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Informing the Army’s Future Structure

The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps will be modernized and centralized in a single formation based in Alberta.


Force 2025​

Situation​

Force 2025 (F2025) is the Canadian Army (CA)’s initiative to review all its components to optimize and modernize its structures to meet current and projected operational requirements as well as support SSE initiatives.
Recognizing that the CA’s effectiveness is adversely affected by a shortfall of 8000 people, an extensive analysis was carried out in December 2021. As a result, a new structure was adopted and is now being implemented.
This new, ‘One Army’ structure will see the integration of the Primary Reserves, Canadian Rangers, civilians, and the Regular Force into a single, integrated team.
Increased integration enhances command and control relationships and training opportunities, and clarifies assigned tasks and integration points, ensuring the CA is prepared to carry out assigned tasks and support concurrent operations.
The One Army model also supports digital transformation initiatives. It is sufficiently agile to respond to modern threats such cyber and space and enable the CA to address capability gaps in areas such as Ground-Based Air Defence, long-range heavy indirect fire support, Counter Improvised Explosive Device (CIED), and Chemical Biological Radioactive Nuclear (CBRN) expertise.
F2025 also includes initiatives to refine attraction, recruiting, and retention. In line with Canadian Armed Forces Reconstitution efforts, the CA is implementing policies to enable the operational capability of Reserve personnel, while ensuring that administration is streamlined, and the continued development and integration of Reserve Mission Tasks to build capacity and depth.
F2025 has six key components:
  • Changes to the training model - Reinforcing training centres with instructors from units to reduce pressure on individual units to design, plan and carry out training;
  • Staffing realignment - Prioritizing the staffing levels of units, including reallocation of vacant positions for both Regular Force and Reserve units;
  • Modernization of structure - While units will see a decrease in total positions, the force generation output is expected to remain largely unchanged through tailored Reserve Mission Tasks and reciprocal integration of Regular Force soldiers into Reserve units;
  • Realignment of responsibilities and authorities - Pushing these functions to newly-created entities or to existing structures where they may be more suitable. Analysis to seek efficiencies is ongoing;
  • Ready Force Levels - Integration of Regular and Reserve components through tailored and tiered Readiness structures that will identify tasks to a unit based on personnel and equipment allocation; and
  • Maintaining a strategic Reserve Force that can be mobilized quickly.

Action​

  • A F2025 Warning Order was issued in March 2022, and the proposed final structure plan is being tested in war games before it is approved;
  • In line with the current international context, the CA is exploring the concept of a global response task force that would provide forces offering a wide range of options to the federal government for emerging crises around the world and at home;;
  • The CA is improving coordination with Canadian Joint Operations Command and Canadian Special Operations Forces Command to better align force generation with force employment and ensure proper force design;;
  • The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps will be modernized and centralized in a single formation based in Alberta. Additional trials will be conducted to inform tasks, mission tasks and structures in order to reduce national procurement and increase its integration into a digitally networked CA;
  • The CA is Experimenting with Second and Third Line logistics through the reorganization of Combat Service Support between 2 Service Battalion and 4th Canadian Division Support Group in support of Ex MAPLE RESOVE. What we learn will be adjusted and applied.

Should the RCAC reference be taken to mean that the RCDs and 12 RBC will join the LdSH(RC) in Alberta in a separate Brigade?

Because if so then that opens up the possibility of 2 or 3 of these Brigades.


Eg

1 HQ and Sigs Sqn
3 PPCLI (RSTA)
2 PPCLI
1 PPCLI
1 RCHA
1 CER
1 Svc Bn

Add 1 Wing and you are heading in the direction of

11th Airborne Division "Arctic Angels"
Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion

 
4 AD was Reg F; 1 AD (L&R Scots), the unit in Quebec, and the unit in AB were all Res F.

4 GS is Reg F.
The link to DHist says 4 AD started as RegF, was reduced to nil strength in 1992 and when it was reformed in 1995 was reformed as a ResF unit as part of the ResF. I can only go by what I can find. This is why I was looking for the MOO and CFOO for 4 AD and 4 RCA(GS) some time ago.

🤷‍♂️
 
Should the RCAC reference be taken to mean that the RCDs and 12 RBC will join the LdSH(RC) in Alberta in a separate Brigade?
Your source says it was last updated in January. A lot has changed since then (war in Europe, new Army commander). Are you sure it is reliable?
 
The link to DHist says 4 AD started as RegF, was reduced to nil strength in 1992 and when it was reformed in 1995 was reformed as a ResF unit as part of the ResF. I can only go by what I can find. This is why I was looking for the MOO and CFOO for 4 AD and 4 RCA(GS) some time ago.

🤷‍♂️
I understood that AD behaved as a total force demi-formation with 4 AD containing a single battery and providing the RHQ to all AD units across Canada.
 
Legally speaking, there's no such thing as a Total Force unit. Units are embodied in the Reg F or Res F.

And woe betide the Res F person in a unit embodied in the Reg F; their liability under the NDA is materially increased
 
I understood that AD behaved as a total force demi-formation with 4 AD containing a single battery and providing the RHQ to all AD units across Canada.
There were actually three batteries in 4 AD around the turn of the century. 119 and 128 AD batteries with ADATS, Oerlikon 35mm and Javelin as well as 210 Workshop which was a battery strength maintenance facility for all things AD. These were primarily RegF.

On the ResF side 1 AD Regt in Pembroke, 18 AD Regt in Red Deer and 6 Fd Regt all together had 5 ResF AD batteries between them with a goodly number of RegF included and manning Javelin missiles. The standing task for the five ResF batteries was to provide Airspace Coordination Centres to each of the three Brigade Groups and a total of three Javelin troops to augment 4 AD. In grand total the establishment was for 475 RegF members and 430 ResF ones. That's a fairly realistic number of air defenders needed to support Canada's Army.

🍻
 
Your source says it was last updated in January. A lot has changed since then (war in Europe, new Army commander). Are you sure it is reliable?
No idea. It was on a government/dnd/army site. So, as accurate as any other government information?

  • A F2025 Warning Order was issued in March 2022, and the proposed final structure plan is being tested in war games before it is approved;

Current time 15 July
Warning order WAS issued in March 2022
So Action plan prepared in the last three months? Post Feb 24 and Ukraine and NORAD announcements?
 
Should the RCAC reference be taken to mean that the RCDs and 12 RBC will join the LdSH(RC) in Alberta in a separate Brigade?
Seems like it. It makes sense to a certain extent. If the RCAC want to go with a cavalry model then they need to be able to mix and match with their various vehicles to see what works.
 
Your source says it was last updated in January. A lot has changed since then (war in Europe, new Army commander). Are you sure it is reliable?
It is certainly odd that a document that states “Date modified: 2022-01-18” contains the line “A F2025 Warning Order was issued in March 2022,” — clearly somebody isn’t telling the entire accurate truth. Or is using time travel.

Whats the situation with Francophone schools in Edmonton these days? As I understand it, lack of facilities for unilingual French-speaking dependants was a driving force behind 1 Commando being stood up in Valcartier when the Canadian Airborne Regiment was being established in Edmonton. I wonder if the same issues would be faced by 12eRBC.

Of course, how we had the resources to educate soldiers’ children in French when their battalions were in Germany, but somehow lacked those same resources in Alberta, that’s another issue.
 
There were actually three batteries in 4 AD around the turn of the century. 119 and 128 AD batteries with ADATS, Oerlikon 35mm and Javelin as well as 210 Workshop which was a battery strength maintenance facility for all things AD. These were primarily RegF.

On the ResF side 1 AD Regt in Pembroke, 18 AD Regt in Red Deer and 6 Fd Regt all together had 5 ResF AD batteries between them with a goodly number of RegF included and manning Javelin missiles. The standing task for the five ResF batteries was to provide Airspace Coordination Centres to each of the three Brigade Groups and a total of three Javelin troops to augment 4 AD. In grand total the establishment was for 475 RegF members and 430 ResF ones. That's a fairly realistic number of air defenders needed to support Canada's Army.

🍻
20th Independent Battery in Lethbridge was the AD battery.

20th Field Regiment is in Red Deer.

While it may be a realistic number to support the Army is it a realistic number to defend Canada, or even Canada's cities?
 
It is certainly odd that a document that states “Date modified: 2022-01-18” contains the line “A F2025 Warning Order was issued in March 2022,” — clearly somebody isn’t telling the entire accurate truth. Or is using time travel.

Whats the situation with Francophone schools in Edmonton these days? As I understand it, lack of facilities for unilingual French-speaking dependants was a driving force behind 1 Commando being stood up in Valcartier when the Canadian Airborne Regiment was being established in Edmonton. I wonder if the same issues would be faced by 12eRBC.

Of course, how we had the resources to educate soldiers’ children in French when their battalions were in Germany, but somehow lacked those same resources in Alberta, that’s another issue.





1657925173496.png

37 min (46.3 km) via AB-216 E


And the Catholic system.

 
20th Independent Battery in Lethbridge was the AD battery.

20th Field Regiment is in Red Deer.
You're part right.

18AD Regt was in Lethbridge, not Red Deer (brain fart on my part) but it wasn't 20th Ind Fd Bty per se that was the AD unit. 20th Ind Fd Bty was reorganized as a regiment and named 18 AD Regt on 10 Nov 1992. 18 AD Regt was allocated two batteries: 20 AD Bty and 39 AD Bty (The artillery distinguishes between Fd, AD and ATk batteries - they run separate lineages). It lost its air defence role in 2005 and reverted to field artillery but it wasn't officially reverted back to a single battery size and name changed back to 20 Ind Fd Bty until 13 Jul 2011 which was around the time period that 4 AD converted over from AD to its new role as 4 RCA (GS).

While it may be a realistic number to support the Army is it a realistic number to defend Canada, or even Canada's cities?
You're mixing apples and oranges here.

On the one hand is air defence for a field army's deployed force which is what the 1992 to 2005 structure was designed to be (that included 4 CMBG and our European air fields).

On the other hand is strategic air defence which has generally been an air force role and which has shrunk considerably from a large and varied force in the 1950s growing with things through Bomarcs and Voodoos until shrinking down to what is now a handful of F18 squadrons.

🍻
 
You're part right.

18AD Regt was in Lethbridge, not Red Deer (brain fart on my part) but it wasn't 20th Ind Fd Bty per se that was the AD unit. 20th Ind Fd Bty was reorganized as a regiment and named 18 AD Regt on 10 Nov 1992. 18 AD Regt was allocated two batteries: 20 AD Bty and 39 AD Bty (The artillery distinguishes between Fd, AD and ATk batteries - they run separate lineages). It lost its air defence role in 2005 and reverted to field artillery but it wasn't officially reverted back to a single battery size and name changed back to 20 Ind Fd Bty until 13 Jul 2011 which was around the time period that 4 AD converted over from AD to its new role as 4 RCA (GS).


You're mixing apples and oranges here.

On the one hand is air defence for a field army's deployed force which is what the 1992 to 2005 structure was designed to be (that included 4 CMBG and our European air fields).

On the other hand is strategic air defence which has generally been an air force role and which has shrunk considerably from a large and varied force in the 1950s growing with things through Bomarcs and Voodoos until shrinking down to what is now a handful of F18 squadrons.

🍻

So we have some clarification then .... despite the deployment of Army Air Defence assets to protect civil infrastructure as at Kananaskis.
 
So we have some clarification then .... despite the deployment of Army Air Defence assets to protect civil infrastructure as at Kananaskis.
That was not about infrastructure; it was about an activity that contained many very high value targets (world leaders). It’s easy to allocate point defence assets when you need to protect the head of a pin for a finite time window.
 
This thread is indeed a wild ride as the train derails down multiple rabbit holes.

The three Reg F Armoured Regiments are not moving to Edmonton. The tanks being consolidated in Edmonton, though, is now wrapped up in F2025 discussions. The tank squadron in Gagetown is under the RCD but is comprised of soldiers from the RCD and 12 RBC. When the dust settles we may see that sqn in Edmonton.

Some folks have been decrying the state of the CA. There is plenty to complain about, but lets look at what can be generated.

The CA could field an absolutely world-class Cavalry Regiment/Cavalry Battlegroup to attach to multi-national formation in high-intensity operations. Whether it had pure squadrons of tanks and recce or scrambled ones could be worked out, but the tools and people are there to perform that mission set.

The CA could field a very good infantry Battlegroup with infantry, tanks and engineers for high-intensity operations, but we really need ALAWS in addition to the existing dismounted TOW to be ready for prime-time. There is work being done on this. I might trade M777s for mortars for fire support. If its down to PYs I might even trade Recce Platoon for Mortars.

The CA could field a mechanized brigade for high-intensity operations, but our towed artillery would be a major issue. Ground Based Air Defence is another gap, but there is also work being done on this. We do have some excellent enablers found in a variety of formations to include 6 CCSB to support a mechanized brigade as well.

What the CA can really do well is force generate outstanding battlegroups along with HQs and support for COIN/stability operations on a permanent, enduring basis. The army we have today was the result of rotational BG operations of this type from 1992 until 2011. At the risk of opening the TAPV can again, that program was borne out of the Kandahar experience. If we had a BG in a place like Mali it makes a certain amount of sense to have a bunch of TAPV. If the Taliban had operated masses of tanks and aircraft then we would probably have lots of anti-tank missiles and GBAD. Instead, they used IEDs and we developed, at great human cost, capabilities to counter that threat. We were fortunate to get the arguably best tank in service out that conflict. That conflict also saved our tube artillery from oblivion, but while we got something that was outstanding for that type of conflict it is not necessarily what would be needed for mobile mechanized operations against a conventional enemy. Or maybe it is?

So now we pivot again, faced with tough decisions about what to retain, what to acquire and what to divest to attain that acquisition of new capabilities.
 
This thread is indeed a wild ride as the train derails down multiple rabbit holes.

The three Reg F Armoured Regiments are not moving to Edmonton. The tanks being consolidated in Edmonton, though, is now wrapped up in F2025 discussions. The tank squadron in Gagetown is under the RCD but is comprised of soldiers from the RCD and 12 RBC. When the dust settles we may see that sqn in Edmonton.

Some folks have been decrying the state of the CA. There is plenty to complain about, but lets look at what can be generated.

The CA could field an absolutely world-class Cavalry Regiment/Cavalry Battlegroup to attach to multi-national formation in high-intensity operations. Whether it had pure squadrons of tanks and recce or scrambled ones could be worked out, but the tools and people are there to perform that mission set.

The CA could field a very good infantry Battlegroup with infantry, tanks and engineers for high-intensity operations, but we really need ALAWS in addition to the existing dismounted TOW to be ready for prime-time. There is work being done on this. I might trade M777s for mortars for fire support. If its down to PYs I might even trade Recce Platoon for Mortars.

The CA could field a mechanized brigade for high-intensity operations, but our towed artillery would be a major issue. Ground Based Air Defence is another gap, but there is also work being done on this. We do have some excellent enablers found in a variety of formations to include 6 CCSB to support a mechanized brigade as well.

What the CA can really do well is force generate outstanding battlegroups along with HQs and support for COIN/stability operations on a permanent, enduring basis. The army we have today was the result of rotational BG operations of this type from 1992 until 2011. At the risk of opening the TAPV can again, that program was borne out of the Kandahar experience. If we had a BG in a place like Mali it makes a certain amount of sense to have a bunch of TAPV. If the Taliban had operated masses of tanks and aircraft then we would probably have lots of anti-tank missiles and GBAD. Instead, they used IEDs and we developed, at great human cost, capabilities to counter that threat. We were fortunate to get the arguably best tank in service out that conflict. That conflict also saved our tube artillery from oblivion, but while we got something that was outstanding for that type of conflict it is not necessarily what would be needed for mobile mechanized operations against a conventional enemy. Or maybe it is?

So now we pivot again, faced with tough decisions about what to retain, what to acquire and what to divest to attain that acquisition of new capabilities.
I'll agree that there are a bunch of good building blocks to work with and that a number of the capability gaps in terms of equipment are already been looked at, or in light of what's happening in Ukraine are likely to be addressed in the near future.

My take is that while the LAV may have shortcomings in comparison to tracked IFVs with integral AT weapons, we are not likely to see them being dropped any time soon as our primary vehicle. Too much money in tight economic times and too many other major defence purchases already in the pipeline (NORAD upgrades, CSCs, F-35's, etc.).

Secondly, while I agree that we need to maintain a "heavy" capability for both military and political purposes, I think that realistically a direct military conflict between Russia and NATO in the near to medium term is low. Russia is too busy in Ukraine and has been too weakened to contemplate directly taking on NATO in Poland/the Baltic States any time soon and NATO won't risk initiating a conflict with Russia both for lack of political will and for fear of nuclear retaliation/escalation by Russia if they fear they risk losing. Any conflict/deterrence requirements will likely be along the peripheries where NATO's heavy forces are not already concentrated. This could include along the Northern NATO flank (including the Arctic) where reduction in ice cover will make competition for valuable resources and trade routes much more viable.

Lastly, during periods of great power competition there is likely to be quite a few brushfire and proxy wars as each of the competing powers vies for greater influence and control of strategic terrain and resources around the world. Our LAV-based forces are well equipped to provide support for our allies in these types of conflicts.

My proposal would be to maintain enough LAV-based mechanized forces to be able to maintain our eFP Latvia deterrence force, sustain a Battle Group sized deployment to foreign stability operations as they come up and be able to force generate (and sustain) a Mechanized Brigade Group for an allied Division in case of a major conflict (NATO's Multinational Division - North or an American/British/Commonwealth Division). That force could look something like this:

  • Lord Strathconas Horse (Tank) - Edmonton
  • Reserve Armoured Regiment (Tank) - Western Canada
  • 12e Regiment Blinde Canada (Cavalry) - Valcartier
  • Reserve Armoured Regiment (Cavalry) - Quebec
  • 1 PPCLI (LAV Infantry) - Edmonton
  • 2 PPCLI (LAV Infantry) - Edmonton
  • Reserve Infantry Battalion (LAV Infantry) - Western Canada
  • 1 R22eR (LAV Infantry) - Valcartier
  • 2 R22eR (LAV Infantry) - Valcartier
  • Reserve Infantry Battalion (LAV Infantry) - Quebec
  • 1 RCHA (SPG Artillery) - Shilo
  • Reserve Artillery Regiment (SPG) - Western Canada
  • 5e RALC (SHORAD) - Valcartier
  • Reserve Artillery Regiment (SHORAD) - Quebec
  • 1 CER - Edmonton
  • 5 CER - Valcartier
  • 1 Service Battalion - Edmonton
  • 5 Service Battalion - Valcartier

I'd also have a Light (Arctic/Air Mobile) Brigade both for defence of the Canadian Arctic and for use as a Rapid Reaction Force for deployment worldwide in times of Crisis. This Brigade could be tasked to become the 3rd maneuver Brigade in the US Army's 11th Airborne Division in Alaska as part of an Allied defence of North America force or if required in a major conflict be used as the core to expand to a full Light Infantry Division with integration with Reserve units. This force could look something like this:

  • Royal Canadian Dragoons (Cavalry) - Petawawa
  • 1 RCR (Light Infantry) - Petawawa
  • 2 RCR (Light Infantry) - Gagetown
  • 3 RCR (Light Infantry) - Petawawa
  • 2 RCHA (M777 Artillery) - Petawawa
  • 2 CER - Petawawa
  • 2 Service Battalion - Petawawa

  • Reserve Light Infantry Brigade (East)
  • 3 R22eR (Light Infantry) - Quebec
  • Reserve Infantry Battalion (Light Infantry) - Atlantic Canada
  • Reserve Infantry Battalion (Light Infantry) - Quebec
  • Reserve Armoured Regiment (Cavalry) - Atlantic Canada
  • Reserve Artillery Regiment (Towed/Light Wheeled Howitzer) - Atlantic Canada
  • Reserve Combat Engineer Regiment - Atlantic Canada/Quebec
  • Reserve Service Battalion - Atlantic Canada/Quebec

  • Reseve Infantry Battalion (Central)
  • 3 PPCLI (Light Infantry) - Shilo
  • Reserve Infantry Battalion (Light Infantry) - Ontario
  • Reserve Infantry Battalion (Light Infantry) - Ontario
  • Reserve Armoured Regiment (Cavalry) - Ontario
  • Reserve Artillery Regiment (Towed/Light Wheeled Howitzer) - Ontario
  • Reserve Combat Engineer Regiment - Ontario
  • Reserve Service Battalion - Ontario
Total Reserve Requirements (by Region) to fill out this force would be:
  • Atlantic Canada
    • 1 x Light Infantry Battalion
    • 1 x Cavalry Regiment
    • 1 x Artillery Regiment
    • 1/2 x Combat Engineer Regiment
    • 1/2 x Service Battalion
  • Quebec
    • 1 x Cavalry Regiment
    • 1 x LAV Infantry Battalion
    • 1 x Light Infantry Battalion
    • 1 x SHORAD Battalion
    • 1/2 x Combat Engineer Regiment
    • 1/2 x Service Battalion
  • Ontario
    • 2 x Light Infantry Battalions
    • 1 x Cavalry Regiment
    • 1 x Artillery Regiment
    • 1 x Combat Engineer Regiment
    • 1 x Service Battalion
  • Western Canada
    • 1 x Tank Regiment
    • 1 x LAV Infantry Battalion
    • 1 x Artillery Regiment
Any remaining Reserve Regiments that are not required to fill out the above requirements would be used to augment 6 CSSB capabilities or to generate Divisional-level forces for the Light Division (SHORAD and MRAD, HIMARS, etc.).
 
This thread is indeed a wild ride as the train derails down multiple rabbit holes.

The three Reg F Armoured Regiments are not moving to Edmonton. The tanks being consolidated in Edmonton, though, is now wrapped up in F2025 discussions. The tank squadron in Gagetown is under the RCD but is comprised of soldiers from the RCD and 12 RBC. When the dust settles we may see that sqn in Edmonton.

Some folks have been decrying the state of the CA. There is plenty to complain about, but lets look at what can be generated.

The CA could field an absolutely world-class Cavalry Regiment/Cavalry Battlegroup to attach to multi-national formation in high-intensity operations. Whether it had pure squadrons of tanks and recce or scrambled ones could be worked out, but the tools and people are there to perform that mission set.

The CA could field a very good infantry Battlegroup with infantry, tanks and engineers for high-intensity operations, but we really need ALAWS in addition to the existing dismounted TOW to be ready for prime-time. There is work being done on this. I might trade M777s for mortars for fire support. If its down to PYs I might even trade Recce Platoon for Mortars.

The CA could field a mechanized brigade for high-intensity operations, but our towed artillery would be a major issue. Ground Based Air Defence is another gap, but there is also work being done on this. We do have some excellent enablers found in a variety of formations to include 6 CCSB to support a mechanized brigade as well.

What the CA can really do well is force generate outstanding battlegroups along with HQs and support for COIN/stability operations on a permanent, enduring basis. The army we have today was the result of rotational BG operations of this type from 1992 until 2011. At the risk of opening the TAPV can again, that program was borne out of the Kandahar experience. If we had a BG in a place like Mali it makes a certain amount of sense to have a bunch of TAPV. If the Taliban had operated masses of tanks and aircraft then we would probably have lots of anti-tank missiles and GBAD. Instead, they used IEDs and we developed, at great human cost, capabilities to counter that threat. We were fortunate to get the arguably best tank in service out that conflict. That conflict also saved our tube artillery from oblivion, but while we got something that was outstanding for that type of conflict it is not necessarily what would be needed for mobile mechanized operations against a conventional enemy. Or maybe it is?

So now we pivot again, faced with tough decisions about what to retain, what to acquire and what to divest to attain that acquisition of new capabilities.

In fairness/defence the latest rabbit hole came as a result of yet another "official" proclamation. Something to do with "narrative".


Action​

  • A F2025 Warning Order was issued in March 2022, and the proposed final structure plan is being tested in war games before it is approved;
  • In line with the current international context, the CA is exploring the concept of a global response task force that would provide forces offering a wide range of options to the federal government for emerging crises around the world and at home;;
  • The CA is improving coordination with Canadian Joint Operations Command and Canadian Special Operations Forces Command to better align force generation with force employment and ensure proper force design;;
  • The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps will be modernized and centralized in a single formation based in Alberta. Additional trials will be conducted to inform tasks, mission tasks and structures in order to reduce national procurement and increase its integration into a digitally networked CA;
  • The CA is Experimenting with Second and Third Line logistics through the reorganization of Combat Service Support between 2 Service Battalion and 4th Canadian Division Support Group in support of Ex MAPLE RESOVE. What we learn will be adjusted and applied.

So if the Army wants to prevent speculation it may want to try and resolve its own issues expeditiously and communicate them forthrightly.


As to the wild ride...

This thread is indeed a wild ride as the train derails down multiple rabbit holes.

The three Reg F Armoured Regiments are not moving to Edmonton. The tanks being consolidated in Edmonton, though, is now wrapped up in F2025 discussions. The tank squadron in Gagetown is under the RCD but is comprised of soldiers from the RCD and 12 RBC. When the dust settles we may see that sqn in Edmonton.

Some folks have been decrying the state of the CA. There is plenty to complain about, but lets look at what can be generated.

The CA could field an absolutely world-class Cavalry Regiment/Cavalry Battlegroup to attach to multi-national formation in high-intensity operations. Whether it had pure squadrons of tanks and recce or scrambled ones could be worked out, but the tools and people are there to perform that mission set.

The CA could field a very good infantry Battlegroup with infantry, tanks and engineers for high-intensity operations, but we really need ALAWS in addition to the existing dismounted TOW to be ready for prime-time. There is work being done on this. I might trade M777s for mortars for fire support. If its down to PYs I might even trade Recce Platoon for Mortars.

The CA could field a mechanized brigade for high-intensity operations, but our towed artillery would be a major issue. Ground Based Air Defence is another gap, but there is also work being done on this. We do have some excellent enablers found in a variety of formations to include 6 CCSB to support a mechanized brigade as well.

What the CA can really do well is force generate outstanding battlegroups along with HQs and support for COIN/stability operations on a permanent, enduring basis. The army we have today was the result of rotational BG operations of this type from 1992 until 2011. At the risk of opening the TAPV can again, that program was borne out of the Kandahar experience. If we had a BG in a place like Mali it makes a certain amount of sense to have a bunch of TAPV. If the Taliban had operated masses of tanks and aircraft then we would probably have lots of anti-tank missiles and GBAD. Instead, they used IEDs and we developed, at great human cost, capabilities to counter that threat. We were fortunate to get the arguably best tank in service out that conflict. That conflict also saved our tube artillery from oblivion, but while we got something that was outstanding for that type of conflict it is not necessarily what would be needed for mobile mechanized operations against a conventional enemy. Or maybe it is?

So now we pivot again, faced with tough decisions about what to retain, what to acquire and what to divest to attain that acquisition of new capabilities.

I highlighted all the points of consideration and debate that are up for resolution. I think there is both ample opportunity, and need, for speculation. Pondering the imponderables and considering all the questions that are presented by stakeholders in the outcome leads to consideration of ancillary issues like the availability of French language schools for the kids and jobs for the spouses.

I agree that this discussion, and the Ukrainian ones, and all the other force design and reserve design ones, wander all over the map. But that is a feature, not a bug. It is a demonstration of how inter-connected all the issues under consideration are. It is not possible to consider elements in isolation. In fact the only reason for looking at any particular element is to consider how it might be employed and the effects on own forces, atts, dets and the enemy.

So yes, a wild ride, and I would not expect the wild ride to ever really end... even after battlefield decisions enter into the discussion.

I really like this line -

we got something that was outstanding for that type of conflict it is not necessarily what would be needed for mobile mechanized operations against a conventional enemy. Or maybe it is?

Ukraine has rotated my kaleidoscope and applied new filters for the time being. As a result that "maybe it is" resonates with me. The first question the Ukrainians have had to ask themselves is "how effective can we be with what we have?" Or putting it another way "what tactics and stratagems work for us?" They are not working to a standardized doctrine that accommodates the expectations of allies. They are developing doctrine that meets the current needs of their situation.

Upthread, or on another thread, there was discussion about an article that suggested that rather than NATO pushing for standardized brigades and divisions that it permit each nation to first of all focus on getting its own defence in order using the doctrines, strategies and tactics that work best for them. Let the Swedes and the Finns continue to be Swedes and Finns and encourage others to be more like them. The more the locals can look after themselves the less the likelihood that III Corps will have to move or ICBMs will have to be discussed.

We in Canada still have a lot of wild rides ahead of us as all of this has yet to be discussed let alone resolved.
 
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