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Informing the Army’s Future Structure

I think for CAV the Black hats drive and the green hats sit in back works best.
It’s not a Inf Bn or a Tank Sqn - it’s a mix and needs a bunch of different skillsets IMHO.

FJAG has been promoting fractional units. 10:90, 30:70, 50:50 etc.

What if the same concept were applied to the Infantry / Armoured debate?

What if we focused the RCAC on manoeuvre warfare and the RCIC on positional warfare?

And then developed a 3:1 standard. Four Subunits to the Unit.

RCAC - 3 parts manoeuvre to 1 part position (3 Sabre to 1 Support)
RCIC - 3 parts position to 1 part manoeuvre (3 Rifle to 1 Support)

RCIC Sabre is all about mounted weapons and the Support is infantry for clearance and to take and hold briefly.
RCAC Rifle is all about light troops and emplaced man-portable weapons and Support is heavy weapons on wheels or tracks to screen and manoeuvre.
 
FJAG has been promoting fractional units. 10:90, 30:70, 50:50 etc.

What if the same concept were applied to the Infantry / Armoured debate?

What if we focused the RCAC on manoeuvre warfare and the RCIC on positional warfare?

And then developed a 3:1 standard. Four Subunits to the Unit.

RCAC - 3 parts manoeuvre to 1 part position (3 Sabre to 1 Support)
RCIC - 3 parts position to 1 part manoeuvre (3 Rifle to 1 Support)

RCIC Sabre is all about mounted weapons and the Support is infantry for clearance and to take and hold briefly.
RCAC Rifle is all about light troops and emplaced man-portable weapons and Support is heavy weapons on wheels or tracks to screen and manoeuvre.
I think there is a culture and a training (*or should have) difference between Infantry - Armor - and Cav

I think the Inf / Armor Combat Teams as fixed entities can work in large armies that do a great amount of training - and have the resources to support -- some here (Infanteer for one) have mentioned that a mixed unit has a tough time of doing training etc.
So I will concede that the Cbt Tm can be built as required.

Both Inf and Armored are required for static and maneuver warfare -

The Cav role, I see as an entity that has troops from a bunch of branches posted in for a 2-3 years and spends it times doing collective training - and some common individual training (and perhaps sending troops to their parent trade units/schools for PCF).

Looking at a CAV unit - you need Armored- Recce (as opposed to Armored - Tank) crew - I don't see a point in trying to make Armored troops Infantryman in that role - so you post in Infantry for the roles applicable. You also have Cbt Engineers, etc.
CAV becomes the Bde Recce asset, as if you look at how the US Army sets it up, it has a lot of what Canada would want in that role.

I think 10/90 isn't enough based on my own 10/90 experiences in the early 90's - I think the 70/30 and 30/70 makes a good deal of sense for some formations -- but again that rolls back to Canada needs to change the PRes to make it a viable entity beyond minor augmentation.
Until that occurs, I tend to dismiss any PRes incorporation
 
I think there is a culture and a training (*or should have) difference between Infantry - Armor - and Cav

I think the Inf / Armor Combat Teams as fixed entities can work in large armies that do a great amount of training - and have the resources to support -- some here (Infanteer for one) have mentioned that a mixed unit has a tough time of doing training etc.
So I will concede that the Cbt Tm can be built as required.

Both Inf and Armored are required for static and maneuver warfare -

The Cav role, I see as an entity that has troops from a bunch of branches posted in for a 2-3 years and spends it times doing collective training - and some common individual training (and perhaps sending troops to their parent trade units/schools for PCF).

Looking at a CAV unit - you need Armored- Recce (as opposed to Armored - Tank) crew - I don't see a point in trying to make Armored troops Infantryman in that role - so you post in Infantry for the roles applicable. You also have Cbt Engineers, etc.
CAV becomes the Bde Recce asset, as if you look at how the US Army sets it up, it has a lot of what Canada would want in that role.

I think 10/90 isn't enough based on my own 10/90 experiences in the early 90's - I think the 70/30 and 30/70 makes a good deal of sense for some formations -- but again that rolls back to Canada needs to change the PRes to make it a viable entity beyond minor augmentation.
Until that occurs, I tend to dismiss any PRes incorporation

3rd (United Kingdom) Division exists as the United Kingdom’s strategic land warfare asset.

As such the Division is able to bring to bear the considerable firepower of the British Army and concentrate the force which includes: Reconnaissance, Armoured Cavalry; Armoured and Mechanised Infantry, Aviation, Artillery, Engineers and Logistics; in what is referred to as “the full spectrum” of warfighting capability.

'The Iron Division' is made up of 1st Armoured Infantry Brigade, 12th Armoured Brigade Combat Team, 20th Armoured Brigade Combat Team, 1st Artillery Brigade, 11 Signals Brigade and 101st Operational Sustainment Brigade, 7th Air Defence Group and 25 (Close Support) Engineer Group, 4 Military Intelligence Battalion and 7 Military Intelligence Battalion.

I'm trying not to get tied up in vocabulary. The vocabulary is less and less representative of the roles in the field.

Let me back up a bit then.

Manoeuvre units (flexible with a manoeuvre focus but a positional capability)
Positional units (flexible with a positional focus but a manoeuvre capability)
ISTAR units (observation and info-gathering with a self-defence capability drawing on the sneak and peek tradition rather than the fight for info tradition)
Fire Support units (fire support of all sorts with a ISTAR capability)

The dedicated one unit, one weapon system, seems to me as out dated a notion as the infanteer being identified as a rifle operator rather than the rifle just being one tool of many for the infanteer.
 
While I was training with the US Army the Bradleys in the US Cavalry Troops were not crewed by Infantry. They were Scouts. While those Scouts Troops had dismounted scouts, they were not intended to be used as infantrymen.

If we are trying to do close combat then we have combat team structures, training and equipment. The Armoured Corps is exploring Cavalry, but that is really about having a single individual training steam and organizational (if not equipment) structure in the field units. We'll see how that develops.

Canadian armour crewmen can absolutely conduct dismounted recce work. If we are looking for an element to recce/mark/secure in support of infantry companies in a battalion dismounted attack then a Recce Platoon from an infantry battalion would indeed be the preferred element. Having said that, Recce Tps, even those equipped with Coyotes, have not been completely tied to their vehicles. They dismount as appropriate to execute their recce tasks.
 
While I was training with the US Army the Bradleys in the US Cavalry Troops were not crewed by Infantry. They were Scouts. While those Scouts Troops had dismounted scouts, they were not intended to be used as infantrymen.
Agreed - given the CA doesn't have a 19D type trade, I was suggesting the role can be filled by mixing Inf and Arm forces.
If we are trying to do close combat then we have combat team structures, training and equipment. The Armoured Corps is exploring Cavalry, but that is really about having a single individual training steam and organizational (if not equipment) structure in the field units. We'll see how that develops.

Canadian armour crewmen can absolutely conduct dismounted recce work. If we are looking for an element to recce/mark/secure in support of infantry companies in a battalion dismounted attack then a Recce Platoon from an infantry battalion would indeed be the preferred element. Having said that, Recce Tps, even those equipped with Coyotes, have not been completely tied to their vehicles. They dismount as appropriate to execute their recce tasks.
Frankly this is a rice bowl issue -- I've never been significantly impressed by 19D's or CA Armored Recce trying to dismount work -- the same way I never understood why an Inf BN would get Coyote's for Recce.
In an Army as small as Canada, it doesn't make sense to attempt to duplicate capabilities and half ass it.
 
Agreed - given the CA doesn't have a 19D type trade, I was suggesting the role can be filled by mixing Inf and Arm forces.

Frankly this is a rice bowl issue -- I've never been significantly impressed by 19D's or CA Armored Recce trying to dismount work -- the same way I never understood why an Inf BN would get Coyote's for Recce.
In an Army as small as Canada, it doesn't make sense to attempt to duplicate capabilities and half ass it.
We have RCAC folks that spend a whole career conducting recce. They do what the US Scout platoons do (although there are absolutely differences in the TTPs).
 
Fair enough, I was going off the basis of the 2 non continental US BCT's running with 2 infantry battalions as precedent for "enough"

Challenge, does the Light Brigade need a standing cav unit, or is it's primary purpose to force generate QRF battalions and potentially light based battlegroups? If it does need a Cav capability, wouldn't it make more sense for the LIB -> Cav conversion to happen within the light force? Good geographic location to play with your reserve ideas in PRes rich Ontario, strip a company each from 1,2,3 RCR to form the new RegF Cav, 3RCR becomes a 10/90 reserve LIB.

If so, the math changes to 3 armoured (1 tank and 2 cav) 6 mech. Two symmetrical medium Bde's, one independent/floating tank regiment that can turn either "heavyish" as needed. Or, if we got wild, two 70/30 tank regiments where the 30 trains on the 70's tanks to end up with two heavy-ish Bde's.
I think what matters most about the structure, is what you intend the final structure's capability to be. With a Canadian Army hovering around 20,000 regulars and 15,000 reservists (those are very rough rounded off numbers you might be able to generate for a field force) the most you could ever deploy and marginally sustain would be a single division (say 20 - 23,000 all told). It would be more practical to generate and deploy a brigade (say 5,000) and the SSE, as is written, is for the deployment of battlegroups (1,5 - 2,500). In each of those structures, it doesn't matter how many are regular or reservists as long as you develop a proper training and mobilization structure to complement it. Obviously the more regulars a force has the more rapidly it can be mobilized and the more effective it will be at the time of mobilization albeit that with time effectiveness will reach a level of parity.

If one looks solely at the SSE then brigade and division structures do not matter. What matters is that a core for the battlegroup exists. That equates to at least a trained battalion headquarters. If you want that battlegroup to be able of deploying rapidly then the more of its sub-components (such as rifle companies, CS and CSS) should be organic. If there is time for pre-deployment training and organization before deployment then those sub-components can come from elsewhere. Essentially this is how we did things during Afghanistan. With roughly a years notice and six months of predeployment training we were able to literally cobble together 2 - 2,500 man battlegroups on a continuing basis using both regular and reserve forces (roughly 10-20%) for each roto. For that type of conveyor system of force generation our brigade structures, our reserve structures and our managed readiness and equipment management systems were adequate and still remain adequate.

The problem comes when you want to up the game and send a brigade all at once. None of our brigades are configured or manned to a level where it could be mobilized without very heavy augmentation in both personnel and equipment from the other two brigades and the reserve force. To go one step further, depending on what level of hostilities they are going into, we would need to procure several crucial weapons systems not currently in our inventory and need the time to train their operators. Lastly, we would need to build a CSS structure to be able to support the force. In addition we would need to build a system that generates replacements for casualties of both personnel and equipment and perhaps a rotational system.

The problem with brigades is that we will never send one as currently configured. The LIB is an issue as is the paucity of artillery and the nonexistence of a variety of enabling weapons such as AD and ATGMs. Time is the big factor. The brigade will need to be "rounded-out" from other brigades and reservists and trained and this will take significantly more time to do than a mere battlegroup.

Building and deploying a division confronts us with the same issues but at a significantly greater magnitude to the point where its nigh on impossible to do.

Personally I think that a structure of the size of Canada's current Army, that aims to deploy only battlegroups is aiming far too low.

I think that if all you are planning on sending is a battlegroup, then an Army which actually has enough effectives (both regular and reservists combined) to man that battlegroup is enough for one roto. If more rotos are envisioned then you need some additional cadres to form additional battle groups while filling the ranks with new recruits. A mechanized battalion has roughly 600 all ranks of which roughly 360 are cpls/ptes. Lets up those numbers to a more realistic level of 800 and 500 respectively and set roto lengths as one year. In a year of intensive training the core of 300 should be able to bring 500 new recruits to a level where the battalion is effective. While our risk averse hierarchy might disagree with that, most armies are quite capable of doing it. So effectively, an Army that plans to deploy only battlegroups needs only multiple sets of equipment and personnel to put out a Roto 0 and maybe two sets of cadres to form Rotos 1 and 2 and subsequent ones. If there is a pool of DP1 level trained reservists already available - lets say enough for Roto 1 - then the job becomes even easier. And if the deployments are basically peacetime ones such as the one to Latvia, a newly raised and trained battlegroup has even more time in theatre to hone its skills to a much higher level.

Obviously if we upscale our requirement for deployment to a brigade, then the problem becomes much more complex. Unlike a battlegroup whose equipment and CSS support is relatively modest, a brigade's are increased by a factor of 5-6 at a minimum. Equipping and training a brigade from scratch easily takes more than a year even if you start with a trained cadre as you need to take the first year to get the battalions organized and trained and then take significantly more time to train them to operate as combined arms.

My point with the above is not to urge us to reduce the army to one Roto 0 and several cadres but to say that its critical to understand and fully tailor your army to meet its expected objectives well before the fact. Know how large a force you want to deploy and in what theatre and organize the structure (equipment and personnel) well ahead of the fact. If cost is a consideration (and when isn't it?) then make a part of the force a properly trained reserve force. If time is not a consideration (and in the peacetime past it hasn't been) then include in the plan the recruiting and training of civilians. But. Make sure that you have a solid doctrine and a structure to support that doctrine and to stay with it. We ad hoc things entirely too much.

What's clear to me is that, having committed to Latvia, we need to sustain a battlegroup in theatre. It's effectively an open ended standing commitment. Under the SSE we need a structure only sufficient in personnel and equipment to sustain it. We do not need a brigade for that. Three, maybe four, battalion cores (1,500 total max) rotating on one year periods could do it. That's significantly less expensive than a whole RegF brigade. If, however, we think that at some point we need to, or want the option to, send a full brigade, then we better have a properly equipped and organized heavy brigade with a proper doctrine available for that. Since that's a contingency, and not a standing commitment, much of it can be a reserve element. If we think that will become a major operation then we better have an additional reserve heavy brigade in the hopper as well.

Over and above Latvia, we need to do that analysis for each and every commitment, whether standing or contingent. Do we want to do security force training? - configure a force for that. Do we want to do UN peacekeeping? - configure a force for that. Do we want an army presence in the Arctic and on our coasts? - configure a force for that. Some of those will be standing commitments requiring a full-time force; others will be contingencies which can get by with a core, reservists and civilians.

In effect this is why I favour restructuring into light, medium and heavy forces - each targeted on a particular class of missions (quick reaction and the North; peacekeeping; and Europe respectively), each equipped and trained to meet those commitments.

I think that our knee jerk response to missions (standing and contingent) in trying to be jacks of all trades are what is burning out the Army as people are shoved around from pillar to post and what is tying us to a large and expensive standing regular force which undermines our ability to obtain proper equipment.

All that to say my whole concept of 30/70 forces comes from the idea of having more full-time "cores" available to build battlegroups or brigades around in sufficient numbers to meet standing commitments and reasonably foreseeable contingencies.

That to say as well, why I'm not in favour of having forces designed to meet a variety of tasks such as a tank regiment that could work with either this brigade or that one or a brigade formed with two battalions and a cavalry regiment. Nor do I know for sure whether the light force needs a cavalry regiment (I suspect it does if it needs to be able to deploy as a brigade as opposed to just light battlegroups).

I certainly am with you on the fact that we need to leverage PRes heavy areas. In fact I think much of the future of the army as a viable and credible force depends on it. I find it regrettable that the Army's leadership hasn't recognized that yet.

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What's clear to me is that, having committed to Latvia, we need to sustain a battlegroup in theatre. It's effectively an open ended standing commitment. Under the SSE we need a structure only sufficient in personnel and equipment to sustain it. We do not need a brigade for that. Three, maybe four, battalion cores (1,500 total max) rotating on one year periods could do it. That's significantly less expensive than a whole RegF brigade. If, however, we think that at some point we need to, or want the option to, send a full brigade, then we better have a properly equipped and organized heavy brigade with a proper doctrine available for that. Since that's a contingency, and not a standing commitment, much of it can be a reserve element. If we think that will become a major operation then we better have an additional reserve heavy brigade in the hopper as well.


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Knowing as little as I do now I would add a 5 or 6 Battery Artillery Regiment to the Battlegroup Commitment.

3x M777 or SPH Batteries
1x SPH or HIMARS Battery
1x STA/FOO/FAC/TUAS Element
1x MRAD/SHORAD/ManPADs Battery

Or something of such sort.

And no cannons with less than L52 barrels.
 
We have RCAC folks that spend a whole career conducting recce. They do what the US Scout platoons do (although there are absolutely differences in the TTPs).
Again to me that is a rice bowl issue, if we talk about making a CAV type Squadron.

I think it make a lot sense to have dismounted Inf Recce types and Engineer Recce types do the dismount portion, and have the Armor do the vehicle and UAS/Surveillance aspects, especially in an Army Canada's size.

I don't see the viability of the current CA Armored Recce Squadron with its current ORBAT.
 
Knowing as little as I do now I would add a 5 or 6 Battery Artillery Regiment to the Battlegroup Commitment.

3x M777 or SPH Batteries
1x SPH or HIMARS Battery
1x STA/FOO/FAC/TUAS Element
1x MRAD/SHORAD/ManPADs Battery

Or something of such sort.

And no cannons with less than L52 barrels.
I think the entire idea of a self deployed battle group is incredibly bad. For years the Bde had been viewed as the minimum deployable formation and I’d say for a lot of reasons.

If you start pushing more and more assets to a BattleGroup it’s a Bde- at that point, and you’ve had to deploy the majority of the command staff and Bde enablers that make the Bde unable to relief itself anyway.

I think that the years in Cyprus as a BN tasking and then the piecemeal BattleGroups for FYR really played havoc with the CA. Then Afghanistan just continued the shell game.

Either the Cdn Gov needs to accept their asks are bigger than the ability of the CAF and scale it up to meet the needs - or they need to scale back the operations to short term commitments of a Bde.
 
Knowing as little as I do now I would add a 5 or 6 Battery Artillery Regiment to the Battlegroup Commitment.

3x M777 or SPH Batteries
1x SPH or HIMARS Battery
1x STA/FOO/FAC/TUAS Element
1x MRAD/SHORAD/ManPADs Battery

Or something of such sort.

And no cannons with less than L52 barrels.
I take the same view with respect to artillery, or any other branch. You need to know what you want for a final outcome. If what we are talking about is battlegroups, then all you need is one composite regiment with a battery of guns for every concurrent battlegroup deployment augmented by an STA battery capable of spinning off troops and maybe a troop's worth of HIMARS. All that backed up by a sufficient stock of equipment, additional full-timers, reservists, recruits etc to create additional rotos from and to support training and rotations and doctrine and trade progression

Again, if the objective is a brigade, then you need multiple regiments with one each for each deployable brigade with an additional force training. As artillery is generally not a major peace-time requirement, they can be tilted considerably to part-time personnel. The amount and nature of equipment is clearly predicated on what expectation there is for the force to deploy concurrently. If we contemplate two simultaneous brigade deployments then we need to be able to form two Roto 0 regiments plus etc etc.

When the big decisions are made, the other ones all fall into place.

Our problem, our very expensive problem, is that we have a force structure with very little purpose. While we had 4 CMBG there was a clear purpose for the troops in Canada to be organized and trained as brigades to rotate through. There was even a long standing commitment for an additional brigade and battlegroup which again gave a focus for organization equipment and training. Under SSE we no longer have a real purpose for a brigade except in the way of a contingency, which is unspoken in SSE, or as a training framework for battlegroups and to spin off NCEs from time-to-time. Neither of those needs a fully formed or equipped brigade.

If one strictly looked at the rotational battlegroup missions as set out in SSE one does not need a full brigade framework or a brigade's equipment holdings. One could easily have a colonel or one star training headquarters that three or four or more battlegroups in training could report to and be supported by. That would be the economical way of doing things.

I'm personally very much in favour of having at least one fully formed brigade properly equipped and trained for our most demanding contingency (which currently is northern Europe) and, because it is a contingency, it could be largely reservist. I think that, at a minimum we need one other brigade to be equipped and trained for defence of Canada operations and other contingencies such as UN missions. My preference, however, is to have a multi brigade structure as set out in my Force 2027 30/70 structure which gives Canada the ability to "grow a host". It's not that I think that they will necessarily be employed, but I'm a firm believer that being able to build a "host" is a very important factor for deterrence and credibility amongst our allies. We've spent decades deluding ourselves that the individual capability of our soldier (which even with 4 CMBG was largely delusional towards the end) buys us credibility. It didn't then and it certainly doesn't now.

I think the entire idea of a self deployed battle group is incredibly bad. For years the Bde had been viewed as the minimum deployable formation and I’d say for a lot of reasons.

If you start pushing more and more assets to a BattleGroup it’s a Bde- at that point, and you’ve had to deploy the majority of the command staff and Bde enablers that make the Bde unable to relief itself anyway.

I think that the years in Cyprus as a BN tasking and then the piecemeal BattleGroups for FYR really played havoc with the CA. Then Afghanistan just continued the shell game.

Either the Cdn Gov needs to accept their asks are bigger than the ability of the CAF and scale it up to meet the needs - or they need to scale back the operations to short term commitments of a Bde.

Very much agree.

Mike Jeffery, the CLS, at the turn of the century was very concerned that with Bosnia ongoing he was unable to meet the then standing defence requirements of the 1994 Defence White Paper of a light battalion in 10 days, a mech battlegroup in 21 and a brigade in three months. He estimated he could do the first but need three months for the mech battlegroup and "might" be able to generate a brigade in six months. At his retirement, just before we sent battlegroups to Kabul, he opined that two six-month rotations of 1,800 in Afghanistan together with our then Bosnia commitment meant that 1/3 of the deployable strength of the army was tied up in international deployments which concerned him for the army's future.

In essence we were officially admitting point blank that deploying and sustaining a brigade was not realistically feasible as at that time we had only two battlegroups deployed at any given time while preparing another two which even in the aggregate is less than a brigade. While our force strength has gone up since then, much of that growth has been absorbed into administrative HQ functions rather than the field force.

Honestly, I think scaling back commitments would not be the answer. That results in an annual expenditure of $26 Billion for very little. If 68,000 full-time military folks and some 20-25,000 reservists can't meet our rather modest current commitments (the CAF website says we have 2,000 deployed on 20 ops) then the government has to take a damn close look at what's going on here. Every business looks closely as to the % of resources expended on overhead and administration as opposed to that on operations or production. Our ratio is so far out of kilter that it should be sending off giant alarm bells. What's needed is a massive reset of the entire structure.

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FJAG, I would be content to see Canada act as the spine for an Allied Brigade Group with an HQ, a Battle Group and the Support elements, in particular Fire Support.

For a Brigade Group of Allies I might expect to see four "manoeuvre" elements, on supplying Situational Awareness (Recce, ISTAR, whatever you want to call it) and three Combat Arms (Infantry, Tank, Armour, whatever).

That would mean:

one large battery in support of each of the three Combat Arms elements (M777 or SPH)
one depth battery in support of the SA/Recce/ISTAR whatever (SPH if M777s or HIMARS if SPHs)
one Situational Awareness battery (STA/FOO/FAC/UAS)
one GBAD battery capable of covering the Brigade Area of Operations / Area of Interest.

I might expect to find Latvian, Swedish and Danish elements under command.
 
FJAG, I would be content to see Canada act as the spine for an Allied Brigade Group with an HQ, a Battle Group and the Support elements, in particular Fire Support.

For a Brigade Group of Allies I might expect to see four "manoeuvre" elements, on supplying Situational Awareness (Recce, ISTAR, whatever you want to call it) and three Combat Arms (Infantry, Tank, Armour, whatever).

That would mean:

one large battery in support of each of the three Combat Arms elements (M777 or SPH)
one depth battery in support of the SA/Recce/ISTAR whatever (SPH if M777s or HIMARS if SPHs)
one Situational Awareness battery (STA/FOO/FAC/UAS)
one GBAD battery capable of covering the Brigade Area of Operations / Area of Interest.

I might expect to find Latvian, Swedish and Danish elements under command.
I like the concept but with only three brigade headquarters it would be unsustainable vis a vis the bde HQ for more than three rotations unless you go to a one year cycle or make it a fourth bde HQ and post families there for two to three years. (again this is why I go to my 30/70 construct in order to create a total of five deployable brigade HQ cores which could support shorter rotations (say 9 months)).)

You'd need someone to supply an artillery battalion (which IMHO should in future have a loitering munitions battery) with its own observers and FSCCs as well. One can cobble together a multinational arty battalion but I wouldn't recommend it.

Since there already is a Multinational division there, an AD bn, an STA battery and a HIMARS bn would best be part of the div. If not made available we'd need those resources for the brigade.

Honestly, I think the fundamental concept of a UK-like Strike brigade with highly upgraded recce regiments, teamed with long range artillery regiments is a very valid concept. I'm just not sure if it needs to be concentrated in a single brigade or whether it should be based on each line brigade's cavalry regiment and the divisional artillery. The former makes it a divisional fight and the later a brigade one. I tend to favour the later in large part for simpler logistics and greater flexibility.

Incidentally, and since I'm not a purist, I think we should adopt the term Brigade Combat Team since both the US and Brits use it. I think I'll do that in my future napkin forces.

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Honestly, I think the fundamental concept of a UK-like Strike brigade with highly upgraded recce regiments, teamed with long range artillery regiments is a very valid concept. I'm just not sure if it needs to be concentrated in a single brigade or whether it should be based on each line brigade's cavalry regiment and the divisional artillery. The former makes it a divisional fight and the later a brigade one. I tend to favour the later in large part for simpler logistics and greater flexibility.

Incidentally, and since I'm not a purist, I think we should adopt the term Brigade Combat Team since both the US and Brits use it. I think I'll do that in my future napkin forces.

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Light-brigades make countries look like light-weights. It sends a political statement.

Canada was a 'heavy' hitter in two World Wars, and it got us a seat at the Big Boys' tables.

If we want to continue to measure up, we should invest in heavy metal.
 
Light-brigades make countries look like light-weights. It sends a political statement.

Canada was a 'heavy' hitter in two World Wars, and it got us a seat at the Big Boys' tables.

If we want to continue to measure up, we should invest in heavy metal.
... and put a bigger presence into Europe. It's the place to be to be seen to be "relevant".

I find it disconcerting that such an obvious "political" decision hasn't yet been made by our touchy-feely government. I guess I just answered my own question.

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Light-brigades make countries look like light-weights. It sends a political statement.

Canada was a 'heavy' hitter in two World Wars, and it got us a seat at the Big Boys' tables.

If we want to continue to measure up, we should invest in heavy metal.
To paraphrase something or other, it's not how heavy it is, it's how you use it.

You are correct. Divesting Heavy Brigades sitting in Canada and replacing with Light Brigades sitting in Canada would make us look like light-weights.

A more proper question is how could we use both Light and Heavy forces? I'm going to make an assumption here that Canada (despite FJAG and others strong wishes) will not be increasing our permanent European presence beyond the existing eFP Latvia commitment (I have seen absolutely no indications that it is even being considered).

Right now we have mixed Medium and Light forces in Canada. We can possibly deploy a Light Battalion fairly quickly in response to an emergency, but as FJAG noted above, deploying a Brigade will take considerable time. Enough time that it might be quite possible to have many of it's positions filled by Reservists.

We could for example have a force structure that was designed to rapidly deploy a Light Battle Group with capabilities something like an Airborne Battalion and/or Marine Littoral Regiment (and regularly exercise this capability with our Allies) followed up in a contingency situation (war) with a Heavy 30/70 Brigade which can be sustained with replacement equipment from a Reserve 10/90 Brigade (the 10 being mixed Reg/Reserve HQ and specialist positions) and further follow-on replacement equipment for a mobilization-only Brigade.

Would a clear, explicitly organized, funded and structured plan which moves most of our Heavy capabilities into the Reserves and makes our Regular forces more Light (but more responsive) make us look "light-weight" to our Allies or would it be seen as an improvement over what we have now?
 
Heavy forces in North America can be relevant if you own all the right resources.

So...holds up to 24 x Challenger tanks (just over a single Canadian tank Squadron). How many to transport a CMBG? There are four in existence, so the combined fleet of them can transport the RCD. How many LSDs does the RCN have? How many on the books?
 
I’m of the opinion that Canada should be able to field a real 3 DIV force for the Army.
1 Light (1 Reg Bde, 1 70:30 Mostly Reg and 1 mostly PRes 30:70)
1 Heavy (1 70:30 mostly Reg Bde ) and 2 30:70 Mostly Res Bde’s)
1 Med (mostly PRes 10:90)

DIV assets and Staff would be 30:70 Reg/PRes

I don’t see that as a bridge to far for Canada with its population and GDP.

I’m also of the opinion that the RCN needs to about triple and the RCAF double.
 
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