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New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy

AOPS is definitely manoeuvrable enough but I have no idea about degaussing, and at that point you're risking a lot (our most massive ships, until we get the JSS) for a few mines. MCDVs definitely easier to send them off on such a mission.
Mavoeuvrable yes, but can it keep a static station? I don't think it can unless it goes to anchor. The "ideal" MCM vessel can stay in one spot while its little minions go and do the work away from the ship.
 
(From the outside looking in) My impression is that over the last 20 yrs or more of larger deployments the big question is always how do you get there? Landlocked deployments are obviously by air and the C17s have made those possible but for those where there is a port available it seems it's all about hitching a ride or renting a ship. Wouldn't it be a priority to get some sea transport with larger landing craft? A couple modest LHDs would add quite a bit of capability whether it's for a combat zone or humanitarian assistance. 10,000 to 13,000 ton Damen Schelde Enforcers series?
You must be a young.un. We have had relatively good airlift capability since shortly after the war starting with the Yukons. In fact, transport used to run a fairly comprehensive airline service even domestically.
 
AOPS is definitely manoeuvrable enough but I have no idea about degaussing, and at that point you're risking a lot (our most massive ships, until we get the JSS) for a few mines. MCDVs definitely easier to send them off on such a mission.
There is a number of issues with that. First of all AOPS has a massive magnetic signature and I'm pretty sure it doesn't have a degaussing system. As well it has a bow thruster but no Z drives. Kingston Class is highly maneuverable and can stop within the length of itself. AOPS has a massive draft compared with other MCM classes including the Kingston Class.
 
Not exactly but I can see a few parallels.

I think it's pretty well established what their limitations are and what their strengths are. They fill the "cheap and useful" role that the RCN needs when a big ship isn't necessary.
Thanks for the insight Underway. 👍🏼

I know you got it, but to make it clear for others tangential to the discussion, is was not saying “like the Griffon” as a slight. I flew a few (all, less 147D) green helos in my time and I would easily take the Griffon over the Twin Huey, some imperfect characteristics notwithstanding. They (Griffon, MCDV) both are what they are. Make the most of them, given we have them, vice spending useful energy instead on whining and complaining.
 
Mavoeuvrable yes, but can it keep a static station? I don't think it can unless it goes to anchor. The "ideal" MCM vessel can stay in one spot while its little minions go and do the work away from the ship.
It has a bow thruster. I've had no issue maintaining a position.

Stoker has some good points in his last comment though.
 
The smaller size of the MCDV gives it a lot of pluses, meaning it can go places neither an AOP's or a frigate can do, but is more seaworthy and more endurance (but slower) than a typical patrol boat. The MCDV's were a great buy, although I have to disagree a bit with Underway and say that they should get the same RWS as the AOP's. Moving forward, their replacement could be split between a slightly bigger and faster vessel and another design that is very similar in size and has an ice strengthen hull like the current MCDV's.
 
AOPS is an icebreaker; those requirements are fundamentally counter to what you need in an MCM ship. It's also built to commercial standards so isn't intended to take battle damage.

Both AOPS and MCDVs good for what they are, but the swiss knife approach just means you don't do a lot of things well, and puts people at unnecessary risk. Probably a lot better at just strapping a few UUVs on to a frigate with a bolt down controller in a mission fit.
 
There's already been talk here that the Halifax class will require some deeper structural overhauls to keep them going. That combined with manning issues suggests that the RCN should be taking one out of service on each coast for that purpose.


We've got a long road ahead. Depending on when the CSC gets started and how quickly they can be built and the learning process. Below is my own creation just going off of some RN and RAN examples. Can Irving get the build process down to 5 yrs? Is that reasonable? Are any of the following guesses even in the ballpark?

CSC/Halifax transitionagelaid downconstruction yrs
Halifax199220313920238
Vancouver199320334020258
Toronto199320344120277
Regina199320354220296
Quebec199420364220306
Montreal199420374320316
Fredricton199420384420326
Calgary199520394420336
Charlottetown199520404520346
Winnipeg199620414520356
St John's199620424620366
Ottawa19962043472037
As it was stated yesterday, a 1 or 2 of these will most likely be paid off in the near future.
If we interpret that to mean within 2-3yrs, when the oldest ship will be 31-32yrs old, we're going to be in serious trouble over the next 10+yrs.

If the first CSC is not available to the RCN until 2031 - 9yrs from now and in 2-3yrs we've already started paying off CPF's in 2024/25, how many CPF's will be usable by 2037 when 5 CSC's are to be built and the youngest CPF is already 41yrs old?

What is not transparent at all is what will be the strength of the RCN in terms of available CSC/CPF's 10yrs from now, 15yrs, 20yrs, etc? None of this information is being conveyed. No one is asking the hard questions and holding people/departments/organizations accountable. Maybe its an SEC issue, don't let our enemies know how weak we will be in 10-15-20-25yrs from now - but anyone with a brain can see this, can understand it. Its plainly evident to anyone who's willing to look for it.

We read that the RCN is going to be short 1k sailors once all the new CSC's are built, really? All 15 CSC's are not going to be available for another 20+yrs, during which the 12 CPF's will be long retired. If 2 CPF's are paid off in the next 3yrs, there's a freeing up of 450 sailors, allocating them to the new AOPS solves that crewing issue (yes training will need to occur, certification, etc, but you have the bodies, it comes down to managing the resources) and the remaining sailors are spread across the remaining 10 CPF's. If the RCN can't solve a staffing issue when they have a 20yr runway to do so.....well....
 
Here is a CBC report from a couple day ago that looks at the problem:



Link
At Maritime Executive, krazy kosts all around, still long time to get most vessels:

Canadian Coast Guard's Three New Fishery Vessels Drydocked for Repair​

The Canadian Coast Guard has found that its new series of marine science vessels have a "class-wide" issue with premature failure of their stern tube bearings, according to CBC, requiring all three hulls to be drydocked and repaired. CCGS Sir John Franklin and CCGS John Cabot have already been refitted, and CCGS Jacques Cartier is due for a propeller shaft bearing replacement next month.

"As any new ship enters full operation, there may be some issues that need to be addressed and we continue to work closely with our customer, ready to provide support and assistance if and as required," a spokesperson for the shipbuilder told CBC.

The vessels were designed and built under Canada's National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS), and the need for an early refit is the latest in a string of delays, cost overruns and setbacks for the program.

The NSS shares contracts among three Canadian shipyards for all government vessel procurement, including the Canadian Surface Combatant, a frigate for the Royal Canadian Navy; an Arctic Offshore Patrol Vessel, for both the Royal Canadian Navy and the Canadian Coast Guard; a new class of heavy icebreakers for the Canadian Coast Guard; the Offshore Fishery Science Vessels; and a variety of other support and non-combatant vessels.

The cost estimate for the frigate has skyrocketed to more than $3 billion per hull, nearly twice the price of a larger Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, and the price of the next two Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships for the Canadian Coast Guard has doubled to $600 million each.

The future icebreaker faces two challenges. The cost for each vessel in the two-hull series has risen to nearly $3 billion, roughly three times the unit cost for the U.S. Coast Guard's Polar Security Cutter heavy icebreaker program.

In addition, according to the Ottawa Citizen, the shipbuilder may have difficulty in sourcing the specialized LR EH50 high-strength steel specified for the construction of the vessels' hulls. The Canadian Coast Guard listed steel availability at the top of the list of its concerns for the program in response to questions from Canada's House of Commons. The market for structural steel has been stretched thin by demand shocks related to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the NYSE Steel Index benchmark price has doubled since 2020.

If our governments were actually interested in acquiring capabilities that are needed (many certainly urgently for CCG), then at least Coast Guard vessels should be bought abroad: CHEAPER. FASTER. MAYBE EVEN BETTER.

Mark
Ottawa

 
The stern seal bearing would have been class approved, no?

Even with a lot of safeguards in place, oversight, commercial standards etc sometimes things just don't work as expected. 🤷‍♂️
 
At Maritime Executive, krazy kosts all around, still long time to get most vessels:



If our governments were actually interested in acquiring capabilities that are needed (many certainly urgently for CCG), then at least Coast Guard vessels should be bought abroad: CHEAPER. FASTER. MAYBE EVEN BETTER.

Mark
Ottawa

I saw the Franklin at VDC getting her shaft pulled and thought it was odd to do a shaft pull so soon.
 
As it was stated yesterday, a 1 or 2 of these will most likely be paid off in the near future.
If we interpret that to mean within 2-3yrs, when the oldest ship will be 31-32yrs old, we're going to be in serious trouble over the next 10+yrs.

If the first CSC is not available to the RCN until 2031 - 9yrs from now and in 2-3yrs we've already started paying off CPF's in 2024/25, how many CPF's will be usable by 2037 when 5 CSC's are to be built and the youngest CPF is already 41yrs old?

What is not transparent at all is what will be the strength of the RCN in terms of available CSC/CPF's 10yrs from now, 15yrs, 20yrs, etc? None of this information is being conveyed. No one is asking the hard questions and holding people/departments/organizations accountable. Maybe its an SEC issue, don't let our enemies know how weak we will be in 10-15-20-25yrs from now - but anyone with a brain can see this, can understand it. Its plainly evident to anyone who's willing to look for it.

We read that the RCN is going to be short 1k sailors once all the new CSC's are built, really? All 15 CSC's are not going to be available for another 20+yrs, during which the 12 CPF's will be long retired. If 2 CPF's are paid off in the next 3yrs, there's a freeing up of 450 sailors, allocating them to the new AOPS solves that crewing issue (yes training will need to occur, certification, etc, but you have the bodies, it comes down to managing the resources) and the remaining sailors are spread across the remaining 10 CPF's. If the RCN can't solve a staffing issue when they have a 20yr runway to do so.....well....
In the RCN we have a lot of pretty talented people, in fact we have whole organizations who deal with the maintenance of our ships and manage their overall condition and their doing stellar work. They know full well the challenges we will have to face to maintain ships until the first CSC is accepted and anyone in the RCN knows this. There is nothing wrong in asking questions but honestly the RCN and the government doesn't have to provide those answers to you in detail and really there are all kinds of details and plans that you don't know about. It almost seems that you think we're inept or hiding something. So post away with your speculation but rest assured the people who need to know know.
 
AOPS is an icebreaker; those requirements are fundamentally counter to what you need in an MCM ship. It's also built to commercial standards so isn't intended to take battle damage.

Both AOPS and MCDVs good for what they are, but the swiss knife approach just means you don't do a lot of things well, and puts people at unnecessary risk. Probably a lot better at just strapping a few UUVs on to a frigate with a bolt down controller in a mission fit.

Which is why I think a mixture of the Braunschweig corvette and Knud Rasmussen patrol ship would suit us, particularly as the latter is Polar Class 6, but isn't an icebreaker (which likely accounts for its higher displacement) and is designed around a similar modular mission payload system as the Kingstons, the StanFlex system, so we would be able to continue using our existing hardware (unless we wanted to adopt the Danes' StanFlex system, which is basically a glorified sea can anyway).

The former addresses the other shortcomings in speed, size and armament for patrol duties without being excessive or downright ersatz frigates. Both were built to naval standards and are more military robust, rather commercial standards.

If our governments were actually interested in acquiring capabilities that are needed (many certainly urgently for CCG), then at least Coast Guard vessels should be bought abroad: CHEAPER. FASTER. MAYBE EVEN BETTER.

Mark
Ottawa

If they have ice strengthened hulls, they would even be Harder, better, faster, stronger.
 
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Which is why I think a mixture of the Braunschweig corvette and Knud Rasmussen patrol ship would suit us, particularly as the latter is Polar Class 6, but isn't an icebreaker (which likely accounts for its higher displacement) and is designed around a similar modular mission payload system as the Kingstons, the StanFlex system, so we would be able to continue using our existing hardware (unless we wanted to adopt the Danes' StanFlex system, which is basically a glorified sea can anyway).

The former addresses the other shortcomings in speed, size and armament for patrol duties without being excessive or downright ersatz frigates. Both were built to naval standards and are more military robust, rather commercial standards.



If they have ice strengthened hulls, they would even be Harder, better, faster, stronger.
Operated with Kund Rasmussen numerous times in the Arctic in the summer and toured her sister ship Ejnar Mikkelsen when she visited Halifax a few years ago. That ship is built to operate in bay ice and the ice type normally found in their part of the Arctic and the conditions in our part of the Arctic are very different. No hanger, 1 ROD and 1 shaftline and the endurance is significantly less than a Kingston Class. It is built to operate off the Greenland Coast with heavy shore support. That being said buy some to operate off our coasts but keep it away from the our Arctic.
 
To be honest, with manning issues likely to continue for the Navy, here's what I would focus on in terms of the future fleet:

  • 2 x Leased AORs to supplement the JSS
  • Victoria Class replacement with 8-10 AIP subs (I like SSNs but I think the monetary and political cost would end up getting us too few to be as effective as a larger fleet of AIPs)
  • Eventual replacement of the Kingston-Class. I see this falling somewhere between an OPV and a Corvette-type vessel. Must haves to me would be range/endurance to reflect our operating requirements, a flex-deck of some sort, USV/UUV/UAV operations capabilities, a flight deck large enough to re-fuel/rearm the Cyclone/Cormorant, RHIBs and constabulary weaponry. Like-to-haves in my mind would be a towed-array sonar (integrated or containerized), a hanger to support a larger-class UAV (MQ-8 Fire Scout?) and some limited AAW/ASW/ASuW capability.

For the Kingston-Class replacement I think you'd want to keep the manning well below 100 personnel (60-80 max...preferably closer to the lower end?) which could definitely limit the capabilities wish list (especially on the air ops side). Between that and the extra manning required for an expanded submarine fleet I think you've likely hit the limit of what the Navy would be able to support even with a major recruiting push and retention efforts. To my mind that rules out wish-list items such as Aircraft Carriers, Amphibious Assault Ships, etc.

Instead I think any additional focus should be on unmanned platforms - long-endurance/long range USVs, XLUUV's etc. for the RCN and UAVs like the MQ-4C Triton or MQ-9B Sea Guardian for the RCAF to expand our awareness of the Maritime domain.
 
In the RCN we have a lot of pretty talented people, in fact we have whole organizations who deal with the maintenance of our ships and manage their overall condition and their doing stellar work. They know full well the challenges we will have to face to maintain ships until the first CSC is accepted and anyone in the RCN knows this. There is nothing wrong in asking questions but honestly the RCN and the government doesn't have to provide those answers to you in detail and really there are all kinds of details and plans that you don't know about. It almost seems that you think we're inept or hiding something. So post away with your speculation but rest assured the people who need to know know.
I don't think its unreasonable for the public that is paying for this to want to know and understand what the plan is. The CAF/DND/government get to hide behind the lack of interest and knowledge from the public more than they should and much more than they would if this was UK/AUS/USA. This is a big reason why support is so shallow for all things military when so little is actually done to encourage support. Usually if you want to find out what we are doing as a military you can find out better from our allies pres releases. If people think that there is an inappropiate amount of ineptness and suppression of information I would suggest that it is merely previous experience that is leading that thought process the result of which is the many posts of markottawa's
 
At Maritime Executive, krazy kosts all around, still long time to get most vessels:



If our governments were actually interested in acquiring capabilities that are needed (many certainly urgently for CCG), then at least Coast Guard vessels should be bought abroad: CHEAPER. FASTER. MAYBE EVEN BETTER.

Mark
Ottawa


I've argued this for years on here. And for the RCN. Our commitment to made in Canada is huge problem.
 
I don't think its unreasonable for the public that is paying for this to want to know and understand what the plan is. The CAF/DND/government get to hide behind the lack of interest and knowledge from the public more than they should and much more than they would if this was UK/AUS/USA. This is a big reason why support is so shallow for all things military when so little is actually done to encourage support. Usually if you want to find out what we are doing as a military you can find out better from our allies pres releases. If people think that there is an inappropiate amount of ineptness and suppression of information I would suggest that it is merely previous experience that is leading that thought process the result of which is the many posts of markottawa's
Sorry disagree broad stokes perhaps, detailed plan no and regardless of the tax payers argument. If the government wants to release a detailed plan on how we are managing the ships maintenance, budgets, manning etc then that's up to them. If the public or OP wants to speculate and find out the nitty gritty details either get a job in Ottawa or file an access to information request.
 
Sorry disagree broad stokes perhaps, detailed plan no and regardless of the tax payers argument. If the government wants to release a detailed plan on how we are managing the ships maintenance, budgets, manning etc then that's up to them. If the public or OP wants to speculate and find out the nitty gritty details either get a job in Ottawa or file an access to information request.
That could be part of the problem as there are precious few defence reporters to go around no doubt a vicious circle with public interest
 
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