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Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ

I think PIVO brings forward some really excellent points. Waiting until the 2030's to start replacing the Halifax class ships is to long. We should be getting hulls in the water within 3-4 years max. There are way to many contractual agreements that are one sided to make this anything more then a dismal failure. Davie ship yards produced a modified Tanker ship to full fil our needs in excellent time. They could have supplied us with another shortly after. But due to politics nothing else they were stood down. Canada is lacking in the ship building combat ship design ability as they were back in the 1990s when the Halifax class was built. At the time they were looking for ways to keep that from happening again. Well here we are and we are dealing with the same issues.

As for not being able to run two different ship classes I say that's just hog wash. Old school mentality of if its not my idea I don't like it. I think between the new Patrol ships, and the new frigates we could split the frigates into two groups, ASW and Surface warfare. Or a mix between the two. We could add a few hulls. That way they could cycle hulls and keep the maintenance cycle better.

Staffing would not be such a issue if they actually recruited properly. You might even want to run 2 ships each coast as Reserve ships and hire more reservists to staff them. Of course someone is going to say that's impossible, they don't have the skills or the ability to do that. They do and they can if they are giving the tasking to do it.

One can hide behind security requirements all they want. But Davie ship yards does/did maintenance on the CPFs they also built one or two of them if memory is correct, they also built the Tribal class along with doing the modernization of those ships. They have a history of building Navy ships as much as Irving does, their hardships are partly to blame on the government because of the lack of overall program structuring of maintaining a modern fleet and being forward thinkers.

But the liberal government is experts at making deal that is so costly that it can not go through with out a lot of rework. To only pay more in cancelation costs then the actual project would have been.

We have the means and the ability's to get hulls into the water in the next 3-4 years maybe sooner if we worked on it bit more effectively. All the smes on here can chime in and say you don't know what your talking about. Probably the same ones who said griffons couldn't and would not fly or be deployed to Afghanistan.
Canadian Industry can literally move a mountain in a day if it needs to be done. They just need the requirement to do it. Heck Alberta could build a fleet of ships and a canal before this project will get off the ground,.
The only way to get a combat vessel built and accepted in the next 3 to 4 years would be to commission a shipyard that has just completed one to build another one that was identical right down to the last cable run and pipe fitting. Any change would mean re-design and would add months to the completion date and it would be a ten year old design that has not been updated at all. The problem is not Irving and God knows I am no fan of theirs, it is a department and a ministry and a government that has done no, nada, zilch in the way of planning since the Halifax's came down the ways. The new frigates should have been on the drawing boards at that time and kept updated so that when it was time to let the contract the government could have said here is what you are bidding on. So we are what, 20 years behind where we should be. We are now playing catch-up and hopefully Trudeau et al won't screw it up by trying to change it in midstream because in the early 30's we will finally start to gain a decent navy once again.

That doesn't mean that we can't speed things along a little bit by, for example, encouraging Irving to farm out significant sub-assemblies so that their floor space is only occupied by the final assembly work but that is working within the system.
 
Its funny because a company such as Irving, Davie or even Seaspan should have been keeping up on designs and such of a surface warfare ship. Especially Irving as they are the "preferred" builder/ advisor on major surface ships for the Canadian Government. Its not like bam we got this info yesterday. I think it is feasible to put a ship in the water in 3-4 years. We have to be realistic and build a ship off the self for right now, then modify as we go. Taking a ship design, then hacking it to pieces, adding here and there, then changing the overall ship hull design would be harder then just building a ship from scratch.
 
Its funny because a company such as Irving, Davie or even Seaspan should have been keeping up on designs and such of a surface warfare ship.
It is the Canadian governments that are to blame. They should have ordered one destroyer or frigate to be built in Canada about every twelve to eighteen months starting with the Iroquois-class destroyers.
I think it is feasible to put a ship in the water in 3-4 years.
How? Please be as specific as possible.
We have to be realistic and build a ship off the self for right now, then modify as we go.
The Canadian navy has never settled for off-the-shelf surface warships such as frigates or destroyers. You might not believe it, but the Canadian navy has VERY high standards for surface warships like destroyers and frigates. Asking the Royal Canadian Navy to settle for off-the-shelf frigates is like asking Canadian politicians to be competent. And which yard is going to build off the shelf right now? Which design are you proposing?
Taking a ship design, then hacking it to pieces, adding here and there, then changing the overall ship hull design would be harder then just building a ship from scratch.
I think the surface combatants will probably use the same hull and propulsion machinery as the Type 26 frigates. But it appears that the rest of the design will probably be very different to the Type 26; this, therefore, will require many years for the detailed design. I have read that construction will start in 2024.
 
Its funny because a company such as Irving, Davie or even Seaspan should have been keeping up on designs and such of a surface warfare ship. Especially Irving as they are the "preferred" builder/ advisor on major surface ships for the Canadian Government. Its not like bam we got this info yesterday. I think it is feasible to put a ship in the water in 3-4 years. We have to be realistic and build a ship off the self for right now, then modify as we go. Taking a ship design, then hacking it to pieces, adding here and there, then changing the overall ship hull design would be harder then just building a ship from scratch.
The reason why we took a existing design and "hacked it to pieces" because it didn't meet our requirements. If we built off the shelf we would be still doing the same thing as off the shelf designs are often built expressly for the country who designed it unless it was an export model usually for countries with no shipbuilding capability.
All three shipyards can build ships, building a high density warship that is so complex as the CSC is beyond the capability of all three yards unless upgrades are made to the yards, and skills expanded. There simply is no shipyard in Canada that can produce a ship even with an existing design in three to four years.
 
I think PIVO brings forward some really excellent points. Waiting until the 2030's to start replacing the Halifax class ships is to long. We should be getting hulls in the water within 3-4 years max. There are way to many contractual agreements that are one sided to make this anything more then a dismal failure. Davie ship yards produced a modified Tanker ship to full fil our needs in excellent time. They could have supplied us with another shortly after. But due to politics nothing else they were stood down. Canada is lacking in the ship building combat ship design ability as they were back in the 1990s when the Halifax class was built. At the time they were looking for ways to keep that from happening again. Well here we are and we are dealing with the same issues.
We are took far along in the process to cancel the CSC in my opinion and there are no other options either domestically or foreign to get ships in three to four years. Davie converted a existing hull with a major piece of it being built foreign to be so quick, warships and an actual build a totally different animal. You are correct, we were lacking in building combat ships thus the whole idea of the NSS to develop that domestic capability and maintain it.
As for not being able to run two different ship classes I say that's just hog wash. Old school mentality of if its not my idea I don't like it. I think between the new Patrol ships, and the new frigates we could split the frigates into two groups, ASW and Surface warfare. Or a mix between the two. We could add a few hulls. That way they could cycle hulls and keep the maintenance cycle better.
Originally there was supposed to be three AAW variants of the type 26 to replace the 280's, it was decided to make all CSC equal and more importantly capable. Building a type 26 and some other class would be more expensive and that's a fact.
Staffing would not be such a issue if they actually recruited properly. You might even want to run 2 ships each coast as Reserve ships and hire more reservists to staff them. Of course someone is going to say that's impossible, they don't have the skills or the ability to do that. They do and they can if they are giving the tasking to do it.
Agree recruitment should improve, what is your solution because the RCN would love to here from you. Your right I will say that that making a few ships to be crewed by reservists is impossible as the reserves had to stop crewing the Kingston Class because of numbers and their skill set and mandate will not allow manning large warships period.
One can hide behind security requirements all they want. But Davie ship yards does/did maintenance on the CPFs they also built one or two of them if memory is correct, they also built the Tribal class along with doing the modernization of those ships. They have a history of building Navy ships as much as Irving does, their hardships are partly to blame on the government because of the lack of overall program structuring of maintaining a modern fleet and being forward thinkers.
Nobody is hiding behind anything, its simply the way it is. Yes Davie is doing CPF maintenance on ships that have been stripped of pretty much everything that's confidential. The crew members that now have to travel back and forth Halifax and Quebec exposing themselves to Covid say hello. All this history that you mention and Davie loves to brag about is not relevant as those workers and that company is long retired and gone. Irving on the other hand did do the midlife extension of the Halifax Class.
But the liberal government is experts at making deal that is so costly that it can not go through with out a lot of rework. To only pay more in cancelation costs then the actual project would have been.

We have the means and the ability's to get hulls into the water in the next 3-4 years maybe sooner if we worked on it bit more effectively. All the smes on here can chime in and say you don't know what your talking about. Probably the same ones who said griffons couldn't and would not fly or be deployed to Afghanistan.
Canadian Industry can literally move a mountain in a day if it needs to be done. They just need the requirement to do it. Heck Alberta could build a fleet of ships and a canal before this project will get off the ground,.
Again no we cannot get hulls in the water in three to four years and I would love to hear you solution on that.
 
The lead time on ordering certain bits and pieces is measured in years not months and some of those bits and pieces have to go into some of the first modules. The steel required for the hull is not your standard Stelco product but requires specific specifications and is made to order: an order that can't be filled by simply picking up the phone and then driving down to the smelter and backing up to the loading dock to pick up your order. So your start of construction from the day you sign off on the plans and place the order is again measured in months and years. These are all items that having a programme like the NSS allow you to have on continuous order for delivery according to a specific timetable.
 
I think if anything were to change overall, it would likely be the number of CSC that get built, rather than how soon we get them. I can see a scenario where it goes from 15 to 10-12 and then decide the KINGSTON replacement be an enhanced OPV/corvette that makes up a little ground on the missing high end units. Something like a Batch 2 River, for example, but maybe using stuff of the CPF's as they get paid off (57, SMART-S etc). But, since the CSC plan is so far along, nothing new can be started, planned and built faster than it.

My 2 cents...
 
The Batch 2 River Class OPV are nice ships, but your pushing into the territory of the AOP`s , not the CSC. The Kingston's fulfill roles that neither the AOPs or the CSC/Halifax can do properly like mine hunting. The only option would be to lease already built ships that close to the CSC/Halifax to bridge the gap (Can you say Aussie Hornets)
It's very likely now that the AOP's will take the place of the Halifax's on many duties to reduce wear and tear on them and preserve them for their primary roles. So in hindsight, yes they should have beefed up the armament/combat systems a bit more. Another way Canada can maintain combat power in the meantime is to order some P8's to supplement the Auroras and order new subs from current production lines that have some VLS capability.
 
Its funny because a company such as Irving, Davie or even Seaspan should have been keeping up on designs and such of a surface warfare ship. Especially Irving as they are the "preferred" builder/ advisor on major surface ships for the Canadian Government. Its not like bam we got this info yesterday. I think it is feasible to put a ship in the water in 3-4 years. We have to be realistic and build a ship off the self for right now, then modify as we go. Taking a ship design, then hacking it to pieces, adding here and there, then changing the overall ship hull design would be harder then just building a ship from scratch.
On the surface, I think most people would agree with you. If you take a ship that is already designed, and start building the modules tomorrow - there is no reason a ship couldn't be built in 3 or 4 years time. That timeframe allows for long lead items to be procured such as special building materials, and high end systems to be delivered.

HOWEVER... as others point out, it currently just isn't feasible with any of the yards - for a variety of the reasons stated above.


One thing we need to remember, which someone else pointed out also - is that we are only 3 or 4 years into a 30yr plan. The NSS isn't just about replacing the federal government's ships, it's about rebuilding an industry & in theory, maintaining that industry into the future. (Which should have been the case since the beginning, but I digress...)

Something else we need to remember is that we don't know what the political / military landscape will look like when the CSC project is rolling along halfway or near the end of the build cycle. What does the situation with China look like? What current conflicts are happening? Is our economy doing okay, or do we continue to squander every opportunity & therefore don't have much money due to us rejecting job-creating projects?




It is waaayyyyyyy too early to say whether ship numbers will be cut or not. Let's not panic. Let's keep plugging away on the Coast Guard ships, the AOPS, and by the time it is time to build the CSC, the design changes will be complete, and it'll plug along too.
 
One last thing: there is no reason why when work starts on ship number 10 for instance that the order is changed at that time to 12 hulls so that number 13 is the start of the replacement. The beauty of having one yard doing the work is there should be flexibility in the final product as long as one ship is completed every 12 months or so. No penalties because there is no cessation of work. Ordering 4 at a time would permit planning to start work on Type 26 mark 2 as ship 13.
 
When Seaspan had an accident with the OFSV's that damaged the rudder, they grabbed the rudder from hull #2 and replaced it, this kept sea trial delays to a minimum and likley they were able to build another rudder for hull #2 with little or no delay to the modules. Hopefully they build and store (properly) a couple of extra rudders, shafts and props for the CSC's.
 
The Batch 2 River Class OPV are nice ships, but your pushing into the territory of the AOP`s , not the CSC. The Kingston's fulfill roles that neither the AOPs or the CSC/Halifax can do properly like mine hunting. The only option would be to lease already built ships that close to the CSC/Halifax to bridge the gap (Can you say Aussie Hornets)
It's very likely now that the AOP's will take the place of the Halifax's on many duties to reduce wear and tear on them and preserve them for their primary roles. So in hindsight, yes they should have beefed up the armament/combat systems a bit more. Another way Canada can maintain combat power in the meantime is to order some P8's to supplement the Auroras and order new subs from current production lines that have some VLS capability.
I agree, but now that mine hunting is being done by unmanned systems, it could be incorporated onto any given platform you choose.

The issue with using the AOPS in the way that you mentioned, I believe, is with the number of ships that will comprise the class. With only 6 hulls, doing OPV stuff, OP CARIBBE, Africa missions and arctic patrols, they are likely to be very busy already. Start throwing in frigate style duties, they're gonna be getting close to rode hard and put away wet themselves. But, if the inclination was there, when the time came to replace the MCDV, the Navy could go looking for a class in between the AOPS and the frigate. Better armed than the former, but less expensive to operate given less displacement, hull form etc . Also cheaper to operate than a frigate, but more effective in a conflict than the AOPS.

I suggested the RIVER, but it doesn't have to be that exactly. Something that could make 22kts or so, has a helo pad and comes in around 2000 tonnes would be what I had in mind. Maybe a BECKETT??
 
Agree recruitment should improve, what is your solution because the RCN would love to here from you. Your right I will say that that making a few ships to be crewed by reservists is impossible as the reserves had to stop crewing the Kingston Class because of numbers and their skill set and mandate will not allow manning large warships period.
And yet we continue to use the same reserve system that has failed us for over half a century.

With 5,000 naval reservists authorized -- assuming a rate of 50% trained to at least DP1 standards -- we ought to be able to crew 10 CSCs or 50 MCDVs with reservists in an emergency. But of course we can't.

They say that "insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result." When will we learn to restructure the system from the ground up and create a viable force that will properly leverage the reserve force to crew selected ships maintained in reserve status for use in an emergency. I'm not saying that we build extra ships for a reserve force, just that we designate a portion of the fleet for reserve status thus reducing wear and tear on individual ships and reducing the anticipated life cycle costs (much of which is made up of personnel costs).

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Two in eight Canadians are French-Canadian. One in eight Regular Force sea trades (those managed by the RCN) are French-Canadian.

Enlarge the fleet school establishment in Quebec City to provide more pers support, and move VDQ and MON, and Monton and Shawinigan to be home ported in Quebec City (although most support such as FMF and ammo would remain n Nova Scotia). Suddenly, French-Canadian sailors and their families can live in their mother tongue.

There. Just found about a 12% increase to the RCN Reg F hard sea trades (over the next 10 years or so). Next problem?
 
And yet we continue to use the same reserve system that has failed us for over half a century.

With 5,000 naval reservists authorized -- assuming a rate of 50% trained to at least DP1 standards -- we ought to be able to crew 10 CSCs or 50 MCDVs with reservists in an emergency. But of course we can't.

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Unfortunately, FJAG, navies are not armies: It is not a pyramid of personnel with a large number of basic trained personnel at the bottom led by a few highly trained senior personnel. DP1 trained personnel makes less than 10% of ship's crew, while technicians that require lot of training compose the core of the crew. It takes seven to ten years to train a maritime engineer to act as the EOOW (Engineering officer of the watch - basically the person in charge of a steaming watch - who oversees engineers with a specific function who required 3 to 5 years to get there themselves) And that's in the Reg force. Part time, how much time do you think it takes to qualify a reservist?

That's just engineers, but it's the same for most trades, save perhaps (only perhaps) the boatswains. If I have the naval reserve officers available for four good three and a half month summers in a row, they can probably manage, just, to qualify as bridge watch keepers on the frigates, but I would have to have them available for the same amount of time to qualify them for a D level position after that, and even more for the next step (divisional officer position and then coursing leading to a LCDR position other than XO). Basically, it would take a reservist three times the number of years of a regular force officer to qualify for any similar position, and that is if and only if they are available three to four months a year for military training.

Two in eight Canadians are French-Canadian. One in eight Regular Force sea trades (those managed by the RCN) are French-Canadian.

Enlarge the fleet school establishment in Quebec City to provide more pers support, and move VDQ and MON, and Monton and Shawinigan to be home ported in Quebec City (although most support such as FMF and ammo would remain n Nova Scotia). Suddenly, French-Canadian sailors and their families can live in their mother tongue.

There. Just found about a 12% increase to the RCN Reg F hard sea trades (over the next 10 years or so). Next problem?

Absolutely agree Dapaterson. Not only that, I personally believe that only when a small group of ships, designated franco units are posted in Quebec will they actually truly be able to operate as franco units. I have been onboard the designated "franco" navy ship and they are simply units of mostly francophones members talking in french amongst themselves but operating by speaking english words to one another, as they do not know proper French naval vocabulary - they never heard it or had it used around them.

Besides, Quebec city already has a perfect place to put such facility: Davie's yard is only using a third, at most, of it's berthing facilities and yard buildings. It's a deal just waiting to be made.
 
Unfortunately, FJAG, navies are not armies: It is not a pyramid of personnel with a large number of basic trained personnel at the bottom led by a few highly trained senior personnel. DP1 trained personnel makes less than 10% of ship's crew, while technicians that require lot of training compose the core of the crew. It takes seven to ten years to train a maritime engineer to act as the EOOW (Engineering officer of the watch - basically the person in charge of a steaming watch - who oversees engineers with a specific function who required 3 to 5 years to get there themselves) And that's in the Reg force. Part time, how much time do you think it takes to qualify a reservist?

That's just engineers, but it's the same for most trades, save perhaps (only perhaps) the boatswains. If I have the naval reserve officers available for four good three and a half month summers in a row, they can probably manage, just, to qualify as bridge watch keepers on the frigates, but I would have to have them available for the same amount of time to qualify them for a D level position after that, and even more for the next step (divisional officer position and then coursing leading to a LCDR position other than XO). Basically, it would take a reservist three times the number of years of a regular force officer to qualify for any similar position, and that is if and only if they are available three to four months a year for military training.
Fully understood which is why I said at least 50% at DP1. It's different but not much so in the Army. A little under one half of an artillery regiment of 552 is Cpl/Pte positions and well over half of those would be DP2 so maybe around 20% or less would be just DP 1 qualified. A frigate has an establishment of 216 of which 72 are classed as Cpl/Pte although I have no idea what the breakdown between Cpl and Pte is in that category. (Both, incidentally have an additional 60 and 72 straight Cpl positions respectively)

I do not doubt that there are many technical positions in the Navy but don't undervalue the complexity of the skills needed in the Army either. Running a LAV or tank turret or a counter mortar radar or the electronic systems on an M777 or its fire direction systems or an Air Support Coordination Cell takes a bit of talent as well. The Army tends to do a fairly decent job of reducing such tasks to drills which once practiced sufficiently become second nature - but not all. And let's not forget that it takes some real skills to lead men into hostile fire - and a battalion needs a lot of those guys. Sailors tend to go where the ship goes.

I expect that a reservist winning a slot as a commander of a vessel is probably beyond most of them (although I did know a one with ticket for an MCDV and he was a busy lawyer in civvy life). It's the same for a full-sized, fully equipped artillery regiment (while there are a lot of COs and bty/Coy/Sqn commanders of reserve battalions and regiments, I would think that the vast majority of those would not cut it in the transformed Army that I see either)

I wouldn't expect a full reserve crew for a ship anymore than I see a full reserve infantry battalion or artillery or armoured regiment either. I'm more of a 10/90 guy for the Army or maybe 20/80 guy for a ship.

I know that this is a hobby horse of mine, but I just can't see Canada's military ever being effective until we start cutting full-time manpower so that the very heavy annual personnel costs can be converted to capital procurement and O&M funds. To me there is very little difference in manning ships full-time with reservists the way that the Navy tried to do 15-20 years ago with MCDVs. The cost difference as between a full-time reservist and a full-time regular force member is negligible and just a phony baloney way of circumventing PY limitations. True recurring savings are achieved if both some ships and fully trained reservists are left "in reserve" for major emergencies such as war and only as many ships and crews as needed are staffed full-time for such missions need to be undertaken on a full-time basis. Rotating ships through full use and reserve/maintenance cycles would also save on wear and tear on the hulls and systems not to mention operating costs.

If Naval reservists could be concentrated where the ships can be tied up: the two coasts, Quebec and maybe some form of craft (maybe MCDVs or even one frigate on the Great Lakes) routine weekend and summer training/maintenance could be undertaken on those "reserve" ships rather than in stone frigates. I know that the US Navy does not do this (although both the US Army has roughly one half of its people and equipment [including aviation) in the ARNG and USAR and the USAF has a substantial amount its people and equipment in USAF reserve and Air NG units)

The problem that our Navy (and Air Force and Army) is going to have to come to grips with sooner than later is that the exorbitant costs of full-time personnel (especially all those in Ottawa) will so undermine the capital acquisition and O&M costs that the capability gap will continue to drop to the point where the whole force becomes incapable of anything but the mildest of conflicts. That's good being wasted.

I truly like what I see in the CSC as a system (the MCDV on the other hand I see as the equivalent of the C3 howitzer - a nice training aid but not a combat vessel. I personally think we need some light combat vessels or at least weaponize the MCDV) What scares me is that when the public (i.e. politicians) looks at the CSC life cycle costs of $219 billion, folks are going to choke. (are already choking). Personally I see the 15 ships as a bare minimum that the country would need for a war. I wonder what the lif-cycle costs would be if seven of those ships were designated for the reserves to be manned at 1/6th the personnel costs over a period of 30 years (together with reduced maintenance costs due to lower sea time per hull. It might be a significantly lower and more palatable number for everyone and still ensure Irving et al keep getting all the requisite Fed funds to build hulls with a purpose.

Honestly OGBD, I think you can do a lot with reservists if one designs the terms of service and training system properly and use them as "break-the glass reserves" and not as people you can yank around whenever the mood strikes the headquarters or when they show up for training whenever they feel like it. With today's system there's no way in hell one can do this.

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The MCDV is the vessel that ensures your CSC can leave and enter the harbour safely. Not a sexy role but important. A country could mine our harbours by proxy and it would bring marine trade to a screeching halt till each harbour is deemed cleared.

I was speaking to the HMCS Discovery recruiting officer recently, interest is definitely increasing due to the economic situation. that being said, prior to Covid, every commercial marine company was screaming for ticketed personal as was the Coast Guard and Transport Canada.

Looking at HMCS Discovery, situated in one of the most important harbours in Canada, which has no real armed response vessel. I can't think of a port this size anywhere else in the world that has no ability to respond with a military unit. Give them the mission and a fast armed harbour patrol vessel and you see interest climb.
 
The MCDV is the vessel that ensures your CSC can leave and enter the harbour safely. Not a sexy role but important. A country could mine our harbours by proxy and it would bring marine trade to a screeching halt till each harbour is deemed cleared.

I was speaking to the HMCS Discovery recruiting officer recently, interest is definitely increasing due to the economic situation. that being said, prior to Covid, every commercial marine company was screaming for ticketed personal as was the Coast Guard and Transport Canada.

Looking at HMCS Discovery, situated in one of the most important harbours in Canada, which has no real armed response vessel. I can't think of a port this size anywhere else in the world that has no ability to respond with a military unit. Give them the mission and a fast armed harbour patrol vessel and you see interest climb.
True to the first. Although if Wikipedia is to be believed we only have a total of two deep mechanical mine sweeping system and one remote mine hunting and disposal system amongst the fleet. Hopefully that's incorrect. On top of that the 40 mm Bofors they came with have been removed. That somewhat limits their utility. (Not to mention they're a tad slow)

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While mine clearance is certainly not a bad tool for a navy to have, for the personnel and funding challenges the RCN is facing in the 2020s it's really an superfluous capability for us IMO.

The likelihood of an adversary attempting to mine Halifax or Esquimalt harbours during a modern conflict is incredibly remote. The closest thing you could possibly see would be the approaches to the Strait of Juan de Fuca to interfere with USN submarine operations. This would inconvenience the RCN, but even that is a super distant possibility. The distances involved, the better employment of adversarial submarines with mine-laying capability, and the strengths of modern ASW are all major strikes against this possibility.

The size, endurance and self-defence limitations of the MCDVs more or less preclude them from expeditionary mine clearance ops during wartime, which is where you are most likely to find a requirement for mine clearance in North America.

I don't have any great heartache with the existence of the MCDVs, they serve their purpose as a low-cost way to achieve RCN/GoC domestic and international objectives (e.g. fish pats, Op Caribbe, Tradewinds, etc.), and the capability probably made sense at the time the contract was signed. Short of some revolutionary new direction in warfare that completely changes the maritime battlespace (mass networked transoceanic mine-laying AUVs or something), I cannot see a world where the MCDVs are eventually replaced with another equivalent vessel with mine clearance as its primary design purpose.
 
You could have a cargo ship lay mines in the harbour that are activation delayed for months and likley will not be noticed in time. You don't need subs.
 
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