The Brigade Fight

[FJAG]

I disagree with this assertion in US Doctrine.  It stretches the meaning of the close/deep/rear framework, which was created for contiguous, linear operations (look at the Russian and U.S. theory behind it), almost to the point of uselessness.  What does "organizational or temporal orientation" mean without relation to terrain and space?

I don't entirely disagree with you. In my mind as well the Bde is too involved in using it's available assets to deal with the situation in the close manoeuvre area to be able to take concrete action beyond that although they may well have gathered information with respect to the deep manoeuvre and deep fires areas and have concerns about them. Division and above is where there are resources available to plan and implement that fight.

I think these definitions from the recently published TRADOC Pam 525-3-1 "The US Army in Multi Domain Operations 2028" support your point.

Deep Fires Areas*
The areas beyond the feasible range of movement for conventional forces but where joint fires,
SOF, information, and virtual capabilities can be employed.

Deep Maneuver Area*
The area where maneuver forces can go (beyond the Close Area) but is so contested that
maneuver still requires significant allocation and convergence of multi-domain capabilities.

There's a bit of relativity here though. I think FM 3-96 isn't written just for high intensity conflict on the European battlefield but for a broad range of situations short of that where BCTs might be much more widely dispersed and without many of the typical div and above enablers save their own organic cannon battalion (The US command relationship incidentally would be - "organic" and the support relationship would be - "direct support" - see FM 3-09) and air.

:cheers:

 

[Haligonian]

If we look at a warfighting CMBG, lets assume that it has mortars for its infantry battalions and a full Regiment of 155 artillery. The Brigade Commander has the ability to sense and strike beyond his immediate fight in terms of time and space. He can see and strike well beyond (comparatively) the FLOT. Guns striking the enemy for the next battle are not supporting the close battle, but that is at least a choice he makes. It is not unreasonable to factor in Reinforcing tube artillery for a CMBG/Brigade. The Brigade also has the staff horsepower to plan and execute CAS in a much more fulsome manner than a typical Battle Group. So while I agree that the Brigade Deep battle is much more limited in scope than the Div and Corps deep battle, I still maintain that it is the first level at which we can realistically have a Deep battle going on the same time as the Close battle. The Div is indeed were the Deep battle really comes into itself. I would also agree that the Brigade should not fight the Deep at the exclusion of the Close.

Along the same lines that Infanteer pointed out, let's envision a Bde in the defence.  It could be realistically tasked to defeat/destroy a first echelon enemy division.  In such a case it's M777's will not even be able to reach into that attacking Division's depth.  If deep operations are about interdicting enemy follow on echelons and disrupting an enemy's ability to introduce follow on forces then that Bde just isn't achieving that.  That attacking division would likely completely fit within the area defined by the Close fight.

In the case of a bde on the offence with an enemy Bn defending then I think all the guns would still be squarely focussed on the close fight of suppressing/neutralizing sub unit BPs to allow friendly forces to close, break in, and fight through.  Higher echelons with greater range would be responsible for isolating that Bde's close fight from deeper elements that may seek to c-atk/block/reinf.

While the Bde's guns may not always be focussed on smashing the enemy units in the absolute bleeding edge of the front line this doesn't necessarily mean that they are doing "deep" work.  They're still tools of the close fight.

 

[Haligonian]

The other factor of "realistically" is related to command of deep operations.  The British Official History of the Gulf War describes how the GOC of 1(UK) Armd Div conducted deep operations and put his Divisional Artillery Chief in command.  The Division was augmented with elements from BAOR, and the officer responsible for deep operations had staff planning and command support capabilities that are inherent in Divisional Fires organizations.  I don't think we could reasonable expect a CO of a close support artillery regiment, with a HQ primarily focused on moving the guns and providing FSCC support to the Brigade manoeuvring in the close fight, to have the ability to run a concurrent deep operation.

When I conducted planning with an Allied organization (in training) for the coordination of close and deep operations, the deep battle was properly assigned to a general officer who (in our organization's case) possessed a significant air element (like, more aircraft than the RCAF) as well as access to long range fires from a variety of joint force platforms.  He also possessed the HQ to control these capabilities, so that he could properly fight a deep operation.

A good point and something that is supported doctrinally.  I opened up the old B-GL-321-001/FP-001 Corps Operations (kinda funny we published a Corps ops pub, which appears to be a straight rip off of the US one) and it notes that for the optimal conduct of Deep Ops a Corps requires a Deep Operations Coordination Cell (DOCC).  This is something that our Bde's are lacking and would be inappropriate for them to have in a conventional setting.

 

[daftandbarmy]

While the Bde's guns may not always be focussed on smashing the enemy units in the absolute bleeding edge of the front line this doesn't necessarily mean that they are doing "deep" work.  They're still tools of the close fight.

What 'Brigade Guns'? My understanding is that the Brigade Commander does not own any guns.

 

[Haligonian]

What 'Brigade Guns'? My understanding is that the Brigade Commander does not own any guns.

Each CMBG has an arty Regt with two batteries of 4.

US and UK Bdes have their own guns as well.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Each CMBG has an arty Regt with two batteries of 4.

US and UK Bdes have their own guns as well.

OK, I'll shut up now. Thanks!  :nod:

 

[Old Sweat]

For whatever it is worth, and leaving aside the horribly inadequate number of tubes, in the bad, old days when 4 CMBG deployed as part of 2 (BR) Division of 1 (BR) Corps, both the RCHA and the SSM Battery operated as part of the divisional artillery under the command of the CRA. In garrison, the units were under command of our brigade headquarters.

Further to the above, on the RV series of exercises, the regiments came under command of the CDA once concentrated in the field.

 

[FJAG]

OK, I'll shut up now. Thanks!  :nod:

You're not out of line at all. In my day our concept for artillery was always that it was centralised at a high level and that effectively (in common parlance) it was owned by Commander Div Arty or Commander Corps Arty and loaned to the brigades for as long as they needed them. In that type of situation for example the DS regiment from a brigade operating as a reserve could be put at priority call to a more forward bde that needed their fire. There were numerous terms for how guns were allocated which basically revolved around 1) who could move them 2) who provided fire support coordination resources to who, 3) who had priority of fire support, and 4) other factors of much lessor importance.

The move to more independent deployment of brigade groups and BCTs changed that relationship quite a bit. In the US where BCTs replaced the prior concept where div and corps seemed to retain ownership of everything but manoeuvre elements (and for a time those as well at div) the change was fairly clear cut. Artillery battalions there are essentially one of two types, tube arty organic to the BCT and tube and all other natures which belong to an arty brigade which are assigned to and distributed by divs and corps as they saw fit to reinforce (in the generic sense) fires wherever needed.

I'm not so sure what Canadian doctrine is these days. It's actually come to the point that my research in aid of my writing fiction has made me more conversant with how the US Army functions these days than the Canadian one because my personal knowledge and research material for the Canadian army goes back several decades (primarily as a result of the fact that one can easily get US army publications on the internet while Canadian ones are mostly hidden behind the DWAN wall.)

:cheers:

 

[jeffb]

You're not out of line at all. In my day our concept for artillery was always that it was centralised at a high level and that effectively (in common parlance) it was owned by Commander Div Arty or Commander Corps Arty and loaned to the brigades for as long as they needed them. In that type of situation for example the DS regiment from a brigade operating as a reserve could be put at priority call to a more forward bde that needed their fire. There were numerous terms for how guns were allocated which basically revolved around 1) who could move them 2) who provided fire support coordination resources to who, 3) who had priority of fire support, and 4) other factors of much lessor importance.

The move to more independent deployment of brigade groups and BCTs changed that relationship quite a bit. In the US where BCTs replaced the prior concept where div and corps seemed to retain ownership of everything but manoeuvre elements (and for a time those as well at div) the change was fairly clear cut. Artillery battalions there are essentially one of two types, tube arty organic to the BCT and tube and all other natures which belong to an arty brigade which are assigned to and distributed by divs and corps as they saw fit to reinforce (in the generic sense) fires wherever needed.

I'm not so sure what Canadian doctrine is these days. It's actually come to the point that my research in aid of my writing fiction has made me more conversant with how the US Army functions these days than the Canadian one because my personal knowledge and research material for the Canadian army goes back several decades (primarily as a result of the fact that one can easily get US army publications on the internet while Canadian ones are mostly hidden behind the DWAN wall.)

:cheers:

The doctrine is basically the same. However, there is no Div Arty currently in the CA and certainly no Artillery Bde. As we can't realistically fight a Division, the concept of the Arty Bde with tactical tasks to support the various Bdes is probably just an academic one. In Canada, each CMBG has an Artillery Regt under Full Command. From time to time, individual Btys have been given a Direct Support role to individual Bns (BGs) but this is the exception.

 

[daftandbarmy]

The doctrine is basically the same. However, there is no Div Arty currently in the CA and certainly no Artillery Bde. As we can't realistically fight a Division, the concept of the Arty Bde with tactical tasks to support the various Bdes is probably just an academic one. In Canada, each CMBG has an Artillery Regt under Full Command. From time to time, individual Btys have been given a Direct Support role to individual Bns (BGs) but this is the exception.

Roger....

I'm just trying to think of one of those artillery principles I heard many years ago that went something like 'Commanded at the highest levels and available to the lowest levels' meaning, of course, that you can instantly drop the full weight of the Corps Artillery to #3 Pl Comd's FPF if required....

 

[Old Sweat]

Roger....

I'm just trying to think of one of those artillery principles I heard many years ago that went something like 'Commanded at the highest levels and available to the lowest levels' meaning, of course, that you can instantly drop the full weight of the Corps Artillery to #3 Pl Comd's FPF if required....

It was something like "Commanded at the highest level and controlled at the lowest", meaning that while the corps or dividision artillery commander moved the guns, any FOO could call for their fire. Lieutenant General Sir Brian Horrocks, a very successful British corps commander in Africa and NWE, wrote words to the effect that a gunner had every gun in range no farther away thsn the tip of the aerial on his radio.

In the Canadian Army we have all grown up in a state of military poverty and tend to think that less is normal. It's very difficult to envisage what "real armies" look like and what they bring to the battle. There really is no way to develop that sense other than lots of hitting the books, and hopefully going on an allied exercise or several.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

The Brigade deep battle must be considered in the context of its parent Division's (and Corps') deep battle/battlefield framework. Just because the assets of the Brigade are not in the Corps deep battle does not mean that the Brigades does not have a deep battle itself.

My argument is that a Brigade does indeed have a deep battle, while the Battle Group does not. The Brigade deep battle it is not as fulsome as the Division deep battle, were we see longer planning horizons, more battlespace and more assets to prosecute the deep fight. Nevertheless, the Brigade has a complete planning capability (compared to the Battle Group), battlespace that it likely reserves to itself and assets/access to assets to prosecute a deep battle. Brigade-level tube artillery can reach, assuming 1/3 range factor, some 20 km beyond the FLOT. This is outside the Battle Group's close battle, and can certainly shape the next close battle. The Brigade Commander has to choose how to allocate his ISTAR/Fires, but having the choice to allocate between the close and deep battle is not a bad thing.

Now, I can imagine a scenario where the Brigade will be focused exclusively on the close battle. If the Brigade has a very specific task in close terrain without much depth battlespace forward; no allocation of higher fire support and a very complete and detailed Divisional deep battle then perhaps the Brigade Commander will focus on the close battle and rely on his boss for all shaping actions. On the other hand, it is not hard to envision the Brigade being reinforced by an additional tube artillery regiment/battalion. The brigade also has the wherewithal to properly employ CAS which could be absolutely allocated to the Brigade. The Brigade may indeed have enough depth to require a deep battle.

Someone mentioned a Brigade tasked to Defeat an attacking Division. The Brigade does not need to be able to strike throughout the entire depth of the attacking enemy Division to have a deep battle. I would hope that Div and Corps are doing something themselves. That does not relieve the Brigade Commander of shaping his own close battles. Perhaps his planning has revealed that he needs to disrupt the enemy Brigade Tactical Groups that he will face in his own battlespace with his own or reinforcing assets, allowing him to sequence his fixing and striking forces with favourable force ratios. I imagine that he would indeed have a deep battle, even if it is happening in what the Corps commander would consider his own close battle. 

 

[Haligonian]

The Brigade deep battle must be considered in the context of its parent Division's (and Corps') deep battle/battlefield framework. Just because the assets of the Brigade are not in the Corps deep battle does not mean that the Brigades does not have a deep battle itself.

My argument is that a Brigade does indeed have a deep battle, while the Battle Group does not. The Brigade deep battle it is not as fulsome as the Division deep battle, were we see longer planning horizons, more battlespace and more assets to prosecute the deep fight. Nevertheless, the Brigade has a complete planning capability (compared to the Battle Group), battlespace that it likely reserves to itself and assets/access to assets to prosecute a deep battle. Brigade-level tube artillery can reach, assuming 1/3 range factor, some 20 km beyond the FLOT. This is outside the Battle Group's close battle, and can certainly shape the next close battle. The Brigade Commander has to choose how to allocate his ISTAR/Fires, but having the choice to allocate between the close and deep battle is not a bad thing.

Now, I can imagine a scenario where the Brigade will be focused exclusively on the close battle. If the Brigade has a very specific task in close terrain without much depth battlespace forward; no allocation of higher fire support and a very complete and detailed Divisional deep battle then perhaps the Brigade Commander will focus on the close battle and rely on his boss for all shaping actions. On the other hand, it is not hard to envision the Brigade being reinforced by an additional tube artillery regiment/battalion. The brigade also has the wherewithal to properly employ CAS which could be absolutely allocated to the Brigade. The Brigade may indeed have enough depth to require a deep battle.

Someone mentioned a Brigade tasked to Defeat an attacking Division. The Brigade does not need to be able to strike throughout the entire depth of the attacking enemy Division to have a deep battle. I would hope that Div and Corps are doing something themselves. That does not relieve the Brigade Commander of shaping his own close battles. Perhaps his planning has revealed that he needs to disrupt the enemy Brigade Tactical Groups that he will face in his own battlespace with his own or reinforcing assets, allowing him to sequence his fixing and striking forces with favourable force ratios. I imagine that he would indeed have a deep battle, even if it is happening in what the Corps commander would consider his own close battle.

I think you have a point conceptually, but I feel like we might be pushing the concept of Deep Operations beyond the point of usefulness and confusing it with Shaping operations, which are of course related.  I, of course, also agree that if the Bde is given a ton of enablers, which I think is the case with these US bdes at NTC/JRTC then they then get a responsibility to fight deep.

What you've described above sounds similar to shaping operations to me which are done at every level.  Every echelon is responsible to shape conditions to allow for success by the echelon below them as well as considering how to isolate their objective within the limitations of their organic and attached assets.  However, by what you described above I feel like we could talk about a pl level deep battle. For example, by talking about neutralizing c-atking forces with an SF MG as the assault element fights through or is consolidating.

Land Ops talks about deep operations being against forces that aren't engaged in close operations.  That is pretty broad and falls in line with what you discuss above.  On the other hand out of FM 100-5 Operations (1986 AirLand Battle), pg 20,  "As with close operations, not all activities focussed forward of the line of contact are deep operations.  Counterfire, for example, is intended primarily to support the current fight, even though the targets attacked in the counterfire effort maybe located at great distances from the forward line of own troops (FLOT).  Similarly, electronic warfare efforts to disrupt the enemy's control of engaged forces are part of close operations even though the targeted emitters maybe well to the enemy's rear." Deep operations are not just about supporting the close fight, that would be more akin to shaping, but breaking the enemy's will, cohesion, and critical capabilities.  Further, while the FLOT will be an important control measure in identifying geographically what is deep I think the FSCL will also be critical in that and perhaps more telling on what operations are deep and what aren't.

 

[Haligonian]

An interesting article here related to this discussion but takes it up an echelon. 

The argument is that a Division (let alone the Bde) is a tactical organization that needs to focus on the close fight.  He introduces the idea of a 'tactical deep' which is geared to setting conditions for success in the close battle vice achieving larger operational/campaign objectives.  "'Tactical Deep' acknowledges that a division is simply not large enough to achieve a credible operational effect other than the defeat of a close enemy.  It also conceptually frees capabilities such as information manoeuvre and cyber to focus on operational-strategic impact away from the immediate close battle."

Operational Effect:  The Argument for a British Corps
https://uklandpower.com/2018/11/09/operational-effect-the-argument-for-a-british-corps/

It raises the question that if this guy is right where should our cyber, EW, and other such assets reside?  And if you decide to focus our Bde's exclusively on the close fight and being enabled by a higher multinational HQ then how do our staffs become familiar with employing these assets for the time when they will inevitably be pushed down.

 

[McG]

According to such sources as I can find, 4 Canadian Mechanized Battle Group became 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group in 1972. I do not think that the C ever stood for Corps.

Only in doctrine, never in a real world formation's name.

I don't think tube artillery qualifies a formation to conduct deep operations.  If a CMBG is going to employ its artillery, it'll be aiming its piddly 8x howitzers in support of its lead unit.  Our tube artillery cannot really reach into an enemy's depth in any significant way.

While I understand the framework of close, deep, and rear could be applied to CMBG planning, I'm not really sure it is helpful, or useful.  Land Ops states that deep operations must be long range (probably not what I'd define a M777 as...) and protracted (probably not something 8 tubes could deliver, even with a leaflet drop from a CH-146 layered over it...).  I'm not sure a Brigade is the right organization to manage and coordinate such widely dispersed tactical engagements.  The CMBG, and I'd argue most (all?) brigade-sized formations are designed, scaled, and resourced to fight the "close battle," dealing with the problem to their front.  We should probably avoid teaching or training Brigade Commanders and their staff to go out trying to fight a "deep battle."

I hear 1 CMBG has been playing with an idea it calls the tactical deep fight (apparently a 3 PPCLI idea) where the light battalion is used to conduct "tactical deep" operations via airmobile.  In CAXes, that has seen the battalion deposited somewhere far enough back that it is not destroyed on the LZ by opposing mechanized forces ... which normally means they are somewhere too deep to add value to the current fight and too shallow to influence the next fight.  We will see what comes in the next month as I am assume the Bde will look for an opportunity to experiment with this on Ex MR (and if it works I suspect we will hear of it here).

Arguably if we see light forces as an element of Canadian Army deep capability, they might be better set-up for success by grouping them in a single centralized light brigade.  Then we invest in a whole lot more airframes.

 

[MilEME09]

Only in doctrine, never in a real world formation's name.
I hear 1 CMBG has been playing with an idea it calls the tactical deep fight (apparently a 3 PPCLI idea) where the light battalion is used to conduct "tactical deep" operations via airmobile.  In CAXes, that has seen the battalion deposited somewhere far enough back that it is not destroyed on the LZ by opposing mechanized forces ... which normally means they are somewhere too deep to add value to the current fight and too shallow to influence the next fight.  We will see what comes in the next month as I am assume the Bde will look for an opportunity to experiment with this on Ex MR (and if it works I suspect we will hear of it here).

Arguably if we see light forces as an element of Canadian Army deep capability, they might be better set-up for success by grouping them in a single centralized light brigade.  Then we invest in a whole lot more airframes.

Given they stood up that support brigade in Gagetown, I would suggest then moving all light infantry battalions there under a new brigade within 5 Div. Of course this would involve some rebranding perhaps, may I suggest the return of the Black Watch to the Reg Force? unfortunately I doubt this would happen as we would then be turning three battalions back into mechanized, and creating an entire regiment, the man power required would need a significant investment in increased man power, equipment and time. Interesting concept though, I would wonder how long they would be excepted to operate behind lines like that without resupply? would resupply have to be air mobile as well? it brings up a few logistical challenges. On top of which how about vehicles, pak arty, etc.... we don't really have kit to outfit a light air mobile brigade.

 

[a_majoor]

Only in doctrine, never in a real world formation's name.
I hear 1 CMBG has been playing with an idea it calls the tactical deep fight (apparently a 3 PPCLI idea) where the light battalion is used to conduct "tactical deep" operations via airmobile.  In CAXes, that has seen the battalion deposited somewhere far enough back that it is not destroyed on the LZ by opposing mechanized forces ... which normally means they are somewhere too deep to add value to the current fight and too shallow to influence the next fight.  We will see what comes in the next month as I am assume the Bde will look for an opportunity to experiment with this on Ex MR (and if it works I suspect we will hear of it here).

Arguably if we see light forces as an element of Canadian Army deep capability, they might be better set-up for success by grouping them in a single centralized light brigade.  Then we invest in a whole lot more airframes.

This sounds like a variation of Marshal M.N. Tukhachevsky's "Deep Battle", simultaneous insertion of "Desanty" into the rear area to cause disruption while the main force is engaged in the front. And if we were to decide to group all the light battalions together, I would style them as "The Canadian Mounted Rifles" to reflect their role and mode of operation.

And the idea just might be feasible. After all, Australia is going to divest themselves of their "Tiger" attack helicopters, which fit well with Liberal procurement planning...

 

[FJAG]

Only in doctrine, never in a real world formation's name.
I hear 1 CMBG has been playing with an idea it calls the tactical deep fight (apparently a 3 PPCLI idea) where the light battalion is used to conduct "tactical deep" operations via airmobile.  In CAXes, that has seen the battalion deposited somewhere far enough back that it is not destroyed on the LZ by opposing mechanized forces ... which normally means they are somewhere too deep to add value to the current fight and too shallow to influence the next fight.  We will see what comes in the next month as I am assume the Bde will look for an opportunity to experiment with this on Ex MR (and if it works I suspect we will hear of it here).

Arguably if we see light forces as an element of Canadian Army deep capability, they might be better set-up for success by grouping them in a single centralized light brigade.  Then we invest in a whole lot more airframes.

Each brigade having one light battalion and two LAV battalions undoubtedly came out of the limitations in the number of LAVs that we were prepared to purchase and the desire not to treat any one brigade differently from the rest by making it fully light and not out of any deep rooted tactical solution that was meant to be solved.

Considering that the key warfighting nations now organize around brigades and consider them the "primary combined arms, close combat force" it behooves us to organize ours as viable fighting organizations and not look for ad hoc missions to justify their Mickey Mouse structure. Instead lets move all the LAV's into two brigades and make one brigade light. Considering Petawawa already has the CSOR and that JTF and Trenton are close by, maybe it should become the centre of excellence for all things light while Edmonton and Valcartier concentrate on all things medium.

But that's just me.

:brickwall:

 

[Kirkhill]

Each brigade having one light battalion and two LAV battalions undoubtedly came out of the limitations in the number of LAVs that we were prepared to purchase and the desire not to treat any one brigade differently from the rest by making it fully light and not out of any deep rooted tactical solution that was meant to be solved.

Considering that the key warfighting nations now organize around brigades and consider them the "primary combined arms, close combat force" it behooves us to organize ours as viable fighting organizations and not look for ad hoc missions to justify their Mickey Mouse structure. Instead lets move all the LAV's into two brigades and make one brigade light. Considering Petawawa already has the CSOR and that JTF and Trenton are close by, maybe it should become the centre of excellence for all things light while Edmonton and Valcartier concentrate on all things medium.

But that's just me.

:brickwall:

What a siwwy wabbit you are!

I'd go one farther and group all the tanks, guns and heavy engineers at Gagetown.  We only have enough kit for one regiment of each.

 

[Haligonian]

A lot of the talk thus far has centered around our fires ability (or lack thereof) and what the expectation should be of our Bde's in a so called deep fight.  What do we want from a maneuver perspective though?  What do Bns/Coys and Regts/Sqns need to be able to do and how many should we have?

I just finished reading Jim Storr's newest book and he has a portion in there on formation sizes and combat power.  He makes a point that, within reason, bigger is not better.  Armies would be better off with more smaller divisions than fewer larger ones.  Smaller formations are more nimble, able to change directions and employ reserves more quickly.  They keep a lower proportion of their forces out of contact and have a better ratio of CS and CSS units to combat units.  In WW 2 the best divisions appeared to have 20-25 sub units in them.  One of the major findings of his book is that operational level success comes from the ability to move rapidly to positions of advantage and if required to fight from those positions.  Smaller formations can move more quickly and hence stand a greater chance of achieving operational success.

So are our brigades too big? 

I think the first problem is structure which we've hit on in this thread and many other places in the forms.  Not enough tanks.  Too much recce.  Not enough guns.  Guns that are too slow (ie. not SP).  Mixture of light forces with mech forces.  The first problem then is less about the size and more about the structure and equipment in some cases.

In this case we have entire units which are not fit to purpose.  Light units and non SP arty units in mech brigades.  Insufficient B fleet vehs to move a Bde's worth of food, fuel, ammo, and stores on wheels.  This means that we will not be fast or sustainable enough to get where we need to quick enough, and ready to fight.

When we look to subunits in the Bde it is difficult to characterize us as too small or too big due to the structure issues described above.  Do the three light rifle coys within a CMBG really count as it seems unlikely that a light unit would deploy if the CMBG were going into a real fight?  Perhaps they would reroll?  Let's just assume they reroll those coy's into something mechanized then we find ourselves with a bde with at least 9 x rifle coys and a tank sqn for a total of 10 subunits.  If we look at the "ideal" structure of 4 CMBG then we see 9 x rifle coys and another 3 x tank squadrons for a total of 12 sub units.  The first scenario would see a 3 Bde division with 30 sub units and the second with 36 sub units.  This puts us well above Storr's historical ideal.  Interestingly the problem was even more accute when we had 4 rifle coys and a fourth sqn in the Armd Regts (is that right?  not sure we had a 4th sqn).  That puts us at a whopping 15 or 16 sub units in the Bde.  US Bdes are in this boat as their combined arms units have four sub units of a mix of mech infantry and tanks.

We find ourselves in a situation where our Bde's could be too unwieldy to rapidly seize opportunities on the b2attle field and get to where they need to get to quickly.  This is something we should probably play with in simulation.  Ex UR would be an ideal opportunity.  Split the exercise in half, one half with a large Bde and whatever 1 Cdn Div is used to playing with as HICON and then another where the Bde in the box get's smaller and 1 Cdn Div gets an addition small Bde to play with.  The interactor piece might be tough but there would be some great data pulled out of it.