220 Reservists Needed for TF 03-06

[Gunner]

Mmmm, it seems this was the overriding impetus behind the CRIC deployments, even more so that the "formed reserve subunit" stuff. Do you think that reserve leaders can be adequately developed if they were individual augmentees? Is there any precedent for this? I'm aware of individual augmentees at the pte/cpl level, which by all accounts worked reasonably well in the past.

Britney, I would argue that the Reserves will always have difficulty providing Sr Offrs/Sr NCOs/WOs that have the level of experience required to fill key jobs for a deployment.  Experience comes with time, the Reserves don't get enough of it.  A bit of a catch 22 situation don't you think?  

I don't know about the non-LFWA CRICs/CRC but the two coys we put out the door were not 100% Reserve.  On Roto 11, the CSM and CQ were from 1 PPCLI and they provided very good "backbone" for the Coy.  It places alot of responsibility on them and can cause trouble in terms of where their loyalites lie.  I believe the CSM on Roto 12 was an ex-Reg but the CQ and Tpt NCO were from 2 PPCLI.

 

[Britney Spears]

There are plenty of augmentation roles for senior Reservists, but virtually none in command roles.  To have a Reserve Pl WO in a Regular Force platoon would (under the current structure anyway) be very politically unpalatable, not to mention detrimental to unit cohesion.  The system for individual augmentees does work reasonably well, but I cannot see it in command roles anytime soon.  Problem?  You bet.

That's what I thought. My personal impression was that the two CRIC rotations were almost a case of the tail wagging the dog. Basically there was a need to develop a core of reserve SrNCOs and officers, but it was impossible to do this on an individual basis, so the CRIC was created for this purpose. The other 100 reservists were just there for the ride.

Britney, I would argue that the Reserves will always have difficulty providing Sr Offrs/Sr NCOs/WOs that have the level of experience required to fill key jobs for a deployment.  Experience comes with time, the Reserves don't get enough of it.  A bit of a catch 22 situation don't you think? 

Sound's about right.

What's the solution?  Well, until the Reserve Force is resourced sufficiently to enable the activation of sub-units on relatively short notice without the attendant training gaps and massive administrative issues, I just can't see it happening unless directed for political reasons.  At the platoon level, though, it is more that do-able, particularly for less intense theatres.  I suspect that that's where the future for P Res unit deployment lies, at least in the short to mid-term...

I don't know about the non-LFWA CRICs/CRC but the two coys we put out the door were not 100% Reserve.  On Roto 11, the CSM and CQ were from 1 PPCLI and they provided very good "backbone" for the Coy.  It places alot of responsibility on them and can cause trouble in terms of where their loyalites lie.  I believe the CSM on Roto 12 was an ex-Reg but the CQ and Tpt NCO were from 2 PPCLI.

So, given all of the above, is this the final verdict from the two CRIC rotations, then? That reserve platoons are good, but bigger than that, bad? We never did hear too much about that reserve BG for Roto 15, did we?


I'm sure I'm being very simplistic about al of this,  intuitive problem solving for me usually doesn't extend much beyond "pull the charging handle back, lift the feed cover".  It helps to be informed when fishing for lucrative jobs in the future.........  

 

[Haggis]

I believe the CSM on Roto 12 was an ex-Reg but the CQ and Tpt NCO were from 2 PPCLI.

The CSM on Roto 12 was 2VP.   Last time I spoke to him he was the QMSI.   The OC was ex-Reg F.

Roto 13 was the first full Reserve Coy, althought I've heard it said that the OC, 2IC, CSM and CQ were regarded as "Reserve ringers" having had either previous deployments or extensive Class B experience.   It did take a tremendous amount of staff work and effort to mount and deploy.   I would say that most of the "obstacles" encountered during the mounting were outside the RCD and surmountable and in many cases personality driven rather than systemic.

Ghost778, I have to agree and disagree.   Yes, it was a lot of work but the leadership of that coy learned as much during the mounting phase is during the deployment.   You, having two tours, could clearly see the difference from the soldier perspective between rotos.

Remember that Roto 13 "CRIC" (I hate that term...) walked into an Armoured BG which was not structured or equipped to sustain a rifle company of any kind.   That company was built completely from scratch in terms of personnel and more so in equipment and infrastructure.   That is something Rotos 11 and 12 didn't have to contend with.  Try as the did, the RCD simply were not scaled to support an Infantry Company everything from weapons to NVGs to consumables had to come from outside the Regiment.

One of the "strengths" of having a Reg F CSM or CQ was said to be the "old boy net".   That didn't work for Roto 13.   The Reserve Coy was just as much an outsider in the RCD Old Boys net as Bravo Coy, 1RCR (the LAV Coy).    That being said, C Coy, RCD BG was treated no better or worse than Bravo Coy by the RSM and CO.  In fact the CO and RSM were quick to include C Coy in every facet of BG and regimental life.

 

[George Wallace]

Roto 13 was the first full Reserve Coy, althought I've heard it said that the OC, 2IC, CSM and CQ were regarded as "Reserve ringers" having had either previous deployments or extensive Class B experience.   It did take a tremendous amount of staff work and effort to mount and deploy.   I would say that most of the "obstacles" encountered during the mounting were surmountable and in many cases personality driven rather than systemic.

Ghost778, I have to agree and disagree.   Yes, it was a lot of work but the leadership of that coy learned as much during the mounting phase is during the deployment.   You, having two tours, could clearly see the difference from the soldier perspective between rotos.

Remember that Roto 13 "CRIC" (I hate that term...) walked into an Armoured BG which was not structured or equipped to sustain a rifle company of any kind.   That company was built completely from scratch in terms of personnel and more so in equipment and infrastructure.   That is something Rotos 11 and 12 didn't have to contend with.

  Utter rubbish!

One of the "strengths" of having a Reg F CSM or CQ was said to be the "old boy net".   That didn't work for Roto 13.   The Reserve Coy was just as much an outsider in the RCD Old Boys net as Bravo Coy, 1RCR (the LAV Coy).     That being said, C Coy, RCD BG was treated no better or worse than Bravo Coy by the RSM and CO.

I suppose that all depends on what perspective you are taking on this ROTO.   I've heard comments to the complete opposite effect about the Reserve Coy.     (Shrug)

 

[Jarnhamar]

We never trained with the RCD except for the silly you killed my chickens opfor stands.  On roto 8 I remember advancing up the matawa behind tanks and being fired into company sized objectives (live fire).

Roto 13 was pretty much left to their own accord.

 

[enfield]

This is fascinating - I was a rifleman in the Roto 11 CRIC, and its interesting to see Sim of the background that went into the deployment.

I can't comment on Roto 12 or 13, but the 1VP CRIC certainly struck me as a 'one shot' deal, and I'm not sure it validated any ideas on the abilities of the Reserves in general.

D Coy was excellent given the training provided (In my biased opinion), but was unique. The CSM and QM were Reg, two of three Pl WOs were highly experienced ex-Reg, and several other key NCOs/NCMs were either ex-Reg or were unusually experienced Reservists.

There was also an effort by most units, and by 1VP/Coy leadership, to select the best available reservists. D Coy was not 'average' or 'normal' for the Reserves.

That said, I'm not sure there was much difference between the performance of the CRIC vs. Reg F troops in theatre, within the limited range of tasks expected/performed. We could do the expected job, in a mature theatre, as well as the Regs could.

I don't anything about the admin/planning that went into the CRIC, but on a basic level, I think the CRIC could have been greatly improved with decent pre-pre-deployment training (39 Bde TCCCS course was conducted without actual radios for example) and effective pre-deployment training with the 1VP BG. The gap between Reg and Res skill sets didn't have to be as large as it was.

The P Res can provide excellent 'raw material' for most levels in a Coy, and while short on field experience and formal courses,  I think enthusiasm and outside experiences can make up for it, to a degree.

 

[KevinB]

1VP had just gotten off Prarie Ram 02 when the CRIC pers arrived.

IF the Reservists had been inc in the month long Prarie Ram it may have been a better idea...

 

[Haggis]

1VP had just gotten off Prarie Ram 02 when the CRIC pers arrived.

IF the Reservists had been inc in the month long Prarie Ram it may have been a better idea...

How very true...

... and if Roto 13's C Coy would have been included in BTE 03 they wouldn't have been doing thier own Warfighter during CFB Petawawa's block leave.

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

Part of the problem with having an earlier training window was that a policy was directed whereby all Reserve pers would have ALL the qualifications called for by the TO&E, including all career courses required by their Reg F counterparts.  This was deliberately inserted to prevent Reg F "naysaying". Thus the OC spent May (IIRC) 2001 requalifying Combat Team Commander at CTC (OC Roto 12 avoided this by already being qualifed), while most of the Sr NCOs underwent the Small Arms Instructor Course in Wainwright - both courses generated at considerable trouble for all concerned.  Were they required?  Probably not.  This "requirement" dramatically reduced the leadership's availability for training before the Spring 2002 timeframe, as many of them had civilian jobs that they were already taking huge amounts of time off from.

Before the company was brought together, all admin was conducted at (and by) LFWA HQ.  Your grumpy bear wrote the Coy training plan. 1 PPCLI transferred the bulk of C Coy's stores to what became D Coy before the OC or his staff hit the ground.  The CQ and CSM went with it, partially to ensure that accounts were properly maintained.  1 PPCLI was extraordinarily cooperative and patient throughout this process, which contributed greatly to the deployment.

Enfield:  good to have input from someone who deployed.

There was also an effort by most units, and by 1VP/Coy leadership, to select the best available reservists. D Coy was not 'average' or 'normal' for the Reserves.

You can say that again!  The Area Commander personally selected the entire leadership (albeit based on resumes and the like) and even section 2ICs received a once-over at the Area level.  Roto 11 was certainly not "average"...

 

[KevinB]

Just a minor correction Teddy.

D Coy acquired the inactive B Coy lines and stores. - C Coy was the Coy that went on Roto 11, A Coy and the Cbt Support Stayed home (but it gave us some good times to pack up Mortars and ship it lock stock and barrel to the Guns... - likewise for the Pioneers).

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

Righto...  I remembered it as C Coy, but the damned mercury-tainted fish I've been eating has me all confused again... ;D

 

[Haggis]

This "requirement" dramatically reduced the leadership's availability for training before the Spring 2002 timeframe, as many of them had civilian jobs that they were already taking huge amounts of time off from.

That's the primary reason why the Roto 13 Coy wasn't part of BTE 03.  All had already committed to a year off, the maximum even the most benevolent employer would likely grant for anything short of "war".  Secondary was funding of the Reserve Coy for an additional six weeks.

The Area Commander personally selected the entire leadership.

Rotos 12 and 13 were also far from "average".  OC D Coy on Roto 12 wrote a lengthy article for "The Bulletin" describing the selection process.  Although Roto 13 didn't conduct the same selection due to personnel and resource constraints in Petawawa (something to do with Pet launching two simultaneous Rotos of 1800 and 1200 soldiers respectively), they improvised and weeded out early on,  prior to deployment for pre-training.  In fact for 13, the OC and CSM were given what essentially was a face to face 2 hour "job interview" by the DComd and ARSM. This was after they had been screened in by unit and Bde.

Did some deploy with the Reserve Coys on both Rotos that shouldn't have?  Most certainly!  Can the same be said of the rest of the BG?  Quite probably.  Could it happen again?  The odds are in favour of it. 

 

[Spr.Earl]

What the end result is;We reservists need Job and Pension protection and DND to give us a time line for us to Volunteer for any Op.

I will give you my own personal experience.
I and another volunteerd for Bosnia over 10 times from 93 but we had no returns but all of a sudden in 95  I had 2 week's to make my mind up, I end up in Dundern under 3 VP with W.O. Este,W.O. Vigau,M.W.O.Day. and M.W.O. Sussie. in 95.I was lucky as in my Civie Job I saved my Over Time untill I got my Class C contract (Reg.Force Pay) all 3 months was Class B pay, a few guy's were in dire straits for money and were choked when they found out they were only getting Pvt1,2, 3 pay on Class C.Due to my time in I got Cpl 4 which was calculated on paid day's in the Militia this is after we learned we passed Selection.
This in 95

We Mo.'s all ended up in differant Coy.'s under our own Reg. Force Snr. Nco's.I ended up in B Coy. with 8 other Sappers from B.C and Alberta.We had too pass all the Infantry criteria or you were R.T.U.'d.
The one good thing was the make up courses,I got my Reg.Force Machine Gunners Course instructed by 2 VP Weaopns Instructors,others got Track,Comms. all with a Reg Force Qualification.
The Shit thing was we had to do all the 2 x 10,1.5,weapons etc. all over again when we hit 1 CER again and then again in Minasotta down in Camp Ripley  :\

I agree with the Reg. Force ethos,all must be up to speed but in order for that to happen we need Legislation to protect the Reservist so he/she can supprot our Reguler Force and not suffer finacaily while trying to serve our country as long as  the Militia are not protected on the Civie side and DND does not give a good heads up for our Militia we can't and won't be able to use our Militia to it's full extent.
This is not even going into making the Militia attending Reg.Force course's like the U.K. or the U.S. aaand making a better Militia.

Oh this is not even metioning the pay grab DND did too those guys'
Not one of those guy's from then are in any more and amongst those Sappers you had a good Section.

 

[combat_medic]

To veer the topic back to the subject of reservists in Afghanistan for a moment, I know a lot of questions have been popping up for the people who want to volunteer; ones which I imagine many of you will be better equipped to answer.

1. As far as D&S Pl, for the Res troops that do this (which I understand will be the majority), will this be basically gate guard/$hit jobs for 6 months, or will it include local (foot) patrols, QRF and other tasks?
2. If Res are restricted to gate duty, has anyone considered the possibility of rotating them between Mirage and Kandahar? I imagine the change of scenery alone could add a little interest to what would otherwise be a pretty dull task.
3. The shortages of LAV qualified drivers/gunners has been mentioned. Is the shortage due to lack of instructors? Equipment? My understanding is that the course is only 6 weeks, or so. I also know that on Rotos 6 and 7, many of the Res got AVGP dvr quals in pre-training. While I think a valid point has been made about degredation of skills, and, outside of deployment, most Res will never see a LAV again, but wouldn't it be more useful to have a larger pool of drivers available? Couldn't some of the Res fill this role?
4. In 39 CBG at least, I know there will be a great deal of training this year for the troops planning to deploy to bring their level of training up to their Reg counterparts (up to and including live fire Coy attacks and a lot of the DAG Admin), I imagine this is part of the lessons learned from the Roto 11-13 Res Deployments. So why is it that the Res, even as individual augmentees are not able to fill regular rifle posns, and seem relegated to the crap jobs? Isn't all that pre-pre-training, combined with 6 months full time enough to make up a sufficient amount of the training gap?

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

1. As far as D&S Pl, for the Res troops that do this (which I understand will be the majority), will this be basically gate guard/$hit jobs for 6 months, or will it include local (foot) patrols, QRF and other tasks?

  Can't answer this one, and I suspect that OPSEC would intervene as to specific roles anyway.

2. If Res are restricted to gate duty, has anyone considered the possibility of rotating them between Mirage and Kandahar? I imagine the change of scenery alone could add a little interest to what would otherwise be a pretty dull task.

  This was done (by section) on ATHENA Roto 2 and IIRC Roto 3.

3. .... I also know that on Rotos 6 and 7, many of the Res got AVGP dvr quals in pre-training.

This was because they were individual augmentees and because many PRes pers were already qual on AVGP (armour, for instance).  AVGP is a much simpler vehicle than LAV III.

While I think a valid point has been made about degredation of skills, and, outside of deployment, most Res will never see a LAV again, but wouldn't it be more useful to have a larger pool of drivers available? Couldn't some of the Res fill this role?

  I doubt that there's sufficient time to conduct Reserve-specific PCF training on LAV III.  We looked at it for Roto 11 and discarded it as an option, partially because of time and cost.  If 1 VP conducts PCF training after their collective cycle is complete and includes Reservists on that course, that would increase the pool.

4. In 39 CBG at least, I know there will be a great deal of training this year for the troops planning to deploy to bring their level of training up to their Reg counterparts (up to and including live fire Coy attacks and a lot of the DAG Admin), I imagine this is part of the lessons learned from the Roto 11-13 Res Deployments.

The training is NOT at the level of their regular counterparts, particularly after Cbt Team live is complete.  I would be surprised (and will certainly stand corrected) if 39 CBG is conducting Level IV live fire training.  Such training is typically well beyond their mandate and 39 CBG does not normally possess the requisite level of expertise to conduct the ranges, etc..

So why is it that the Res, even as individual augmentees are not able to fill regular rifle posns, and seem relegated to the crap jobs?

  I'm not sure that they are relegated to the "crap" jobs.  Rotos 11 - 14 included a significant Reserve sub-unit presence, as already discussed, while Roto 15 was virtually 100% PRes (I won't get into that!).  D&S isn't a crap job, but instead reflects the operational reality on the ground.  I cannot, in the current climate, see a Canadian Res sub-unit conducting offensive operations in Afghanistan.

Isn't all that pre-pre-training, combined with 6 months full time enough to make up a sufficient amount of the training gap?

Short answer, no.  The record shows that the pre-pre-training conducted locally is haphazard at best and dangerously lacking at worst. It works at platoon level, but only just.  Furthermore, there isn't really sufficient time to build the skill sets required for operations in a dangerous theatre in the weeks available before deployment (once leave, gateway training and TMST are factored in).  Afghanistan isn't Bosnia, where there was sufficient operational flexibility to accept some risk, or Mirage, where the threat level is considerably lower.

 

[George Wallace]

I think that one of the major hurdles for the Reserves, even Armd Reservists, to becoming LAV III drivers, is the necessity to have an 'Air Brake Crse'.   I noticed this summer that the Reserve MSE Op Crse (run in Edmonton) were getting qualified on HLVW, so it proves that Reservists can get this qualification.   As we see fewer and fewer AVGP, Bison and Coyotes being produced, it only seem logical (I know - no logic here) that more LAV III and LAV III variants are going to enter the system, so why not start now with some D & M Crses geared in that direction.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

C'mon George. Your thinking logically and constructively, instead of beating the Reserves over the head the Reg stick and saying "You'll never be good enough". Haven't you been listening?  Your already morphing ;D

 

[George Wallace]

Damn it Dave....I'm trying....I will try to slow it down a bit 

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

I think that one of the major hurdles for the Reserves, even Armd Reservists, to becoming LAV III drivers, is the necessity to have an 'Air Brake Crse'.   I noticed this summer that the Reserve MSE Op Crse (run in Edmonton) were getting qualified on HLVW, so it proves that Reservists can get this qualification.   As we see fewer and fewer AVGP, Bison and Coyotes being produced, it only seem logical (I know - no logic here) that more LAV III and LAV III variants are going to enter the system, so why not start now with some D & M Crses geared in that direction.

I couldn't agree more.  "Train to need" has been killing us (and is almost entirely driven by resource considerations).  My point was that LAV III training wasn't practical in a pre-deployment context.  As for a steady state, it makes sense to me.

 

[Haggis]

I'm not sure that they are relegated to the "crap" jobs.   Rotos 11 - 14 included a significant Reserve sub-unit presence, as already discussed, while Roto 15 was virtually 100% PRes (I won't get into that!).   D&S isn't a crap job, but instead reflects the operational reality on the ground.   I cannot, in the current climate, see a Canadian Res sub-unit conducting offensive operations in Afghanistan.

Bear, I'm inclined to agree with you.  D&S (or Force Protection) is IMO a viable option for PRes troops.  This was discussed at length in another thread ("Force protection a good job for Reserves?" http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/28456.0.html)

Dropping a Reserve sub unit intentionally into offensive ops with the current level of pre-deployment training is not prudent.  However they should still be trained for such a contingency in case trouble comes looking for them.

The record shows that the pre-pre-training conducted locally is haphazard at best and dangerously lacking at worst. It works at platoon level, but only just.   Furthermore, there isn't really sufficient time to build the skill sets required for operations in a dangerous theatre in the weeks available before deployment (once leave, gateway training and TMST are factored in).

Locally conducted pre-training to the Pl level must be centralized and under the deploying Reserve sub-unit control (with Reg F assistance and mentoring such as Roto 12)  Roto 13 (the last BG sized roto) showed that three CBGs cannot reach a common standard training their platoons independently.  Centralized training was conducted by the Coy over the March break preceding deployment (and partly used as a selection tool) with standardization and validation during the first three weeks in Petawawa.  IF this was already done and validated, it's conceivable that the Reserve sub-unit could arrive at the mounting base for pre deployment trg with sufficient skills to start at Level III in a Level IV context.  But that would put an additional strain on the force generating CBGs and ATCs.