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Reconstitution

Fortunately in all that mess there are a lot of really dedicated PS in the various departments that actually get why it's critical, genuinely want to deliver ships that do the job we need them to, and try to keep things moving through the system, but at a GoC level any procurement over $40M is basically a ball of competing priorities, and gets further amplified over $100M with additional policy requirements. There are some pretty senior people from some of the other core departments working on it full time that get it, but they do get torn between their departmental priorities and the projects
This is absolutely true!

The problem is that it’s also hit and miss, not through deliberate stewardship of senior PS.

I was part of an effort where the stars aligned, in great part to an Exec Director at TBS who was sharp as a whip, ‘got it’ and she took to heart what the capability would mean to those who had to operate it (and of course, successive Governments that would lean hard on the capability).
 
Clear articulation of the project outcomes, beyond just "Dunno, the general wants it", makes interactions with central agencies significantly easier.

You can even take an ED at TBS from "shut down the project immediately" to "other departments must copy what you're doing" through clarifying the narrative - and appointing project leadership that is engaged, and not too busy to lead the project because they need second language training to prepare them for their release in a year or so.
 
Clear articulation of the project outcomes, beyond just "Dunno, the general wants it", makes interactions with central agencies significantly easier.
People like that in project leadership positions is most definitely a CAF own goal…
 
@Kirkhill @FJAG @TacticalTea re: Reserve Navies

I'd like to point out that the USN Reserve, which is close to 60,000 in strength, is almost entirely (99%) composed of former Active Duty members who were fully trained technicians and professional mariners.

If the US Military, who possess the Gold Standard when it comes to Reserves and what we would wish to aspire towards, don't have a Maritime "Militia", why do we seem to think it's a good idea?

The skills required to be an effective professional Mariner at sea, much less achieve any sort of acceptable collective readiness isn't something that can be learned in a few weeks during the summer.

A Frigate and an MCDV are apples and oranges.
I actually have no specific opinion about the naval reserve but am interested in it from the point of view of a book I have written and am rewriting.

My experience with them is limited to knowing a few of the senior officers from my time on Chief of Reserves Council and when giving legal advice to the ill-fated Reserve Force Employment Project. It was during the RFEP, whose aim was to modify the model of how reserves are employed, that I got an understanding of what the RCN wanted their reservists to do with the MCDV (which were still relatively new then). I thought that they were out to lunch. Their underlying plan was to have reservists operate a number of the ships year round. To me that's a fundamental misuse of reservists. If you want a capability operated year round then its a RegF position for me.

I've known that the USN has a reserve but no National Guard equivalent but have no idea as to the extent that they make use of their reservists except in emergency situations. I know that there are reserve ship capabilities but, again, not sure how much those get reactivated or crewed.

As you've probably surmised by now, I'm firmly in the camp of those that distinguish between day-to-day peacetime military capability (which I see primarily as an economy of effort task to set the conditions for a capable, expanded force for the defence of the nation's sovereignty in an emergency) and the part-time capability used to generate a larger, stand-by force to react in emergencies. That takes a plan which I think is sadly lacking in the CAF right now because we are operating above an economy of effort level and have a very limited surge capability to speak of.

What interests me in particular how both the US Army and Air Force are able to have a functioning, equipped National Guard system while we do not even see the necessity for such a system and instead follow an anaemic augmentation concept.

As far as the Navy is concerned, I certainly appreciate the complexity of operating a combat vessel but even there I suspect that there are roles that can be filled by properly trained part-timers to bulk out the ranks as long as the ships are manned on a hybrid basis. Effectively most complex military systems are merely an aggregate of individually manageable tasks performed by a team. We already send ships to sea with newly trained RegF sailors. A newly trained ResF sailor is no different as long as he is given the same courses as his RegF counterpart. It's simply a matter of determining which trades can be trained within the summer school break system and then turning on a training system to do that and setting up a system to maintain an adequate level of currency.

IMHO the biggest hurdle is that the CAF has failed to invest the resources needed for an adequate recruiting and training system for the RegF much less the ResF. The result is that we have undermanned ships and units while there is a supply of reservists sitting around armouries and stone frigates incapable of being rapidly mobilized should the need arise. It is not a scenario that the public or GoC should continue to accept.

🍻
 
The CAF should be an organization that produces and provides readiness. Readiness requires personnel, materiel and equipment. Generating readiness means a strong investment in systems that produce personnel, and produce / maintain / sustain materiel and equipment.

Or you maintain facades of units that are paid full time but are not operationally ready and take months to prepare.
 
Clear articulation of the project outcomes, beyond just "Dunno, the general wants it", makes interactions with central agencies significantly easier.

You can even take an ED at TBS from "shut down the project immediately" to "other departments must copy what you're doing" through clarifying the narrative - and appointing project leadership that is engaged, and not too busy to lead the project because they need second language training to prepare them for their release in a year or so.
Part of the challenge on some projects is the TBS submission goes from the DND project manager, to PSPC then into TBS.

I've had some fairly bad procurement managers make major changes (without providing us the changes before submission) to the TBS submission that were inaccurate, didn't make sense, or were flat out lies, and then gotten a blast when it came back for re-submission.

IMHO, there are a few too many layers of bureaucracy for the TBS submission, but for core elements like project outcomes, makes zero sense that the procurement authority is touching that at all or is the POC for any questions.
 




On the other hand, a former colleague has a son who has been in the civil engineering sector for only a couple years now and is on his second employer and always seems to be eyeing up the field. He recently got a promotion because his boss was walked out the door, but his parents reminded him that could be him in a couple of years. The private sector values loyalty less, certain sectors, much less.

Sounds like he is in a better position than some.

I'd give the shirt right offa my back
If I had the guts to say

Take this job and shove it
I ain't working here no more
My woman done left
And took all the reasons
I was working for
 
The CAF should be an organization that produces and provides readiness. Readiness requires personnel, materiel and equipment. Generating readiness means a strong investment in systems that produce personnel, and produce / maintain / sustain materiel and equipment.

Or you maintain facades of units that are paid full time but are not operationally ready and take months to prepare.
Doesn't that sound more than a bit similar to what the Russians have so painfully discovered recently?
 
For the record - I was not proposing a Maritime Militia. I am coming to see the blue suiters - Navy, Air Force and their Grandad, the Ordnance - in a different light to the Army. Equally I am becoming more convinced that The Militia and The Reserve are two separate bodies and should be organized as such. The Militia may be a reserve force but it cannot be The Reserves.
I've actually bought into the Home guard system to an extent. Moreover, I think the CAF already has the building blocks that you envision but using different terminology.

The 18th and 19th century Militia is gone. While there once was a time when you could get valuable military service out of every able bodied man with a musket, modern warfare has left that behind and the term "Militia" should die an honourable death.

In Canada the Reserve Force is broken into four sub-components which, if properly, established and used, would meet all of your needs:

The Primary Reserve is the premier component. It can exist in the form of individuals, units or formations which function on a stand-by basis in peacetime but can be activated to full-time service in a number of situations when circumstances demand. The value of the primary reserve is a direct function of the training, equipment, organization and leadership it receives.

The Supplementary Reserve is the secondary component and consists of individuals who have been trained in either the RegF or the ResF and while they have no day-to-day responsibilities for training, they can be activated by the GoC in an emergency to fill out the ranks. Their value is dependant on an efficient administrative system that records their skill levels and currency and current contact information amongst other things.

The Canadian Rangers are in the nature of a home guard which receives limited military training and equipment but is organized under a command structure and is capable of carrying out limited tasks assigned to it while having no obligation to undergo annual training. Note that there is nothing that limits the Rangers to the North and elements exist throughout Canada and could be easily expanded further, if so desired.

The Cadet Organization which is designed to prepare youth with limited military skills and to effectively indoctrinate them to participate in future military service.

Essentially the organization and structures for everything that you need is already in place. What's needed is to put proper flesh on the bones.

I think that rather then using archaic terminology it would be better if one discussed the ways to improve the overall defence structure by referring to changes needed by each "sub-component" of the "Reserve Force"

🍻
 
I've actually bought into the Home guard system to an extent. Moreover, I think the CAF already has the building blocks that you envision but using different terminology.

The 18th and 19th century Militia is gone. While there once was a time when you could get valuable military service out of every able bodied man with a musket, modern warfare has left that behind and the term "Militia" should die an honourable death.

In Canada the Reserve Force is broken into four sub-components which, if properly, established and used, would meet all of your needs:

The Primary Reserve is the premier component. It can exist in the form of individuals, units or formations which function on a stand-by basis in peacetime but can be activated to full-time service in a number of situations when circumstances demand. The value of the primary reserve is a direct function of the training, equipment, organization and leadership it receives.

The Supplementary Reserve is the secondary component and consists of individuals who have been trained in either the RegF or the ResF and while they have no day-to-day responsibilities for training, they can be activated by the GoC in an emergency to fill out the ranks. Their value is dependant on an efficient administrative system that records their skill levels and currency and current contact information amongst other things.

The Canadian Rangers are in the nature of a home guard which receives limited military training and equipment but is organized under a command structure and is capable of carrying out limited tasks assigned to it while having no obligation to undergo annual training. Note that there is nothing that limits the Rangers to the North and elements exist throughout Canada and could be easily expanded further, if so desired.

The Cadet Organization which is designed to prepare youth with limited military skills and to effectively indoctrinate them to participate in future military service.

Essentially the organization and structures for everything that you need is already in place. What's needed is to put proper flesh on the bones.

I think that rather then using archaic terminology it would be better if one discussed the ways to improve the overall defence structure by referring to changes needed by each "sub-component" of the "Reserve Force"

🍻
The Rangers, or something that looks much more like Rangers than a reserve would be a natural place for the classic "militia" roles and expectations to settle: deal with local problems when the Crown needs lots of keen bodies.
 
The CAF should be an organization that produces and provides readiness. Readiness requires personnel, materiel and equipment. Generating readiness means a strong investment in systems that produce personnel, and produce / maintain / sustain materiel and equipment.

Or you maintain facades of units that are paid full time but are not operationally ready and take months to prepare.
This!
 
Part of the challenge on some projects is the TBS submission goes from the DND project manager, to PSPC then into TBS.
For a joint submission?

If for EA only, then why is DND forwarding a yellow docket to PSPC? Once signed, it goes straight from DCSFA direct to TBS.
 
The Reg F has arguably been broken since post-FRP and has repeatedly failed to fix itself.

Time to clean house and bring in professional management, instead of continuing with the current management perhaps.

Isn’t that what happens during posting season when all the Career Manglers do their handovers?
 
I've actually bought into the Home guard system to an extent. Moreover, I think the CAF already has the building blocks that you envision but using different terminology.

The 18th and 19th century Militia is gone. While there once was a time when you could get valuable military service out of every able bodied man with a musket, modern warfare has left that behind and the term "Militia" should die an honourable death.

In Canada the Reserve Force is broken into four sub-components which, if properly, established and used, would meet all of your needs:

Essentially the organization and structures for everything that you need is already in place. What's needed is to put proper flesh on the bones.

I think that rather then using archaic terminology it would be better if one discussed the ways to improve the overall defence structure by referring to changes needed by each "sub-component" of the "Reserve Force"

🍻

I think I could work within that framework although I would suggest the following:

The Cadet Organization which is designed to prepare youth with limited military skills and to effectively indoctrinate them to participate in future military service.

Leave the Cadets to their own devices and go lightly on the indoctrination bit. The kids are there because they want to be there and want to enjoy the experience.


The Canadian Rangers are in the nature of a home guard which receives limited military training and equipment but is organized under a command structure and is capable of carrying out limited tasks assigned to it while having no obligation to undergo annual training. Note that there is nothing that limits the Rangers to the North and elements exist throughout Canada and could be easily expanded further, if so desired.

I like the notion of expanding the Ranger concept but I also like the idea of the Rangers continuing their current distinct identity. I would expand the concept to "The Primary Reserve". But....

The Primary Reserve is the premier component. It can exist in the form of individuals, units or formations which function on a stand-by basis in peacetime but can be activated to full-time service in a number of situations when circumstances demand. The value of the primary reserve is a direct function of the training, equipment, organization and leadership it receives.

I don't like the notion of that organization being the "Primary" reserve. I would relegate the Primary Reserve to an Auxilliary Corps retained on the same terms as the Rangers but with focus on larger orgnanizations - Companies rather than Patrols.

I would swap the Primary Reserve label with the Supplementary Reserve.

The Supplementary Reserve is the secondary component and consists of individuals who have been trained in either the RegF or the ResF and while they have no day-to-day responsibilities for training, they can be activated by the GoC in an emergency to fill out the ranks. Their value is dependant on an efficient administrative system that records their skill levels and currency and current contact information amongst other things.

I would make the Supplementary Reserve both a condition of service and a more attractive destination. A short term contract engages you for two or three years with the colours and five to seven years with the Reserve. Make it a stipendiary reserve - with pay, benefits, gym memberships, access to educational benefits, a thousand rounds a year and access to government ranges.....etc that kind of thing. The Reservist is expected to stay in contact, show up one weekend a year in uniform to requalify - and to be ready for call up. Extra points if they assist with the Auxilliary.

And the Auxilliary is not a new idea

The Auxiliary Corps​

Signalman J. Bennett of the 1st Canadian Railway Telegraph Company installing wire on pole in station yards, Louvain, Belgium, 6 January 1945.
Signalman J. Bennett of the 1st Canadian Railway Telegraph Company installing wire on pole in station yards, Louvain, Belgium, 6 January 1945.
Photo by Barney J. Gloster. Department of National Defence / National Archives of Canada, PA-130257.

The mission of the Auxiliary Corps is to provide the Armed Forces with all the supplies and resources they need to do their job. Many soldiers, who already had the required skills when they enlisted, were directed towards these corps. For others, it may have been the opportunity to learn a new trade. Some auxiliary corps, such as the postal services, worked behind the lines and, normally, did not t come under fire, while others, signalmen for instance, were assigned to combat units and shared the life of regular troops. They all played a vital role and they all faced the dangers that an army can encounter when advancing in enemy territory.


I see no reason not to add transport and security elements to the Auxilliary Corps remit - or marine and air components.
 
You’re very French, you’re riding a first-class carriage with a third-class ticket - Sez the French Ambassador

I have a new hero....

Peut-etre?


Naval (Sic)-gazing Canada has neglected its military, new French ambassador says​

The problem, in part, is that Canada has grown too reliant on the U.S. and its massive defence machine, the most costly in the world, Michel Miraillet said

Author of the article:
Tom Blackwell
Publishing date:
Oct 14, 2022 • 38 minutes ago • 4 minute read • 16 Comments

Canadian peacekeepers in Haiti in 1997. In military terms, this country is less present than it was 10 or 15 years ago, France's ambassador said of Canada.
Canadian peacekeepers in Haiti in 1997. "In military terms, this country is less present than it was 10 or 15 years ago," France's ambassador said of Canada. PHOTO BY DANIEL MOREL/AP, FILE

Caught up in naval (sic)-gazing and living under the protective shield of the United States, Canada has allowed its military presence worldwide to wither over the last decade or so, France’s new ambassador to Ottawa suggested Friday.

In blunt comments that he said reflected his own personal opinions, Michel Miraillet argued Canada needs to boost its defence capabilities as threats increase from the likes of China, Russia and North Korea.

The problem, in part, is that Canada has grown too reliant on the U.S. and its massive defence machine, the most costly in the world, he said.

“It’s always difficult for a country that by its nature is highly protected, with a big guy below who is a big pain in the neck but at the end of the day, well, it works,” said Miraillet. “You’re very French, you’re riding a first-class carriage with a third-class ticket…. If you want to remain in the first-class seat, you need to train and expand and to go somewhere.”

“This country in some ways may be too comfortable, too comfortable.”

The ambassador’s remarks were by no means the first time someone from outside this country has criticized Ottawa’s recent defence spending record. U.S. presidents have long urged Canada and other lagging members of NATO to meet the alliance’s recommended goal of allocating two per cent of GDP to the military.

But it’s unusual to hear a similar complaint from another of Canada’s allies, albeit one whose arms industry might profit from increased equipment buying from Ottawa.



RECOMMENDED FROM EDITORIAL​

  1. Canadian troops of NATO enhanced Forward Presence battle group attend meeting with Canadian Defence Minister Anita Anand in Adazi, Latvia February 3, 2022.

    Canada slips further away from NATO's 2% defence spending benchmark​

  2. U.S. Ambassador to Canada David Cohen:

    U.S. Ambassador says Canada didn't live up to its own hype on defence spending​

According to NATO figures, France is 11th among the group’s 29 nations, spending just under the two-per-cent target — 1.90 per cent of GDP. Canada is 24th, budgeting just 1.27 per cent of gross domestic product for defence.

Miraillet, a former director general for global affairs, acknowledged Canada’s recent contributions to international defence, including its involvement in Afghanistan, soldiers sent to Baltic countries and training of Ukrainian troops.

He also said that this country has a “fantastic” reputation in France as a sympathetic nation with similar values.

But the ambassador said he recalls a day when, for instance, Canada was a major contributor to United Nations peacekeeping, a contrast to today’s situation.

After reaching a high point in 1993, when over 3,300 Canadians were deployed on peacekeeping missions, the number dwindled to just 54 this year, figures compiled by Royal Military College Prof. Walter Dorn indicate.

“At the end of the day, I have the feeling that in military terms, this country is less present than it was 10 or 15 years ago,” said Miraillet. “Canada was far more present in the past in Africa than it is now…. There is a need to have more Canada on the ground, not only in Africa but also in Asia.”

He suggested as well that threats in this country’s backyard are growing, with China sending icebreakers into the Arctic, possibly heralding the arrival of Peoples Liberation Army submarines. Meanwhile, Russia has deployed more attack submarines than ever, said the ambassador.



You’re very French, you’re riding a first-class carriage with a third-class ticket


But he said Canada has a “huge problem” with its own submarine fleet, calling them “very old” ships. In fact, the second-hand vessels bought from the U.K. have been plagued with mechanical problems, triggering high-cost repairs. Miraillet also called into question the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), the joint U.S.-Canada continental defence program.

“You are now confronted with a situation where NORAD looks like an old Volvo 240. I mean it’s strong, but you have to beef it up.”

Instead of looking beyond its borders at security threats and humanitarian needs worldwide, Canada seems consumed by internal political discussions, especially over “gender” issues, said Miraillet.

“Now I have this sentiment — this is very personal — but the country is really belly-button focused, more than ever.”

His remarks — delivered with self-deprecating humour — may not have been completely altruistic. France has a major arms industry and recently was stung by Australia’s decision to scrap a deal to buy 12 French-made diesel-electric submarines. They are to be replaced by eight nuclear subs it will buy from the U.S. instead. The Royal Canadian Navy has said it is looking at purchasing a new submarine fleet.

The ambassador cited an incident in the early 90s when the Canadian navy approached France about buying attack submarines from it, only for the U.S. to scuttle the discussions. But he suggested Canada needs a bigger military to respond to international security risks, regardless of where it buys its equipment.

“I’m not telling you that you need to buy French frigates — though that would be a sign of good taste,” he said with a smile. “But on the other hand, what I want to see is just to have enough capacities to be ready … just for deterrence.”
 
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