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Informing the Army’s Future Structure

Most of our soldiers live near two major urban centres.

It would be easy to bus them all to a depot location, like Chilliwack, on weekends for training. In fact, we used to do that with the training facility in Nanaimo, I believe. Troops in remote locations could be serviced by a smaller detachment based in Vernon or Kamloops, or wherever makes sense.

The 50+ (very expensive and under-utlized) full time positions - with Class A augmentation as required - that currently inhabit the Bde HQs would then re-configure into a mainly recruiting and training role. The 'Class B Commandos' would then also have the huge culture shock of working weekends like the other reservists, which they do not do now.

In any case, the principle would be to ensure that only trained soldiers and Officers arrive at units, like the Reg F. Then the limited resources at the units could focus all their time and attention on readiness for whatever task they finally figure out for us.

And the full timers can scrap with the full timers at CFRG etc over the vagaries of the often mysterious recruiting systems.
So you’re going to have the recruits work every weekend or are they going to be on BMQ? Does that BMQ start date coincide with their joining the CAF? What do they do in the mean time, what do they do in the time between BMQ and heir trade training, still at the depot ? Those depot dets in more remote locations ( PG, Trail) are manned by whom? Presumably the units themselves right? When it comes to trades training how do you ensure they meet the requirement for course loads and instructor ratios?
 
So you’re going to have the recruits work every weekend or are they going to be on BMQ? Does that BMQ start date coincide with their joining the CAF? What do they do in the mean time, what do they do in the time between BMQ and heir trade training, still at the depot ? Those depot dets in more remote locations ( PG, Trail) are manned by whom? Presumably the units themselves right? When it comes to trades training how do you ensure they meet the requirement for course loads and instructor ratios?

These are all very good questions, of course.

However, all I know is that the Reg F only have to focus on readiness, and working with fully trained soldiers who are supplied by their recuriting and depot supply chain.

Individual Reserve units are also responsible for managing the full supply chain for their recruit soldiers and Officers, and this draws down on scarce resources like MCpls, Sgts and Lt/Capts that could be better employed in readiness focused training. I can only imagine that dozens of Reserve units independently contacting CFRC must be a PITA at their end too, and introduces a huge number of inconsistencies in a process that should be streamlined and seamless.

There are few things more depressing than having an untrained OCdt waiting around for their courses for months, unable to be employed for anything apart from Mess duties, secondary duties or other menial tasks. Or even worse, put in charge of a 'Recruit Platoon' of half trained troops who themselves can't be 'officially' employed for anything but menial tasks, or deploy to the field, until they're fully trained.
 
These are all very good questions, of course.

However, all I know is that the Reg F only have to focus on readiness, and working with fully trained soldiers who are supplied by their recuriting and depot supply chain.

I mean beyond having to Augment the schools constantly, year round, yes that is currently true. That’s changing with our new model however; how we’re supposed to be high readiness while also conducting OJT Dp1 is a question to the Army Sgt Major couldn’t answer for me but I digress.

Individual Reserve units are also responsible for managing the full supply chain for their recruit soldiers and Officers, and this draws down on scarce resources like MCpls, Sgts and Lt/Capts that could be better employed in readiness focused training. I can only imagine that dozens of Reserve units independently contacting CFRC must be a PITA at their end too, and introduces a huge number of inconsistencies in a process that should be streamlined and seamless.

This is where I see the problem, either we have dispersed reserve units or we don’t, we simply don’t have the man power to maintain section sized Depots for Flinflon, Trail, and Sydney. Those bodies have to be managed somewhere and I don’t see a practical solution beyond the units being responsible.

There are few things more depressing than having an untrained OCdt waiting around for their courses for months, unable to be employed for anything apart from Mess duties, secondary duties or other menial tasks. Or even worse, put in charge of a 'Recruit Platoon' of half trained troops who themselves can't be 'officially' employed for anything but menial tasks, or deploy to the field, until they're fully trained.

Being in charge of the recruits seems like an ideal junior leadership task to be honest. I never remember not being allowed in the field for the year I spend between BMQ and SQ / BIQ infact I was just part of a section doing the same thing everyone else was. Maybe that wasn’t the way it was supposed to be done but who knows.

Earlier you mentioned the problem of OCdt hanging around never going on course. Surely that would merit a career review board?
 
Earlier you mentioned the problem of OCdt hanging around never going on course. Surely that would merit a career review board?

I applaud your belief that such a laudable HR management process would be reliably implemented in a consistent manner by hundreds of part time organizations that pride themselves on being, in their own way, 'special' ;)
 
Anciently all recruits from all over Canada were sent to CFB Cornwallis for training. It had started off as the RCN's central training facility.

My point is that what works for regs doesn't work for the militia and rangers. And I continue to draw the distinction between the militia and the reserves. Reserves should be superannuated Regs.
Oh, that old thing! They basically what St Jean does now in better buildings.

I agree with you. That's a waste of money for the ResF. You can do about 75-80% of DP1 training at local armouries year round which saves you the cost of 2/3 of the rations and all of the quarters by letting people live at home. You then do the last 20-25% in the field at a regional training centre (depot) and, again save on quarters. It obviously varies by trade. It also means most of the training staff do not have to go on TD away from home.

People living in small communities that can't put a full DP1 platoon together obviously need a separate solution by being taken to one of several regional training centres.

I don't even like the idea of the Cornwallis/St Jean system even for the RegF. I lean towards the US One Station Training System that combines recruit and DP1 trade training into one base with the two course running sequentially. Maybe I'm just reverting back to my preunification experience but it strikes me that the BMQ portion of DP1 is too long and requires an unnecessary posting. It should be reduced and tailored for each of the three environments (the purples can be dealt with separately as a "fourth service") and be part of the specific DP1 trade course.

One doesn't have to revert to names like Militia: Primary Reserve and Supplementary Reserve are hard wired into our current legislation - PRes and SupRes will do just fine and everyone understands what it is. One just need to administer the SupRes better.

🍻
 
There are few things more depressing than having an untrained OCdt waiting around for their courses for months or years, unable to be employed for anything apart from Mess duties, secondary duties or other menial tasks.
FTFY
 
So you’re going to have the recruits work every weekend or are they going to be on BMQ? Does that BMQ start date coincide with their joining the CAF? What do they do in the mean time, what do they do in the time between BMQ and heir trade training, still at the depot ? Those depot dets in more remote locations ( PG, Trail) are manned by whom? Presumably the units themselves right? When it comes to trades training how do you ensure they meet the requirement for course loads and instructor ratios?

Anciently all recruits from all over Canada were sent to CFB Cornwallis for training. It had started off as the RCN's central training facility.

My point is that what works for regs doesn't work for the militia and rangers. And I continue to draw the distinction between the militia and the reserves. Reserves should be superannuated Regs.
Honestly If more course offerings were done for the Reserves and the mandate to make them work instead of being cancelled then central training can and will work. The problem is the lack of staffing from all levels, and the lack of commitment from all levels. Being a instructor is one of the harder things I did, often working 16 plus hours a day, while my friends and co-workers were having a steak and beer close to the parade square. I can say the Regular Force Staff I worked with were awesome. They were impressed with my performance as I was theirs. We trained a lot of QL3 Artillerymen/ SQ Field when that came in.
At my Unit level the local BMQs were run pretty smooth. The worse part is not having shacks for them to live in and have locker setups for inspection. But you can overcome that for the most part.
Going home after a long day of training is tougher in some respects then staying in the shacks.

There are workable solutions, but to many people are stuck in the not my job, or it wont work so we wont do it. So far they have failed in their current training ways and will continue to fail unless they put some real thought into it.

For for the love of soldiers stop cancelling courses.
 
I mean beyond having to Augment the schools constantly, year round, yes that is currently true. That’s changing with our new model however; how we’re supposed to be high readiness while also conducting OJT Dp1 is a question to the Army Sgt Major couldn’t answer for me but I digress.
We'll never get rid of augmentation. It's a way of life because we're simply not large enough in either students or instructors to run a year-round balanced course load.

I do agree with @daftandbarmy though that ResF units will never be able to concentrate on any level of collective training unless relieved of the administrative and training responsibility of individual training. I think we can solve much of the problem with regional training depots who own the BTLs of both the RegF and ResF running with their own core staff in a training cycle balanced to cater to the needs of both. I think that these depots should also own Army recruiting so that the entire process from civilian applicant to trained DP1 soldier is owned by one organization. Same-same for the RCN and RCAF.

If I were King I'd break the training year into two cycles: 1 Sep to 30 April for collective training and 1 May to 31 Aug for DP1 and 2 Individual training (including a major collective training exercise for ResF units in August). That would leave the RegF free in the 1 May to 31 Aug time frame to do equipment maintenance, summer leave, APS AND providing augmentation for regional depots. The four summer months should be the Army's primary individual training period because of the high school and summer breaks. Courses schedules should commence as soon as high schools let out at the end of June and universities and colleges at the end of April or so.

This is where I see the problem, either we have dispersed reserve units or we don’t, we simply don’t have the man power to maintain section sized Depots for Flinflon, Trail, and Sydney. Those bodies have to be managed somewhere and I don’t see a practical solution beyond the units being responsible.
I'm a great fan of the presence in the local community concept but there is a point of diminished returns where tiny units need to be rolled into nearby larger units (even if a different type of unit) or, in some cases, shut down.

For smaller units not capable of recruiting let's say twenty recruits for a course, the individual recruits should be sent off for summer training at a regional depot. We can't go on making small bespoke courses for a half dozen candidates at a small armory.

Being in charge of the recruits seems like an ideal junior leadership task to be honest. I never remember not being allowed in the field for the year I spend between BMQ and SQ / BIQ in fact I was just part of a section doing the same thing everyone else was. Maybe that wasn’t the way it was supposed to be done but who knows.
I think that this is more realistic than syphoning off a small group of instructors to keep a tiny handful of recruits amused during the winter (albeit involving a level of risk the Army tends to frown on). That's how my first two years as a gunner went. Since I was thick as a post in school Grade 11 and had to go to summer school instead of my initial recruit course, I spent one winter on a basic gun number's course and the next on a driver wheeled and arty communicator course and did a half dozen live fire exercises (as both a #3 and once as a #1 on a 105mm C1) before ever taking my recruit course. That kept me interested and involved.

🍻
 

I know, right? It's infuriating...

Angry Ross Geller GIF by Friends
 
I applaud your belief that such a laudable HR management process would be reliably implemented in a consistent manner by hundreds of part time organizations that pride themselves on being, in their own way, 'special' ;)
See career review board, it’s actually not that much work honestly. We sent a candidate on one after he refused to listen to female course seniors and failed off BMOQA.

Generally though the model the reserves functions of off, week night training in local areas, doesn’t allow for a depot system. I’m not against regional training centres but that would require a larger overhaul.

But hey, I’m still trying to figure out how we’re going to correct Meaford’s failure and get some new Pte’s to shoot an 84 so they won’t be listed as Pte (R) anymore, never mind their CQCB. Good thing I get fully qualified soldiers from the training system right ? My suggestion that we bill Meaford for the rounds, fuel, and rations was met with mirth and not action sadly.
 
I don't even like the idea of the Cornwallis/St Jean system even for the RegF. I lean towards the US One Station Training System that combines recruit and DP1 trade training into one base with the two course running sequentially. Maybe I'm just reverting back to my preunification experience but it strikes me that the BMQ portion of DP1 is too long and requires an unnecessary posting. It should be reduced and tailored for each of the three environments (the purples can be dealt with separately as a "fourth service") and be part of the specific DP1 trade course.
I fully agree about the value of one station training. As it stands now, a soldier needs 2 or 3 courses to become DP1 qualified and sent to their first job — and the various army and joint training authorities seem to lack the ability to synchronize that training, leading to our most valuable resources — people — sitting around the country waiting for courses. Often being treated like garbage at the same time — because neglecting PATs has become a habit.

Enrolling a potential R22eR soldier and sending him straight to Valcartier, without any contact with CFLRS, just makes good sense to me. And the infantry knows this — they’ve been experimenting with ‘trial’ combined BMQ/DP1 Infantryman serials since the 1990’s. I don’t know what’s stopping this — but I suspect it’s CMP gatekeeping and trying to defend the value of St Jean. A value I question.
 
I suspect it’s CMP gatekeeping and trying to defend the value of St Jean. A value I question.
I'm sure one could use St Jean for an alternate purpose. Same as one could repurpose RMC.

Never sell real estate!

🍻
 
I'm sure one could use St Jean for an alternate purpose. Same as one could repurpose RMC.

Never sell real estate!

🍻
I’m on board with that — it’s the current incarnation of CFLRS that I have issues with. Once we have sent all the recruits out to their trade schools, and all the officer cadets over to a new CFOCS on the current grounds of RMC Kingston, I think that the Mega would be a fine home for Joint ISR. It lacks fresh air and natural light (both known enemies of the intelligence community) and looks retro-futuristic in a Jetson’s/Tom Swift sort of way. And it’s affordable to live near there.

Instead, we’re pushing ahead with making the NCR the home of JISR. And in 15 years people will be wondering how come we built an expensive modern facility that will sit empty and we can’t staff because the troops that are supposed to be working there can’t afford to live in Ottawa.
 
I’m on board with that — it’s the current incarnation of CFLRS that I have issues with. Once we have sent all the recruits out to their trade schools, and all the officer cadets over to a new CFOCS on the current grounds of RMC Kingston, I think that the Mega would be a fine home for Joint ISR. It lacks fresh air and natural light (both known enemies of the intelligence community) and looks retro-futuristic in a Jetson’s/Tom Swift sort of way. And it’s affordable to live near there.

Instead, we’re pushing ahead with making the NCR the home of JISR. And in 15 years people will be wondering how come we built an expensive modern facility that will sit empty and we can’t staff because the troops that are supposed to be working there can’t afford to live in Ottawa.
All on board - but re the live in Ottawa thing. I firmly believe that we need less people in Ottawa but that said, we need more people in the big cities. I think that's where the future of our reserve force is (of which we need more) and we need a large number of RegF as their leaders, trainers, administrators and logisticians. That means we need affordable housing for them and a career path that doesn't shuffle them around from pillar to post.

We need a housing authority that buys or builds suitable urban condos, townhouses and even single residences that will support that at a reasonable price. It may have been fine in the 1950s to build bases in the wilds of Canada where they and their stay at home wives and kids lived; the world doesn't work that way anymore.

🍻
 
Except the CA is attempting to place a foundation on quicksand…

Been known to happen, remember the new hospital in Lahr?

The new hospital was not put over "quicksand"; the soil problem was contamination from the tannery that had previously occupied the site. Even then, it did not affect the entire site. With minimal (and expected) remediation, the foundation went in pretty much on schedule. The remaining problem we had was development of the area in back of the hospital and even that delay had more to do with negotiation with the host nation as to financial responsibility for the cleanup. The contingency factor in our budget accommodated the limited soil remediation (we had to go back to TB for an increase but that was more to do with the rise in the Deutsche Mark rather that unforeseen requirements).
 
US Army Reorg into Divisions

I'll just leave this here as it seems topical and I really want to see this thread get to 340 pages in the next two months.
The main issue for Canada is the size of the Army and the fact that Div generally are homogenous type formations and Canada can’t (won’t) field enough equipment and troops for a real Division (arguments can be made the same is true for a real Brigade).
 

The Ukraine war proves the US Army is right to focus on high-tech long-range weapons and old-school high-intensity training, Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville tells Breaking Defense.​




WASHINGTON — As Ukraine’s underdog army pushes back the Russian invaders, what lessons should the American military take to heart?

The US Army’s top officer doesn’t hesitate: “We’re seeing the impact of long-range precision fires,” Gen. James McConville said at once. “The HIMARS has been a game changer for the Ukrainians.”

“The battle has shifted,” said McConville, the Army Chief of Staff, in a late September interview with Breaking Defense.

RELATED: How we fight: Army issues all-new handbook for multi-domain war

The first phase of the fight, a desperate defense against onrushing Russian armor, put a premium on man-portable anti-tank missiles like the US Javelin and British NLAW. The defenders also needed shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, like the venerable Stinger, to take out Russian helicopters and ground-attack aircraft.

But as Ukraine stabilized the front and then went on the offensive, both sides shifted emphasis to artillery, seeking to disrupt enemy advances and soften up sectors for attack. Ukrainian forces urgently needed the ability to strike deeply and accurately at Russian supply depots, transport hubs, and other critical targets far behind the front lines. So the West began supplying long-range artillery systems, like the American HIMARS missile launcher.

“The Ukrainians initially had a lot of success with what I would call short-range weapons systems, like the Javelin, like the Stinger,” McConville said. But over time, “they found that having artillery – [like] the triple-7s [i.e. the M777 155 mm howitzer] — gave them much more capability. And now with HIMARS, [they have] the ability to engage across the depth of the battlefield.”

Long-Range, High-Tech, High Lethality

Such “Long-Range Precision Fires” – from GPS-guided howitzer shells to hypersonic missiles – have been the US Army’s No. 1 priority for research, development, and acquisition since 2017.

That’s when then-Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. Mark Milley, now chairman of the Joint Chiefs, used the annual Association of the US Army conference as a platform to set the service on a bold new course, refocusing from grueling guerilla warfare in the Middle East to high-tech conflict with China and Russia. McConville, who was Milley’s deputy, succeeded him as chief in 2019 and is now shepherding several programs the two men started into production.

“Those capabilities will be coming into the force starting next year,” McConville said. “That will fundamentally change how we do business.”

In 2023, the Army will get its first combat-ready prototypes for three new Long-Range Precision Fires systems:

  • the hypersonic Dark Eagle missile, whose classified range is estimated at over 1,700 miles;
  • the Mid-Range Capability (MRC), aka Typhon, which repurposes Navy SM-6s and Tomahawks for strikes at ranges of about 1,000 miles; and
  • the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), an all-new weapon designed to fit in existing HIMARS launchers and hit targets over 300 miles away.
By comparison, the farthest-striking missile currently available to the Army is the HIMARS-launched ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System), with a maximum range of under 200 miles. And the US hasn’t actually given any ATACMS to Ukraine, just the 40-mile GMRLS rockets. That range is adequate for most targets in eastern Ukraine, but not for the vast distances of the western Pacific.

“We are developing systems that help us deal with the ranges and the speeds that are required in an environment that is much larger,” McConville said.

What’s more, the Army aims to upgrade these new weapons with sophisticated seekers that let them strike moving targets, including ships at sea. That makes them much more useful in the Pacific, historically a Navy-dominated theater, where the Army seeks a new role supporting the fleet with land-based anti-ship strikes.

“Long range precision fires gives you the ability to penetrate integrated air and missile defenses,” McConville said. “It gives you the ability to sink ships – which, again, can be very helpful if someone’s considering some type of amphibious operation.” (While McConville doesn’t offer examples, the most-discussed amphibious scenario is a Chinese attempt to land troops on Taiwan).

Of course, the US isn’t the only one developing such long-range precision-guided weapons. So is Russia – although it has resorted increasingly to indiscriminate strikes against civilians in Ukraine – and China. That puts a premium on missile defenses, McConville said, another of the Army’s six modernization priorities. But it also requires US forces to stay on the move and spread out, so they don’t provide big, static targets, like the Russian ammo dumps and air bases repeatedly ravaged by Ukrainian strikes.

Dispersion and mobility are tactics the Army must relearn after a generation in Afghanistan and Iraq, where US forces built up an extensive, static infrastructure of big bases, supply dumps, and well-appointed command posts.

Commanders… will no longer be able to have the large command posts that they had in Afghanistan or Iraq… with stadium-type seats and a lot of big screens,” McConville said. “In the future, the battlefield will be so lethal, and there’ll be the ability to gather [targeting] information on where our command posts are, so we’re going to have to move them very, very quickly, and they’ll have to be dispersed and smaller.”

The new approach will require a change in mindset and doctrine – which leads to what McConville considers the most crucial weapons system: the human brain.

The Human Factor: Training & Doctrine

Western weapons have made a major difference in Ukraine, McConville told Breaking Defense. But weapons are nothing without soldiers to wield them. So, he said, what’s most important in this war – and every war – is the human factor: the Ukrainian soldiers’ will and skill.

Both have grown with eight years of combat experience and Western training since Russia’s initial, more limited invasion in 2014, when Ukraine ceded Crimea without a shot and then suffered heavy losses in the Donbas.

“This is not the Ukrainian army of 2014,” McConville emphasized. Today, he said, “the Ukrainian army is very competent and very committed. With the training that’s going on, that NATO is conducting for the Ukrainians, they pick up these [new] capabilities very quickly.”

Admittedly, much of Ukraine’s success is due to Russian incompetence. But McConville warns against understating either the Russian threat or the Ukrainian accomplishment in repelling it.

We should not underestimate what the Ukrainians are doing,” he said. “They’ve done a lot of training, they have learned, they’re a learning organization, and they are performing very, very well on the battlefield.”

The US, likewise, has changed its training in recent years to emphasize high-intensity combat against a well-armed nation-state.

“If you go out to our national training centers, now, it’s large scale combat operations, where, over the last 20 years, we’d been focused on counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, irregular warfare,” McConville said. “If you have command posts, you have to move them often, or they’re going to be targeted…. Your command posts are going to be jammed, your computers are going to be taken away from you.”

That’s down to what the Army calls “long-range effects.” Those include not only Long-Range Precision Firepower, like HIMARS and hypersonics, but non-lethal tools like hacking and radio jamming to disable the command, control, and communications systems on which all modern militaries depend. The Army’s new Multi-Domain Task Forces are meant to combine firepower, electronic attack, and cyber warfare to cripple an enemy military’s digital nervous system — and potential enemies aim to do the same to US units.

That means commanders can’t count on live drone feeds from the battlespace or constant communications with frontline forces. It means junior officers must learn to fight in the dark, without detailed intelligence or instructions from higher headquarters.

“You will have to develop organizations that are trained, disciplined and fit,” McConvile said, “to the level that they can operate off of truly off mission command.”

That’s the doctrine whereby commanders tell subordinates what they must accomplish – “commander’s intent” – without micromanaging how they accomplish those missions. Planning, coordination, and orders still matter, but the emphasis is increasingly on adaptability, improvisation, and initiative.

“How we do command and control will change,” McConville said. “It’ll be much more focused on mission command. You’ll give orders that are more based on the commander’s intent, because you may not have the ability, in this very lethal and complex environment, to continue to give orders to your subordinate units. They may be dispersed, they may have to operate on intent, you may not be able to contact them.”

In such chaotic high-tech conflicts, drones, robots, and networks all play a useful role, McConville said, but such AI systems are also vulnerable to disruption and deception. Just as armies have long used camouflage to trick the human eye, he said, today they’re finding ways to “confuse the algorithm.” So while artificial intelligence can support human soldiers, McConville believes that it can’t replace them.

“You’re going to see our ground forces enabled by robotic combat vehicles and unmanned aerial systems,” he said. “We’re going to have autonomous vehicles, we’re going to have autonomous aircraft — but at the end of the day, I still think there’s a place for soldiers in the decision making loop, and you want them in a position where they can see the battlefield, because when you’re looking through cameras and drones, you can’t get the full picture.”

“At the end of the day, people are your greatest strength,” McConville emphasized. “They’re the most important weapons system.”

“We equip our soldiers with the best gear, but having soldiers that are willing to fight and defend their country in a very lethal battlefield is extremely important,” he said. “That’s what we’re seeing in Ukraine.”

“What makes the difference is the will to fight. All conflicts are a battle of wills.”
 

The Ukraine war proves the US Army is right to focus on high-tech long-range weapons and old-school high-intensity training, Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville tells Breaking Defense.​




Adaptive Dispersed Operations and Mission Command always brings to my mind the June 6th drops in Normandy of the 6th, 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions. They were effective despite (or because of) their wide dispersion but with everybody knowing what their commander's intent was.
 
Is there somewhat of a disconnect between the renewed focus being on dispersed operations and mission command vs. the shift from the BCT being the primary unit of action back to the Division? The new "Heavy" and "Penetration" Division structures seem to me to lean toward a concentration of heavy forces which might attract the exact type of precision fires that are meant to be avoided by dispersion.

Is there something to learn from the way the Ukrainian campaign has rolled out (accidental or not)?
  • The initial enemy attack is blunted by dispersed, light forces using handheld AT/AD weapons which are difficult to detect by a force on the move and less easily targeted by the attacker's artillery.
  • Once the initial attack is stopped long range precision fires are used to degrade the enemy's logistics, AD assets and troop concentrations forcing them to disperse.
  • Once the attacking force is isolated into smaller pockets, mobile units achieving local superiority conduct counter-attacks where weaknesses are detected.
 
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