.) Embedding with American troops in God-forsaken places like Kunar and Helmand Provinces is hard business. What drives this man? West is worth a book in himself.

But the legwork pays off. West shows in the most granular, detailed way how and why America’s counterinsurgency in Afghanistan is failing. And, in the places where the effort is showing promise, he demonstrates why we don’t have the resources to duplicate that success on a wider scale. Mind you, West is no antiwar lefty: he’s a former infantry officer who fought in Vietnam. An assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration, he admires — nay, adores — America’s fighting men and women, and he wants the United States to succeed. But the facts on the ground, it appears, lead him to darker truths.

West joined American troops in Garmsir, Marja and Nawa in Helmand Province; Barge Matal in Nuristan; and the Korengal Valley in Kunar — all in the heart of the fight. His basic argument can be summed up like this: American soldiers and Marines are very good at counterinsurgency, and they are breaking their hearts, and losing their lives, doing it so hard. But the central premise of counterinsurgency doctrine holds that if the Americans sacrifice on behalf of the Afghan government, then the Afghan people will risk their lives for that same government in return. They will fight the Taliban, finger the informants hiding among them and transform themselves into authentic leaders who spurn death and temptation.

This isn’t happening. What we have created instead, West shows, is a vast culture of dependency: Americans are fighting and dying, while the Afghans by and large stand by and do nothing to help them. Afghanistan’s leaders, from the presidential palace in Kabul to the river valleys in the Pashtun heartland, are enriching themselves, often criminally, on America’s largesse. The Taliban, whatever else they do, fight hard and for very little reward...

The subtitle of West’s book promises a “way out,” but it’s a little thin on exit strategies. His solution, tacked on to the final pages of the book, is to transform the American mission to one almost entirely dedicated to training and advising the Afghan security forces. Let the Afghans fight. “Our mistake in Afghanistan was to do the work of others for 10 years, expecting reciprocity across a cultural and religious divide.”

West is not the first to advocate such a course. But it’s not that simple, as he well knows. Nothing in Afghanistan is. Nine years of training and investment have created an Afghan Army fraught with the same corruption and lack of cohesion as the rest of the country. As it is, the Americans are now pouring more resources into the Afghan security forces than ever before. At best, the Afghans are years away from taking over the bulk of the fighting. And even that is a very fragile hope.

Until then, what? As “The Wrong War” shows so well, the Americans will spend more money and more lives trying to transform Afghanistan, and their soldiers will sacrifice themselves trying to succeed. But nothing short of a miracle will give them much in return.

Mark
Ottawa
 
MarkOttawa said:
Further to this post,
http://forums.milnet.ca/forums/threads/49908/post-1020500/topicseen.html#msg1020500

more on Bing West's new book:

The Next Impasse, By DEXTER FILKINS
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/27/books/review/Filkins-t.html


Mark
Ottawa



Bit of a tangent, I'm afraid, but what is St. Crispin's Order of the Infantry? Bing West is, apparently, a member of this organization and I'm (only mildly) curious about it. Now, if it was e.g. St. Crispin's Order of the Archers, or even the Meteorologists, I might be less curious, but ...

 
The following story from the National Post website is reproduced under the Fair Dealings provisions of the Copyright Act. Note: this sets off my "what is the real story" alarm.

Taliban chief who fought Canadians surrenders

Keith Gerein, Postmedia News · Thursday, Feb. 24, 2011

A young Taliban field commander who waged numerous battles against Canadian troops has surrendered to Afghan authorities, along with 30 of his men.

Haji Toorjan, 28, hinted at growing fractures in the Taliban's hierarchy, saying other mid-level insurgents are looking to lay down their arms and rejoin Afghan society.

"I know many Taliban in the south, they want to renounce violence but they have no outreach program," he said Tuesday after a ceremony in Kandahar City in which he turned over his weapons.

"Among the Taliban, there are commanders now who are tired and want to join the peace process. The government should reach them out and meet their demands, which are not high: protection, shelter and jobs."

Mr. Toorjan said he has been serving on the front lines of the insurgency for five years, primarily as a commander in the Panjwaii district where many Canadian troops have been killed. More recently, he has been operating in the Arghandab district, a U.S. area of responsibility northwest of Kandahar City.

"We fought seriously against NATO and the Afghan government," he said through an interpreter.

"Mostly I have been engaged with Canadian Forces in Panjwaii district. We fought a lot against Canadian Forces."

Taliban leaders have been instructing field commanders to attack softer targets, such as government workers, tribal elders, and reconstruction projects such as roads and irrigation culverts, he added.

He and his men became disenchanted with the long struggle, ultimately deciding to trade in their AK-47s for the prospect of a regular job and the chance to raise a family. He said the Taliban paid its fighters nothing, but provided food, weapons and shelter across the border in Pakistan.

The young commander said the tipping point came when he learned Pakistan's intelligence service has been supporting much of the violence in Afghanistan as a way of expanding its influence.

A short time later, he contacted a leader within Afghanistan's National Directorate of Security, who arranged to pick him up in the border town of Spin Boldak and bring him to Kandahar.

"Pakistan's [intelligence service] wants to make us bring violence to Afghanistan. They are sending Afghans to fight against their own soil and bring destruction to the country, so I decided not [to] fight against Afghans anymore."
 
Shared in accordance with the "fair dealing" provisions, Section 29, of the Copyright Act.

Canadian soldiers should be allowed to finish their fight
MERCEDES STEPHENSON, QMI Agency, 27 Feb 11
Article link
This summer, as Kandahar bakes in the relentless heat, Canada will formally end its combat role in Afghanistan. After nearly a decade of fighting, Canadians will transition to a training role — behind the wire — teaching the Afghan National Security Forces.

Canada must maintain a presence in Afghanistan, but it is difficult for Canadians to walk away from combat operations in Kandahar before the job is done, given the heroic efforts and sacrifices of our soldiers.

The training mission is a worthy one. It is an opportunity for Canada to leave Afghanistan with an independent Afghan security force — and to leave the country for good.

Thus far, corruption and incompetence have plagued the Afghan security force. The blame falls largely on the shoulders of NATO training partners who failed to apply consistent standards.

Shoving police officers into the field with a weapon, a uniform and nary a day of training was beyond ill advised — it was extraordinarily stupid.

The opportunity to teach professional skills, ethics and literacy to Afghan police and military forces will have a long-term positive impact on the country.

Failing to develop the Afghan security force will only delay the West’s exit from Afghanistan. It will also lead to Canada’s inevitable return to the troubled country when it once again descends into chaos.

Soldiers go where they are told to and do as the government orders because that’s their job. They are loyal to the core.

Quietly though, many wonder what it was all for. There is a feeling of unfinished business, of being taken off the field in the last moments of the championship game when the critical moves are being made, when the score is so close.

Why are we walking away from combat when the tools and troops to do the job have finally showed up?

For years, the Canadian Forces doggedly fought for Kandahar alone, with less than 3,000 troops.

As determined as our soldiers were, they were outnumbered, unable to clear out insurgents, hold the ground against their return and build the institutions necessary for long-term progress.

Troops referred to their patrols as “mowing the grass” because time and again they would sweep through and fight for the same areas they had taken successfully weeks or even years earlier.

The frustrating cycle repeated itself until reinforcements arrived. There are more than 10 times as many troops in Kandahar province today as there were before the surge.

Much of the progress in Kandahar today was hard earned by Canadian troops through sacrifice, innovation and bloodshed.

Now, as the surge is in full swing, Canadian troops have to walk away without being allowed to finish what they started.

This is all the more grating because combat has not affected Canada’s ability to fight — it has affected our will to fight.

Ultimately the decision to leave combat had nothing to do with tactical success or failure on the ground and everything to do with political debates at home.

Canada earned a new level of respect and influence during the Kandahar mission, and specifically through committing to combat — something Lt. Gen. Peter Devlin, Canada’s army commander, told me last week in an exclusive interview. Much of the reputation the Canadian Forces have earned us in Afghanistan will be left in the dust of Kandahar.

Asked what could be done for his troops, one veteran officer answered, “Let them win, if you really want their efforts to have not been in vain.”
 
Shared in accordance with the "fair dealing" provisions, Section 29, of the Copyright Act.

Ottawa under the gun to specify Afghan training mission as slots fill up
Murray Brewster, The Canadian Press, 6 Mar 11
Article link[/color]]Article link

The federal cabinet is being asked to decide quickly on the specifics of the Canadian military training mission in Afghanistan as other countries jockey for prime classroom instruction posts, say NATO and Canadian defence sources.

National Defence will present its recommendations to the Conservative government in the very near future and will ask to deploy "a small number" of troops at regional training centres in addition to stationing soldiers at classrooms in the Afghan capital.

"We'll need to start laying down our markers by April in order to get the slots we want," said one defence source.

The locations under consideration include the western city of Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif in the north and Jalalabad, near the border with Pakistan.

Not long after Canada said it would take up a training mission with 950 soldiers and support staff, the Dutch indicated they were willing to do police training.

The fear has become that if the Harper government waits too long to make a decision, Canada could be left filling the leftover slots in much the same way dithering by the Liberal government under Paul Martin left Ottawa with no choice but to take up the dangerous mission in Kandahar.

But a certain obfuscation crept into the message in January. Officials and ministers started telegraphing that deployment would be "Kabul-centric" — meaning it'll be based in the capital but not exclusively in Kabul.

In fact, each of the regional training centres under consideration is ranked safer than Kabul, according to the military's threat assessment. The Afghan capital has been rocked by a string of attacks this winter, including a suicide bombing last month that killed two people at the entrance to a hotel.

The Conservative government has made clear both privately and publicly it does not want to see a proposal that would station troops at instruction centres in Kandahar, or elsewhere in the south.

The caveat — from a government that has long criticized other NATO countries for restrictions on their forces — is in place even though the U.S. commander of NATO training forces has said publicly that instructors are needed "behind the wire" in Kandahar.

Vice-Admiral Bruce Donaldson, the country's second-highest military commander, wouldn't discuss details of the plan.

"Government will make a decision on what best fits the view of the Canadian Forces' next mission and we'll implement it in conjunction with our allies," Donaldson, the vice-chief of defence staff, said in a recent interview with The Canadian Press.

Matching Canada's restrictions to NATO's stated list of training needs has been a "hair-pulling exercise," according to one source in Brussels. The training centre has asked for everything from infantry instructors and signallers to the specialized trades of aircraft mechanics.

Donaldson wouldn't comment.

"We continue to look at options with our partners," he said.

Statistics show that regardless of where you went in Afghanistan last year, there were more attacks on foreigners. An Afghan agency that tracks security for aid groups reported a 64 per cent increase in the number of bombings, shootings and kidnappings aimed at non-governmental development and humanitarian workers.

"Although provincial level data shows that each province performed differently, taking the national data as a whole we consider this indisputable evidence that conditions are deteriorating," the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office reported in January.

The agency noted that of the 10 provinces in the north, six of them saw sharp increases in insurgent attacks, ranging from 107 to 252 per cent.

"It's getting increasingly violent," said Thomas X. Hammes, a retired U.S. marine colonel and expert in counter-insurgency warfare. "Whereas a couple of years ago there was very little contact in the north, now there's fairly regular contact in the German area."

Kandahar, with 1,162 reported attacks in 2010, was the second most violent province in Afghanistan, next to Kunar in the east, according to the NGO watchdog. The provinces outside Kabul, where Canadian troops could end up, saw between one quarter and half that total.

Hammes said the nature of the threat is different outside southern Afghanistan, where the Taliban focus their energy and explosives on Afghan security forces, NATO troops and government officials.

In Kabul, terror incidents are more likely to be led by the Al-Qaeda-linked Haqqani Network.

"Kabul has been mostly high-profile attacks on areas where foreigners are likely to be, but for the most part they've missed U.S. military or ISAF military because everybody is behind the barrier," Hammes said.

The most notable, and perhaps chilling, exception for Canadians was the death last May of Col. Geoff Parker, who was killed by a suicide bomber in Kabul along with U.S. officers. He was the highest ranking Canadian to be killed in Afghanistan.
 
Spin, spin, spin:

CP:
550 civilians killed last year in Kandahar, Afghanistan's deadliest province
http://ca.news.yahoo.com/civilian-deaths-injuries-grew-11-per-cent-kandahar-20110309-032937-521.html

KANDAHAR, Afghanistan - More Afghan civilians were killed in Kandahar than any other province last year, while counterinsurgency operations within Canada's area of command resulted in "large-scale" property destruction, the United Nations said Wednesday.

The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan called on both NATO and insurgent forces to strengthen their efforts to protect Afghans as it released a report examining the severe toll the war has exacted on civilian lives and livelihoods.

"The worsening human impact of the conflict reinforces the urgent need for parties to the conflict to do more to protect Afghan civilians, who in 2010 were killed and injured in their homes and communities in even greater numbers," the 85-page report said.

It concluded there were 2,777 civilian deaths across the country in 2010. Of those, 550 occurred in Kandahar, where Canadian and other NATO forces concentrated their efforts on counterinsurgency operations in a bid to win over the local population.

About 75 per cent of those killed in Afghanistan died at the hands of anti-government forces such as the Taliban, up from 67 per cent in 2009.

In Kandahar, civilian deaths and injuries increased 11 per cent — a much smaller increase than the 78 per cent spike in neighbouring Helmand province, "although civilian casualties in Kandahar were already quite high," the report said.

The rise in deaths last year coincided with a surge of U.S. troops as well as a Taliban offensive that targeted government officials, police officers and truck drivers delivering supplies to ISAF...

Guardian:
Most Afghan civilian deaths 'caused by Taliban attacks, not US forces'
Despite UN report, growing number of insurgent atrocities unlikely to damp popular fury over botched US strikes

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/09/afghanistan-insurgents-civilian-victims

Popular fury over the killing of civilians in botched US-led attacks in Afghanistan is unlikely to be assuaged by new figures showing the Taliban are responsible for a vast and growing proportion of innocent deaths.

The annual United Nations report on civilian casualties shows that more than two-thirds of the 2,777 civilians killed last year were the victims of insurgents – a 28% increase on 2009. By contrast Nato and Afghan government forces were responsible for killing 440, a 25% decrease.

More than half of the deaths caused by the Taliban were the result of homemade bombs and suicide attacks.

The report's authors said the "most alarming" trend was a 105% increase in the number of civilians assassinated by insurgents as part of the Taliban's campaign against government officials.

Overall, it was the worst year since the war began more than nine years ago, with the number of civilian deaths up 15% compared with 2009.

But despite growing carnage in a war where both sides have been escalating their efforts as US-led forces prepare to withdraw by the end of 2014, public fury appears overwhelmingly focused on mistakes caused by foreigners.

An airstrike on 8 March that killed nine boys gathering wood on a hillside in the eastern province of Kunar has further stoked widespread anti-foreigner sentiment.

When David Petraeus, the US commander of Nato forces, made a rare public video appearance in which he apologised for the incident, Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president, issued a curt rebuke, saying the apology was not sufficient.

Nationwide, the battle for Afghan hearts and minds appears to be confounding efforts by Petraeus, who has ordered his communication staff to highlight insurgent atrocities, to stoke public disgust towards the Taliban.

Thomas Ruttig, director of the Afghan Analysts Network, said that Afghans were unable to condemn the Taliban...

Mark
Ottawa
 
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