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Admin Company

Mountie

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Wouldn't it make more sense to eliminate the admin company.  The new task force organizations see the admin company combined with elements from the service battalion to form a Forward Support Group.  So why not just eliminate the admin company, use the infantry personnel to beef up the rifle and support companies and let the service battalions do all the CSS functions.  US Army battalions gave up their CSS companies to their brigade support (service) battalion so that all CSS functions could be coordinated together.  A service battalion could have several forward support companies, plus the supply, transport and maintenance companies providing general support to the brigade.
 
Admin Coy and Spt Coy when employed all the Rifle Coy's used to make a Battalion a self contained unit. Recently we have changed some of the tasks of Support Coy such as Pioneers to Engineers( already over tasked ), Mortars to Artillery ( all but forgotten about with their priorities) and Anti Armour ( PPCLI barely holding on to that ). Now you want strip the battalion of its integral cooks, mechanics, medics, clerks and drivers. The whole idea behind self contained units are that they can deploy without any outside support and win battles.

Nuff said.......Don't strip us anymore as we are barely able to fight alone now!!!!!
 
I agree with you completely if the battalion was deployed as a self-contained unit.  However, it's not anymore.  It has an artillery battery, a field engineer squadron, and an armoured reconnaissance squadron or troop attached to it.  The rifle and combat support companies don't even come from the same battalion anymore.  For TF Orion 1 PPCLI left its 'C' Coy behind and replaced it with 2 PPCLI's 'C' Coy and it has an armoured reconnaissance troop from 12 RBC. 

Now 'A' Coy 2 PPCLI is joining the Task Force 3-06 Battle Group built around 1 RCR.  The article I just read in the Shilo Stag about this also mentioned the company is taking its FOO party from 'B' Bty 1 RCHA with it.  So the 1 RCR battle group will have a rifle company and FOO party from a different brigade. 

Neither 2 PPCLI company is supported by its own admin company.  'C' Coy. receives support from the FSG made up of 1 PPCLI Admin Coy and 1 Service Battalion.  'A' Coy. receives support from teh FSG made up of 1 RCR Admin Coy and 2 Service Battalion.  So does it really matter if the admin company is removed and consolidated in a new company within the service battalion?

So with the ad hoc method currently used to form deployable battle groups would it really matter if the admin company came from the service battalion? This way a permanently organized Forward Support Group (possibly renamed Forward Support Company) could provide support to the entire battle group without augmentation.  The US Army has been doing it for several years now and it seems to work just fine.  It also frees infantrymen from support roles within quartermasters, transport platoon, etc to bring the rifle and combat support companies up to strength. 

I also agree with you that Anti-Armour Platoon and Mortar Platoon should be reconstituted within the battalion.
 
I know the current way of deploying is with what we call modular task forces built around different coys from different bns. What I'm trying to impart is we should keep the same people together as it builds cohesion. By having my weapons techs in the same building I build a rapport with them if they are assigned to say 3RCR. Thats what i meant. I know right now we are taking people from everywhere and slaming them together.
 
I think that if the Admin Coy's where stripped from the battalions,there would be no good place to hide any more.What I'm saying is that you need a break from the rifle Coy's every once and a while,because no one wants to be a number one rifle men for 20 years .While where on the subject why not bring back all of the good gos that where stripped away ,Like the pioneers and the mortars. Or at least create some new platoons like say an Urban ops platoon or demolitions platton .but i digress I'm just rambling now.

SHG
 
It is B Coy 2 PPCLI that is deployed with 1 PPCLI, and B Coy 1 PPCLI that is back in Canada.

. . . and it would be great if the BGs could have thier own Admin Coy to look after the IS & CS issues with the NSE sitting back in the camp to worry about second line & national rear-link.  Not only would it give a level of independance to the BGs, but it would help when planning (they would own thier assets and have CSS officers for the staff).
 
Sorry about that.  I ment to say 'B' Coy.  I have a friend in 'B' Coy in Afghanistan.

I agree with the concept of having the admin company right within the battle group and having the NSE back at the FOB doing second and third line support.  But for some reason the Army changed things. 

Ideally I think combined arms battle groups should be permanently organized as such, instead of the traditional battalion organizations.  But that has been discussed on other threads so I won't get into it. 
 
Forming task-tailored FSGs for the provision of integrated Integral, Close and General (eg. 1st, 2nd and 3rd-Line) CSS support to high-readiness TFs is an ill-advised "flavour of the day" solution to the problem of sustainability within the highly stressed CSS trades.  It is intimately tied to the "plug and play" Army Managed Readiness Plan, which we all know was proven to be untenable before the ink was even dry on those fancy posters.  The inherent shortcomings associated with abandonning historically and operationally-validated CSS structures in favour of forming "all singing, all dancing" FSGs for operational deployments is a related, but separate subject best discussed in a split thread.  The point to hoist aboard in considering whether or not combat arms unit's still require integral Adm/HQ/Svc companies is that the task-tailored FSGs currently in vogue are designed soley to support their affiliated high-readiness TF.  Which begs the question of who supports the the reconstition and continuation training of the majority of units/sub-units not assigned to a particular high-readiness TF at any given time?  Remember that there are currently only three TFs formed per year, including the strategic reserve "Surge TF"  (formerly the 2nd line of operations).  The remaining majority of the field force is either in reconstitution or continuation training mode, all of which requires CSS to make happen.

Further to the above, under the MRP selected combat arms units are typically tasked to force-generate a single sub-unit for high-readiness TF employment under a different unit HQ.  That leaves the typical force generating unit with two of its three "line" companies/batteries/squadrons.  Those sub-units must conduct reconstitution and continuation training, and must therefore be adequately supported.  The sub-unit earmarked for TF employment will eventually be supported by the TF FSG, but not until the organization comes together for final validation training (eg.at CMTC).  Let's not forget that the FSG must conduct its own work-up training, a critical and labour-intensive necessity given that the FSGs are themselves task-tailored sub-units cobbled together from resources drawn across the Brigade.  This leaves combat arms units responsible for coordinating and supporting the initial pre-deployment training of their tasked high-readiness sub-unit - usually for a period of between 4 and 6 months before they are placed OPCOM to the TF HQ.  Concurrent with the responsibility to train their designated high-readiness sub-unit, combat arms units must conduct (and therefore support) the aforementioned reconstitution and continuation training of the remaining 2/3 of their personnel.

Now let's consider what happens to a brigade's Service Battalion when that formation is tasked to force-generate the FSG for a high-readiness TF.  In effect, it is gutted of the majority of its operationally fit personnel.  To the extent that the Service Battalion must invariably seek CSS augmentation from the Adm/HQ/Svc companies of the brigade units in order to fill the FSG TO&E.  This seriously degrades the ability of the Brigade Service Battalion to provide adequate Close (2nd line) CSS to the bulk of the formation that is not tasked to the high-readiness TF.  Forming one or more FSGs (or "Close Support Companies") with the "left-overs" to provide combined Integral and Close CSS for the balance of the formation is a total non-starter.  Already stressed, the Service Battalions are simply in no position to assume Integral (1st line) support responsibility for the formation's units, even if the unit Adm/HQ/Svc companies were all rolled into the Service Battalion.

So why can't the unit Adm/HQ companies provide enough combined CSS manpower with the remnants of the Service Battalion to form Canada-based FSGs with integrated Integral and Close support capability?  After all, it would only make sense to have our Canada-based CSS structures mimic those of our operational deployements, right?  Well, that's the next problem.  The sad truth of the matter is that succesive Army Support Reviews have severely gutted unit Adm/HQ/Svc company structures and resources over the past several years.  As a result, unit Adm/HQ/Svc companies are now capable of providing only garrison-based, day-to-day Integral CSS.  They are no longer able to support their units in the field without substantial augmentation from the brigade's Service Battalion to flesh out missing Integral support capabilities.  As a result, every time a unit now deploys to the field, the Adm/HQ/Svc company must be task-tailored to provide the minimum CSS resources required to support whatever training is planned.  As OC Adm Coy 3 PPCLI, I am currently "living this dream", cobbling together a different ORBAT for every field deployment based on the minimal "garrison-focused" integral resources that I have available, plus required augmentation from 1 Svc Bn.  In effect, the onus for orchestrating both Integral and Close support for unit training activities now falls to the unit OC Adm/HQ/Svcs Company, not the brigade Service Battalion.  I'm sure you can appreciate the additional work involved in developing a unique task-tailored CSS TO&E for each and every unit training activity, begging/borrowing the external augmentation required to flesh it out, and then trying to square away a sub-unit cobbled together at the last-minute, in the field, while simultaneously trying to support training......     

If the above all sounds ass-backwards and jury-rigged, that's because it is.  Our Army CSS structures and systems (both operational and Canada-based) are seriously dysfunctional and highly stressed. 

The bottom line is that units require integral Adm/HQ/Svc companies because those sub-units are essential to sustaining the unit both in garrison and the field.  Canada-based FSGs with integrated Integral and Close support capabilities may be a desireable notion if we determine that our current CSS construct for operational deployments is indeed the way to go (rather than a stop-gap solution).  Unfortunately, the creation of permanent Canada-based FSGs is a pipe dream given the limited CSS resources currently available.  There simply aren't enough Integral and Close CSS assets available to form domestic FSGs.  And the problem of limited CSS resources within our brigades becomes critical whenever they are tasked to force-generate a high-readiness FSG for overseas deployment.

There are numerous other challenges and considerations associated with Army CSS.  It is a convoluted subject that has been the focus of much consternation and hand-wringing within the CSS community for years.  Believe it or not, I've only just touched upon the tip of the iceberg with this post, and my observations are unit-centric in nature.  I am sure that someone working at the Service Battalion or Brigade HQ level could provide you with a whole other set of problems and challenges to consider. 

At the end of the day?  Units require their Adm/HQ/Svc companies, even in their current minimal form, to sustain essential day-to-day operations and training.  For the various reasons stated above, there are simply no viable alternatives at the present time.  And even if there were (in terms of available CSS resources), I remain far from convinced that there is any reason to change our historically and operationally validated CSS doctrine of fielding integral unit 1st Line CSS sub-units supported by 2nd Line Brigade Service Battalions.  The current "all singing, all dancing" FSG construct is nothing more than a stop-gap measure for providing the minimal level of essential CSS support to deployed operations.  It is not even close to optimal in terms of resources and capability.  Of course, that is just my limited perspective from the "coal-face", and I would sincerely welcome any substantiated views to the contrary.

As a final aside, the infantry Administration Company is correctly abbreviated as "Adm Coy".  "Admin" is the short form for "Administrative".  A common mistake - it just happens to be one of those petty things that annoys me to no end given my current appointment....   ;)       

 
Like the good OC says, the decimation of Adm Coys to feed the Mother Ship (Svc Bn) has been talked about, fought over, and generally dreaded for a few years now.

For myself and the guys/girls that worked with me, none of us really want to go back to the Svc Bn. We've done our time there and most see the 1st line units as the preferred place to be. Where we get to do our jobs, supporting the pointy end instead of trying to be the pointy end. Don't get me wrong, I am all for soldiering skills (But honestly, how many of you have laughed at us at the POL point in Wainwright as we are camming up before going into our Biv).

Everyone involved is aware that the only reason for the "reintegration" of CSS resources is due to our lack of bodies, especially trained and field fit bodies (have you seen GS BN?). Problem is, no one wants to say it.

Stripping positions away from the 1st line units is a problem, but realistically, in many cases, those positions were just that. They were empty and had not been filled in years. In 1 VP we were short 4 FCS techs and 3 (maybe 4) Wpns Techs. We were down to 1 Mat Tech (from 3) and the manning level of Veh Techs seemed to change every other year (downward). With the Medics sucked back to their Mother Ship at 1 Fd Amb (and those stupid CDU's) being hailed as a "success" (don't seem to remember it being that way the day that M113 TUA tried to take my hand off. Stupid missile racks) we knew the plan for the super Svc Bn would go ahead.

Ohh, and being one mech out of a few hundred in one Coy? Yeah, sounds like a good place to get promoted to me.
 
As a former OC Adm Coy in 1 PPCLI (in the pre-ASR days) I agree wholeheartedly with Mark C, and with Wookilar. The ideal system, by far, is a strong, integrated Adm coy that is part of the unit and whose members know and are known by the Rifle Coys. The flexibility that comes from having yuor own dedicated CSS that trains and operates as part of the unit is exactly on par with the flexibiity imparted by having integral mortars, pioneers, anti-armour, etc. We had to learn these facts the hard way over a century of warfare.

The number of Infantry positions to be saved by getting rid of Adm Coy would IMHO be minimal: there were only a few 031s in Tpt Platoon, and a smallhandfull scattered around the rest of the Coy (incl the OC, 2IC and CSM). The remainder were all CSS MOCs. And, it should be noted, (at least when I was there) the TOE for an Adm Coy was the smallest sub-unit in the mech bn. Cbt Sp TOE was the biggest, followed by a Rifle Coy TOE. 

Mark rightly (IMHO) points out that this current "box of bits" method of force generation was really developed out of desperation to deal with an overstressed, "hollow" Army. It is, I hope, a transient thing. Unfortunately, while it remains in effect it may be doing lasting damage. When the day comes that our recruiting, training and re-equipping efforts finally bring us a whole force again, we may no longer remember what that looks like.

Cheers
 
Mark C said:
As a final aside, the infantry Administration Company is correctly abbreviated as "Adm Coy".  "Admin" is the short form for "Administrative".  A common mistake - it just happens to be one of those petty things that annoys me to no end given my current appointment....   ;)       
So you're the guy in charge of the acronyms? I would have thought that at least a B-Gen. would have that job.

Sorry Mark, couldn't help myself ....
 
Mountie said:
I agree with you completely if the battalion was deployed as a self-contained unit.  However, it's not anymore.  It has an artillery battery, a field engineer squadron, and an armoured reconnaissance squadron or troop attached to it.  The rifle and combat support companies don't even come from the same battalion anymore.  For TF Orion 1 PPCLI left its 'C' Coy behind and replaced it with 2 PPCLI's 'C' Coy and it has an armoured reconnaissance troop from 12 RBC. 

Now 'A' Coy 2 PPCLI is joining the Task Force 3-06 Battle Group built around 1 RCR.  The article I just read in the Shilo Stag about this also mentioned the company is taking its FOO party from 'B' Bty 1 RCHA with it.  So the 1 RCR battle group will have a rifle company and FOO party from a different brigade. 

Neither 2 PPCLI company is supported by its own admin company.  'C' Coy. receives support from the FSG made up of 1 PPCLI Admin Coy and 1 Service Battalion.  'A' Coy. receives support from teh FSG made up of 1 RCR Admin Coy and 2 Service Battalion.  So does it really matter if the admin company is removed and consolidated in a new company within the service battalion?

So with the ad hoc method currently used to form deployable battle groups would it really matter if the admin company came from the service battalion? This way a permanently organized Forward Support Group (possibly renamed Forward Support Company) could provide support to the entire battle group without augmentation.  The US Army has been doing it for several years now and it seems to work just fine.  It also frees infantrymen from support roles within quartermasters, transport platoon, etc to bring the rifle and combat support companies up to strength. 

I also agree with you that Anti-Armour Platoon and Mortar Platoon should be reconstituted within the battalion.
Your post sums us exactly why the current land force is buggered.  This whole "managed readiness" is a waste of resources.  If battalions were more than "force generators for companies", then keeping the admin company would make sense.  Since it is nothing but a force generator for a rifle company (or two), then I agree with you: parcel out admin coy, tn platoon, maint platoon, etc to the LOGISTICS branch.  EG: service battalions.  It makes the same sense as moving mortars to arty, etc etc.
If we want UNITS, however, then going to the so-called "Cold war" model of an infantry battalion (which was around much longer than the cold war, and has seen service with NATO allies since) is what we need.  Three or four rifle companies, a support company (robust, at that!) and an admin coy.
 
There is another option that I discussed in another thread that would allow the battalion to remain as a combined arms unit with its own CSS built right in.  The USMC battalions have very large service companies built right into them.  The service company provides both Role 1 and Role 2 support.

The example I used in the other post was the USMC Armoured Recon Battalion which is a smaller version of a mechanized infantry battalion.  It is equipped with LAVs (Bison generation) but each vehicle only has four scouts rather than a whole infantry section.  So it is a close comparison.  The USMC has its battalion headquarters elements within the service company as opposed to the combat support company so the company is a little larger than a Canadian company would be.
-Battalion Headquarters = 17 officer & 44 enlisted ranks
(Bn HQ includes the S1 section of 25 personnel which in Canadian battalions would be a separate entity in the Admin Company)
-Service Company Headquarters = 5 personnel
-Communications Platoon = 32 personnel (includes Bn HQ & Co HQ radio operators)
-Supply Platoon = 47 personnel (including 21 cooks)
-Transport Platoon = 115 personnel (includes the LAV crewmen and soft-skinned vehicle drivers for Bn HQ, a small vehicle repair section, and a small ambulance section)
-Maintenance Platoon = 67 personnel
-Medical Platoon = 67 personnel (2 aid stations each with an MO & company medical teams)
-Chaplain Section = Chaplain and assistant

This totals  28 officers & 368 enlisted ranks for a total of 394 personnel.  Quite a large service company for one battalion.  But considering that, according to the Army Transformation site on the CF website, a Canadian Task Force is to consist of an HQ of 90 other ranks (including an ASCC & CIMIC) and a Forward Support Group of 287 other ranks this isn't far off.  394 marines or 377 Canadians.  And the USMC battalion has 4 combined arms LAV Recon companies each of three platoons of LAV-25s and a support weapons platoon with LAV-AT, LAV-Mortar and LAV-Engineer vehicles.  This is similar to the typical Canadian Task Force with 2-3 infantry companies, an armoured reccee squadron, a composite engineer squadron, a mortar/artillery battery, etc.

So if each infantry battalion was reorganized with a complete service company, a combat support company with signal, recce/sniper, anti-armour, mortar, and combat engineer (from the CME branch if you want) platoons and three rifle companies you would have a complete unit that could train together and deploy together.  All it would need is an artillery battery, an armoured reconnaissance troop/squadron and an engineer support troop and its a full task force. 
 
Mountie said:
So if each infantry battalion was reorganized with a complete service company, a combat support company with signal, recce/sniper, anti-armour, mortar, and combat engineer (from the CME branch if you want) platoons...  

Where else are you going to get Combat Engineers? the Infantry Pioneer Platoons are long gone.
 
Pioneers (and Mortars) are only gone due to the lack of numbers in the Rifle Coy's. As well as the removal of CSS resources from the 1st line units, it all goes back to lack of warm bodies. You can try to officially justify it any way you want, but the simple fact is that we do not have enough qualified personell to fill the spots.

We will see if this new influx of people, and our higher numbers overall, is used to fill existing positions or go to "new" positions and the new units.
 
Well that's what I mean.  Rather than reforming the pioneer platoons just cross post engineers to the battalion, just like the maintenance platoon is.
 
Well in my humble opinion until the Infantry figures out how to employ us properly, I would rather remain as an indpendent entity and only be attached when they go on EX.

Just my 2 cents, take it for what its worth.
 
Mountie said:
Well that's what I mean.  Rather than reforming the pioneer platoons just cross post engineers to the battalion, just like the maintenance platoon is.
I've spoken with many Echo types who mourn the loss of our Pioneers even more than we do. It just added a burden to already over-tasked troops.

I sincerely hope this piece-meal crap will soon (relatively) die, once we have built the Army back up.
 
Agreed. Having integral support is the only really efficient way of doing business. There are reasons why we changed it from the WW II model, which is very similar to what we are going back to (wrt CSS formations). It just did not get the job done fast enough.

As  I mentioned above, I have not heard one peep out of the CoC where these new troops are going to go (once we get them and train them). I really hope that we will be filling our existing positions before we start bumping up the new positions. With revitalized, and properly manned (or womaned) Adm Coy's, you will have shorter down times, better rapport between end users and Maintainers, and fewer issues deciding what the priorities are.
 
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